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Art. I. *Holy Scripture Verified; or the Divine Authority of the Bible Confirmed by an Appeal to Facts of Science, History, and Human Consciousness.* By GEORGE REDFORD, D.D. LL.D. 8vo. London: Jackson & Walford. 1837.

IF the Bible be of divine authority, it must be true. The premises preclude the supposition alike of fraud and of mistake. But the question of the truth of the Bible is very different from that of its inspiration. A book may be true, without having been inspired. And when we take up the question relating to the truth of the Bible, not as established by its inspiration, but as apart from this argument, it puts the point of inspiration for the time into abeyance. We assert, for the moment, nothing about it. We maintain only, that, whether inspired or not, the Bible is true; and for proof of this assertion, we make our appeal to all matters in relation to which its truth can be tested.

There is much use in taking occasionally this ground. If it can be maintained, it affords an argument for the entire truth of the sacred volume. If it is true in all points in which it can be brought to the test, it may fairly be inferred to be altogether so. And it is placing the Bible on no mean altitude, to determine it to be a book of truth. The matters it treats of are not only so numerous and so various, but so important and so peculiar, that the volume is invaluable if it be *only* true, without having been inspired. It is in this case unspeakably the most precious book in the world. It thus also stands vindicated from one of the principal charges brought against it by unbelievers, namely, that it is a book of fables and of fallacies. We have a degree of pleasure in seeing the vaunting infidel constrained at

last to put the Bible on the same shelf with Herodotus, Hesiod, and Plato, as a book of true history and philosophy.

But the matter does not end here. If the Bible be true, it must have had a divine origin. It is true in such singular and peculiar respects, and in relation to such extraordinary statements and transactions, that its production cannot be referred to uninspired penmen. When it is observed what facts it communicates, what events it foretels, what discoveries it anticipates, what problems it solves, to believe that men without inspiration wrote it, is far more difficult than to believe that 'holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.'

It is to this highly important use of the verification of Holy Scripture, that the author of the able and interesting volume now before us devotes himself. He is not the first who has treated it, nor does he pretend to be so. He makes, on the contrary, a very respectful mention of his precursors in the same line. But there is a freshness about his argument, having almost a resemblance to novelty, arising, in part, no doubt, from the circumstance he notices, that his subject has rarely been taken up in the single and prominent light in which he has set it; but in part, also, from the habit which unblushing infidels have had of reiterating that the Bible is *not* true. In this respect it almost seems as if the holy oracles had been put on their defence, that defence itself being difficult, if not impracticable. It is cheering to hear in this direction the sound of aggressive war, and to find the advocate of revelation appealing, not only to history and human consciousness, but to science itself,—the long vaunted instrument for showing the Bible to be false,—for unequivocal testimonies of its truth.

The argument is an appeal to facts; and, of course, to facts of every *date*, as well as of every class, by which the Holy Scriptures can be verified. It evidently includes, therefore, the entire argument from prophecy; or the proof of the inspiration of the Bible from the fulfilment of its predictions. So our author treats it, and devotes several lectures to topics of this class—the Perpetuity of the Church, the State of the Jews, the Kingdom of Messiah. We are not going to find fault with this, which was fairly at his option. We cannot help calling to mind, however, that miracles and prophecy are the two great sources from which the external evidence of the inspiration of the Scriptures has at all times been drawn; that both have been very frequently and copiously treated, and the latter especially, with great power and beauty, very recently by Dr. Keith. The argument from prophecy, moreover, is so large and so prominent, that it both requires and deserves a distinct position and a separate treatment; and appears with scarcely sufficient dignity as an item of Scriptural verification. We think, therefore, that Dr. Redford would

have done wisely, if he had resolutely avoided the tempting department of prophecy, to which, as a whole, he must have been quite aware he could do no justice, and expatiated only on the other topics which his line of argument presented to him. His whole ground would then have been comparatively fresh and untrodden ; and it would have been quite large enough, even if his choosing it had taken some pages from the bulk of the volume. We shall, in this respect, take the liberty of doing what the author has not done. Certifying our readers of the ability with which the prophetical topics are treated, in common with all the rest, we shall take no further notice of them ; but shall direct our attention to what we deem the more interesting portion of the work before us.

The first two lectures are devoted to the Mosaic Statement of Physical Facts, relating to the Creation and the Human Race. The author soon comes in contact, of course, with the geological theorists, whom he handles on the whole with great power and skill. We should with pleasure follow him, and gratify our readers with some valuable quotations, but that we shall have an early occasion of presenting the subject to them more fully in a notice of some recent and important geological works.

He next notices the origin of the human race, according to Moses, in a single pair ; on which subject we extract the following interesting and judicious remarks, which may be taken as a fair sample of his treatment of the various topics which rise in his way.

' This fact, however, as stated by the Bible, has been much disputed and denied. Extensive and minute researches have been made, with the view of proving that there are facts in the natural history, or anatomy, or mental endowments of some tribes, irreconcilable with the Mosaic theory. The recent tendency of research, however, upon this subject, conducted upon scientific principles, has clearly been towards the simplicity of the Scriptural statement. The philosophers have gradually *narrowed* and not *widened* their views of original diversities. Some naturalists have divided the human race into seven or eight, others into four or five distinct species. These they describe under the following terms : 1. the Caucasian ; 2. the Negro ; 3. the Tartar ; 4. the American ; and perhaps, as a fifth, the Malay ; but even these have been of late further reduced to three. Each of these includes many minor varieties of colour and form, which the naturalists are constrained to admit, from well ascertained facts, may alter the work of time and physical causes. But this very admission seems fatal to the theory of any original diversity. For if time and physical circumstances may have produced such differences, they will find it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to prove, that causes ' somewhat more painful, and acting for a longer time,' as Sir James Mackintosh observes, ' may not at length have produced the wider differences.'

' In fact, it appears more in analogy with what is well known of the varieties which occur among the animal races, to trace all those found among men to the causes alleged for some of them, than to suppose four or five different originations of mankind ; especially when, after all, the human race are found to include fewer and less important diversities than the animal tribes. A natural and highly probable origin of these diversities can be traced in the very constitution of mankind. The human being possesses, physically, a far greater capacity and facility of adaptation to the varying circumstances of his condition, than any other animal. There are no laws of his nature that impose upon him what the naturalists denominate a special *habitat* ; but he appears to have been designed to live on every part of the earth's surface, and upon a far greater variety of sustenance than any other creature.

' The varieties among the human tribes are stated, by the most eminent naturalists, to be much less considerable than are found among the animal races. Between the man of the American forests in the north, or the Patagonians of the south of the same continent, and the native of Southern Africa, or of New Holland, or the European, the physical differences are far less than between brute animals of the same species from the same places. ' Nature,' says the Count de Buffon, ' seems to have adopted a smaller scale in the formation of *animals* for the new world, and to have formed *man* alone in the same mould as elsewhere.' Sir Charles Bell says, ' Man is superior in organization to the brutes, superior in strength, in *that constitutional property which enables him to fulfil his destinies, by extending his race in every climate, and living on every variety of nutriment*. Gather together the most powerful brutes from the arctic circle, or torrid zone, to some central point, and they will die ; diseases will be generated, and will destroy them.'

' Indeed the opinions and theories of naturalists have for many years been gradually undergoing a process of simplification ; and since the appearance of the elaborate work of Dr. Pritchard upon this subject, which seems to take it up in all its possible aspects and bearings, we should fully expect, that the notion of an original diversity of races can find no subterfuge in analogical reasoning, and as little in historical facts.'—pp. 46—49.

Our author next touches on Man's Dominion over the Mundane Creation, the Social Propensity of Mankind, the Sentence denounced on the Man and Woman respectively after the Fall, the traces of a Universal Deluge, and the Covenant with Noah ; all which we pass over, to notice a little more fully his admirable remarks on the Confusion of Tongues.

' The existing diversity of languages (says Dr. Redford) is, by believers in revelation, attributed to this origin. Here is presumed to be their source ; and, if this narrative is true, then we conceive there may be found satisfactory proof, that nothing short of the agency here exhibited could have originated that diversity which we now find

existing, no doubt greatly increased from the first confusion, among the languages of mankind.

There are two branches into which this question divides itself. The *first* is, whether human language appears to have been originally one, or bears traces of several independent originations ; the *second* is, whether, supposing its primitive individuality, the cause assigned by Moses for the existing diversities is the true one, or whether they might all have grown, by time and the changes of human affairs, out of the single original language.

The first is a question which has been long and laboriously treated, and, until late years, with an aspect far from favourable towards the Mosaic record. The course of inquiry seemed to prove, that the immense differences existing among the languages of the world could never have arisen out of a common or parent stock ; but, as these inquiries have advanced, and become matured, unsuspected affinities have been discovered, and fragments of some original tongue have appeared every where traceable, as supplying common elements to them all. Moreover, it has been determined by these researches, that, as each class of languages is marked by affinities with other classes, and these affinities bear no trace of being descended lineally from each other, but to be independent branches of a common root, or stock ; the conclusion is naturally and necessarily drawn, that, at one period, there existed only that one form of language, which has communicated these common elements to all, and which so identify and concentrate them, as to make it next to impossible that they should have had independent and original formations of their own. The differences are not great enough to necessitate independent originations, and the resemblances are too striking to comport with any theory but that of a common source. So that the strictly philological controversy may now be said to have deprived the unbeliever of all right to question this one part of the Mosaic statement.

Moses attributes this first diversity which arose in human language to a miracle. We apprehend it will be found, upon examination, that no other adequate cause can be assigned for it ; for though, at first sight of this question, it would naturally be suggested, that many diversities of language, and even entirely new ones, have arisen in a manner perfectly natural and explicable, yet none of these cases can be applied to the solution of the difficulty before us.

It is perfectly intelligible how two languages, commixed by colonists from different places, or by the invasion of the one upon the other, should produce a third language ; but the admission of this throws no light upon the case of a solitary language in the world, spoken by all the human beings then in it, becoming two or more. For, admit that mankind once consisted of a few families, all speaking the same language, and suppose them to multiply ever so fast, yet it is obvious that the parent's language will still descend from father to son, just as readily and as necessarily as his nature. There being supposed no new language to arise from any foreign quarter to invade the old one, from

whence is any sudden infraction or alteration to originate? It would appear that the child *must* learn the language of the parent; he *can* learn no other: and so on, through the entire succession of human generations. He can be under no inducement, he can be influenced by no imaginable cause, to leave it off, and invent another for himself. He cannot, even if he would, abandon his mother tongue. His very ideas are all bound up in it. He must, in like manner, transmit his native language to his children; and thus no new language could possibly arise out of a single one, but by a process in the first instance inconceivably slower than that which we witness in the present day, when changes are flowing in from various causes, which could not then have supplied them, because they did not exist.'—pp. 156, 165.

After adverting to the origin of nations, the tripartite division of mankind, and the prophecy of Noah respecting the national character and condition of the races derived from his three sons, our author enters on the second principal division of his subject—the mental and moral condition of mankind. He has here to do with the doctrine of a Moral Apostacy, as declared in holy writ, and the multiplied evidences and traces of such an apostacy found in human nature. He touches with great justice on mental and bodily suffering—traces of social and individual degradation, combined with vestiges of primitive excellence—man's practical aversion from moral goodness, yet sentimental approbation of it—contrarieties and contradictions in human nature—the passion for immortality—the loss of the knowledge of the true God, and thereby of the Supreme Good, and concludes with a general review of man's condition, from which we give the following extract.

'What, then, upon the whole, is the moral condition of human nature? Those who are most extensively and minutely versed in its history know, that it is, in the main, a register of crimes and vices, varied occasionally by follies and sufferings. Every thing seems out of course, in this strange mixture of wickedness and ferocity. Here reason and folly alternately rule. Grandeur and meanness, suffering and enjoyment, every where combine in the human character. All sorts of atrocities mingle with all sorts of levities; every degree of wretchedness with every degree of gratification; conscious guilt with daring presumption. Men are, by turns, fools and sages, vassals and tyrants, criminals and self tormentors; at one time sober, at another frantic, now ready to destroy themselves through remorse, anon transported with ecstasies of joy, by the very sins that had awakened their remorse. Extremes of all kinds, extravagances in all things, contradictions unceasing, meet in our disordered nature. Men have all along, from the first, been tormenting, corrupting, and sacrificing each other, under the malignant anticipation of extracting their own felicity from each other's suffering, their own good from others' ill. What a chimera, then, is man! What a surprising novelty! What a confused chaos! What a subject of contradictions! What a

professed judge of all things, and yet a feeble worm of the earth ; the great depository and guardian of the truth, and yet a huddle of uncertainty ; **THE GLORY AND THE SCANDAL OF THE UNIVERSE !\***—pp. 240, 241.

The fourth lecture is devoted to the coincidences between the doctrines of revelation and the general principles of the divine moral government, as deducible from the facts which appear in the constitution and history of human nature, the author following in the track of Dr. Butler. The facts of which he takes advantage here, are, that the being and perfections of a supreme Governor are universally recognized—that vice is distinguished from virtue, and attended with suffering, and that virtue has a tendency to well-being. He treats also of the doctrine of providence, the power and universality of conscience, the instinctive propensity to prayer, and the indelible sense of future accountableness. ‘Our business,’ he here justly says,

‘ Is to take up the undeniable facts discoverable in our common nature, and having learned what we can from them, and the most cautious exercise of our reason, to judge whether they tally with the sacred word ; and then, if in this endeavour we should obtain satisfaction, we may safely proceed to infer, that the primary Author of that word, and of our nature, are the same.’—p. 251.

The ninth and concluding lecture (which our view of the unity of the subject induces us to notice here) is allotted to the doctrine of a divine and spiritual influence, as revealed in the Scriptures, and as realized in the history of Christianity and the experience of Christians. The effectual influence of the Holy Spirit on the heart is not merely a doctrine, but *a fact* ; and when the doctrine is revealed, the facts go fully to its truth. With great justice our author thus speaks of conversion.

‘ The sacred record every where ascribes this great change to a divine influence, and it is manifest in fact that it is so : for we find persons constantly falling under the power of God’s word whom we never expected to be so subdued, and concerning whom we could have augured nothing so desirable and felicitous ; while others, who have ample opportunities, and the electest means, remain in a state of impiety, obstinacy, and vice ; and some, too, are seen departing out of this life, without having consciously felt what the word represents as the genuine and necessary effect of divine influence on the heart.

‘ Now, then, is it possible to doubt the reality and efficiency of this operation, when we continually witness the most decisive illustrations of all that the Bible asserts on these points ? Individuals subdued under the touch and power of conviction, they know not how, perhaps suddenly arrested by a single sentiment of scripture, or by the ministry

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\* Pascal’s Thoughts.

of the word, and thrown into a state of alarm and self-condemnation, for which they find no palliation, and which cannot be relieved by any human considerations, but which the doctrines and promises of the divine word alone seem to meet and relieve. They may, at first, try their old amusements, or their habitual sins ; but the relish is gone ; all are embittered ; or their old friends may endeavour to rally their spirits, and persuade them that they are only the dupes of their imagination, or have been imposed upon by fanaticism, or have suddenly and casually sunk into a fit of melancholy, which time and change of scene will remove ; but it all proves conspicuously in vain ; the authority of God has taken fast hold of their understanding and conscience ; their imagination is filled with no unreasonable terror ; they try to escape from their fears and griefs, but it is quite impossible. The impressions remain ; the seeds are vital. They have taken root in nature. The word of God has revealed truths of the clearest evidence and deepest interest ; hence their fears, instead of being dissipated, rise higher ; and their minds, instead of recovering their wonted indifference to divine things, become increasingly like a troubled sea. Their resistance to the force of conviction, and the stirring of the *secret* power of God, is fruitless, and at length they are constrained to yield, and submit themselves to the prescribed, though hitherto despised and hated doctrine ; and so, falling on their knees in the deepest penitence, they invoke the divine mercy. At length they perceive the authority, the beauty, the adaptation of the whole gospel scheme to their particular case and experience. They may continue for weeks and months, or sometimes for years, passing through this process, before the distress of their mind, or the violence of their convictions, yields to the consoling doctrine of forgiveness. But, at length, by continued prayer, attention to the scriptures, and belief of the gospel, they are led to such views of the Saviour as effectually remove and suppress both their fears and their sins : the promises inspire hope, and induce them to indulge a full confidence of final acceptance.

' All this is terminated by an entire change in the character and habits, approximating gradually to the standard of gospel purity. They thence begin to pursue a new course of life, conforming themselves, as by an inward constraining influence, to practices which, before, they disapproved and disliked, and most ardently cherishing views and principles which formerly were either unknown or hated, and taking a view of life, its ends and woes, altogether the reverse of that which previously engaged them.

' Now these are not rare cases, nor such as can by any possibility be attributed to delusion, to the effect of imagination, or of an unsound state of mind. They cannot be denied or explained away ; but are obviously the effect of a most powerful, wonderful, and peculiar cause ; since the instances are so numerous, and are to be met with among all classes and professions, among those most fortified by reason, philosophy, and learning, against any sudden or fanatical notions, and whose change evinces a power above nature, and which no one could either have foreseen or exerted, but a Being of infinite wisdom and power.'—  
pp. 590, 593.

We have made our extracts from this volume of considerable length, in order to let it speak for itself, and to put our readers in possession of the scope and value of the argument pursued. We estimate the volume highly. It will well repay an attentive perusal. Of course, in such a book, on such a subject, it would be easy to find matter for criticism, but we like it too well to be critical. Yet we must say a few words. The style is neither so compact, nor so perfectly finished, as it might be. Nor does the author confine himself so closely to his subject, as would have been desirable. The force of his argument is often diminished, and its very scope sometimes lost sight of, through the introduction of extraneous matter. Much of this matter is valuable; and we were especially pleased with his exhibition and refutation of the German neology, in the fifth lecture, which we would have presented to our readers, but that it is too long for our pages. But the value of the matter is no sufficient compensation for the enfeebling of the argument. Some of his statements we think questionable. We give an example.

'The scripture represents man as having, in the first apostacy, lost the divine presence and favour, become an exile and outcast from the bliss of the paradisaical state, and as deprived of that reflection of the divine intelligence upon his mind, which was the source of his wisdom, and the highest glory of his being. . . . *No visitation could be more just*, more in character, than that he should be left without that supreme and guiding light which he had abused and despised,' &c.—p. 229.

Now we do not know that the author's argument required him to meddle with *the justice* of this visitation at all, he is appealing to *facts*; but a reference to the sin of the first man in despising 'the guiding light,' is but an unsatisfactory mode of establishing the justice of its denial to all his race. *They* have not despised it. The author also falls occasionally into something like inconsistency. Thus, at p. 537, he says, of the early triumphs of Christianity,

'Why else, we might ask, was the conversion of the heathens then so easy a work, compared with what it is now, when we have every facility and advantage of learning, experience, and antiquity, all on our side? *Miracle alone can explain it.*'

We are not quite sure of this. Would not an extraordinary measure of the Holy Spirit's influence explain it as well? And is Dr. Redford prepared for the conclusion, that it is *miracles*, rather than an outpouring of the Spirit, which we want to hasten our missionary triumphs? Miracles demonstrate the truth of Christianity; but is a conviction of the truth of Christianity inseparable from conversion? Miracles abounded in the ministry of

Christ, but conversions did not. But we will adduce an authority to which we are sure Dr. Redford will defer—his own.

‘To what then, I would ask, *but the divine influence*, can we attribute the immediate dissemination of the gospel, at a crisis when, from the ignominious death of its Author, there was every rational probability of its suppression, and a dissemination to an extent which otherwise many years would not have sufficed to accomplish?’—p. 571.

This passage is quoted from the ninth lecture, in which the author treats of the doctrine of divine influence, and a large part of which he devotes, not—which was his object—to the comparison of this doctrine with facts, but—which was *not* his object—to the establishment of it by analogies. And we must be permitted to say one word on the view he puts forward. He tells us that physical effects are traceable to spiritual or immaterial causes; that mental power is the source of our own voluntary actions; and that we naturally ascribe the invisible agency operating through all material causes and effects to a divine and infinite Spirit. He goes on to assert the probability that the Divine Spirit exercises a similar influence over human minds; and draws analogies in favour of the doctrine from the influence of one human mind upon another, by the eye, by writing, and by friendship. He then gives us the sum of his observations in these remarkable words:—

‘It is in theology, as in physics; in moral, as in material causes and effects; the final one to which we are constrained to trace up **ALL** others, is spiritual and divine.’—p. 567.

We will not stop to notice the misapplication of the term ‘final cause’ in this argument, which is somewhat strange for so eminent a writer, but is doubtless an inadvertency. What has struck us, and we are sure it will strike the author himself, with surprise, is the broad assertion that **ALL** moral effects are to be traced to a divine cause. Dr. Redford never could have intended to affirm this, and to represent God as the author of sin. And yet this startling and inadmissible conclusion not unnaturally results from the mode of illustration he has adopted. The fundamental mistake lies, in comparing the *gracious* influence of the Spirit of God with that divine energy which pervades—and must pervade, because it upholds—the physical world. Doubtless there is a similar energy from God pervading the universe of rational beings, and upholding their moral powers, even when exerted in opposition to his will. But this is not the ultimate cause of moral actions. The institution of a system of moral government, implies of necessity the existence of independent springs of those moral actions which are to be regulated and recompensed. The influence of the Spirit of God which *guides*

the moral agent, is altogether different from that which *upholds* him. The latter is physical, the former is, in the *evangelical* sense, spiritual, or we should rather say, holy. And it is this local, partial, and sovereignly dispensed influence, which is the origin and support of true religion ; and not that divine energy which animates and sustains alike all departments of the universe. And what proves religion to be of God, is, not that *all* moral effects must originate with Him, for in that case there could be no scope for argument, but that there is no influence but His, in which there could have originated *such* effects as religion exhibits to the world.

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Art. II. *Œuvres de Platon : traduits par Victor Cousin.* 12 Vols.  
Paris. 1825—1837.

The study of the systems of mental philosophy which have been proposed by the sages of heathenism, unattractive as it is in many respects, derives however some interest from its bearing on certain points of what is commonly called natural religion. Enjoying the light of revelation, we are in danger of supposing that arguments drawn from reason in proof or support of some of the fundamental truths of religion have more weight than really belongs to them : we may be even prone to imagine that any revelation from heaven relating to such truths may, indeed, be an assistance to us, but is not indispensably necessary in order to their being known. For instance, the Being and Attributes of God, the immortality of the soul, and a future state of retribution, are regarded as facts, the knowledge of which the mind of man possesses, or may possess, antecedently to any revelation—nay, even as a condition necessarily presupposed in order to his receiving such a revelation at all. In forming a judgment, however, on the question, what knowledge of religious truths man is able to gain by the unassisted exercise of his intellect, we should do well to mistrust the impression which we receive of the strength of reasonings pursued by men, with whom the propositions to be proved were already familiar and certain, and to turn rather to the consideration of those processes of inquiry which have been adopted by men under different circumstances—men possessing every advantage which natural gifts and a well-trained intellect could bestow, but not possessing the advantage of knowing all the results aimed at before the inquiry was commenced. If in such inquiries, men like Plato are found to fail, how small is the probability that any could have succeeded ! And

the probability will appear yet further lessened, when we recollect, that it is more than possible that in their investigations such men have not been without some assistance, even from revelation. The scattered and disfigured truths which tradition preserved, may not have been overlooked by the curious inquirers of antiquity; who, as is well known, ransacked, in their seekings 'after wisdom,' every depository of learning, which seemed to promise the slightest assistance to their inquiries.

We now purpose laying before our readers an account of the views which the great master-genius of Greece has taken of the condition and prospects of the Soul, together with a sketch of the arguments which have been adduced by him in defence of those views.

We must first direct attention to a discourse in the *Phædrus*—a piece most remarkably impregnated by the graces of the Platonic style, heightened to a fervidness and intensity of coloring, which, though frequent and considerate perusal can alone fully realize, yet cannot fail to compensate the tasteful reader with feelings of no ordinary gratification. At the same time, in venturing to give a sketch of the passage, we experience a little reluctance. We are strongly reminded with *Ast*, of the comparison which *Alcibiades*\* makes of *Socrates*; whom he likens to the *Silen*-statues used by statuaries of Greece as depositaries of those choicer and more delicate *morceaux* of their art, in which they embodied their conceptions of divine beauty; and we fear that our readers will be struck by the outward unseemliness and grotesqueness of the imagery, without being put into a favourable position for distinguishing the higher meaning which *Plato* designed to convey. It is but fair to remark, that he has himself repeatedly spoken of the allegory with an air of irony and playful ridicule.† The piece we refer to is a Discourse on Love, which *Socrates* delivers to his young friend, the beautiful *Phædrus*. They are passing an hour of gaiety and juvenile exhilaration by the banks of the fable-peopled brook *Ilissus*, sheltered by the shade of the classic *Plane* tree, amidst the loud chirpings of the Grecian grasshopper; it is in fact to a sanctuary of *Pan* and the nymphs to which they have retreated. After a sportive defence of madness as the source to man of some of his best blessings, *Socrates* suddenly contracts his brow into a serious and dialectic frown, and thus delivers his reasonings to his admiring and intelligent friend. 'All soul is immortal; for that substance in nature which has the property of continual motion is immortal, whereas that which exerts its motive power upon ex-

\* *Sympos.* p. 216. D. E. (Steph.) Cf. *Platon's Leben und Schriften*, p. 100.

† *Phædr.* 257. A. 258. E. 259. A.

ternal objects only, and needs itself to be moved by something out of itself, as it is liable to a cessation of motion, is liable also to a cessation of life. That substance, then, alone, which moves itself, as never relinquishing itself, never ceases to move, but is on the contrary to all things besides which move the fountain and origination of motion. But the substance in nature which has the property of originating, must have always existed; for as every thing which comes into being must do so from an originating substance, this originating substance itself cannot come into being from any thing; for if it did, it would not be derived from originating substance, because *that* is itself—which is absurd. But since it never had a beginning of existence it must also be imperishable; for supposing the originating substance gone, there can never come into being either itself or anything else, since all things must come into being from originating substance. It appears then that the self-moving is the substance which originates motion, and this can never either cease or begin to be; otherwise all heaven and all nature must fall to ruin and come to a stand-still, and never have any possibility of being brought into motion, and being again. That which is self-moved being then proved immortal, if any one affirm that such are the nature and attributes of soul, he will have no reason to fear confutation; for every body, the cause of whose motion is from without, has no soul, but that which has its cause of motion within has soul, this being an attribute of soul. But if it is true that *that* which moves itself is no other than soul, soul (both generically and individually) must of necessity have neither beginning nor end.\* Before we proceed we would remark that this argument is propounded in perfect seriousness, and is repeated at greater length in the tenth book of the laws (p. 894); in subsequent times was frequently made use of; and is detailed or recapitulated by Cicero in no less than four of his treatises (Senectut. 21. Tusc. Disp. I. 23. Somn. Scipion. 8. and De Repub. p. 327. Ed. Turn.) Our readers will observe that it proceeds on the supposition of there being no interference of any Supreme Creative Power in the spiritual world, but that we are to reason on the natural sequence of events, the substances of nature operating according to their own uncontrolled attributes. It is a matter of no little difficulty to divest one's self of all our Christian knowledge, and to judge of such reasoning from a heathen's ground of view.

The result of Socrates' argument is, that the soul has always existed. But how did it come into its present 'oyster-like' prison, the body, without losing those glorious percep-

\* Phædr. p. 245.

tions of the Eternal and Universal, which mark its connexion with a higher state of existence? Whence those vivid intellec-tions (to use a somewhat antiquated but useful word) of Ideas, the capacity for which constitutes the great distinction of a human soul above that of mere brute?\* Plato answers that they are reminiscences of perceptions which the soul gained in a former state of existence. And here amidst all the playful imagery with which the subject is invested, the reader of Plato will not fail to recognize sentiments which have been seriously expressed by him in various other parts of his writings. Socrates proceeds in effect as follows:

What sort of thing the soul is, it would require a perfectly divine as well as a lengthened exposition to show; but we may make use of an earthly and inferior illustration to point out what it resembles. Let it resemble then a compound nature, consisting of a chariot and pair. together with their driver, all feathered. Gods have every thing, both steeds and drivers, perfect in its kind; but other souls (or Dæmons) are of a mixed character, one of the steeds being in their case of a bad temper and bad breed. [According to Ast's explanation, † the driver is  $\tauὸ\lambdaογιστικὸν$  or  $\dot{o}\nuoūς$ , corresponding to the supersensual world, or the super-celestial region; the good steed is  $\tauὸ\Thetaυμικὸν$ , corresponding to the universe—the life which properly belongs to the Dæmons, between the divine or purely spiritual, and the earthly or sensuous; the bad steed is  $\tauὸ\dot{\epsilon}\pi\vartheta\Thetaυμητικὸν$ , or the grovelling instinct, sensuous desire, corresponding to the sublunary and earthly region. It

\* The word Idea in its platonic sense requires some illustration, being altogether different from the sense which it ordinarily bears in present usage. We know not how to describe it better than in the words of Tertullian *de Anima*, cap. 18. *Vult enim Plato esse quasdam substantias invisibles, incorporales, supernundiales, divinas et aeternas, quas appellat IDEAS, id est, formas exemplares et causas naturalium istorum manifestorum et subiacentium corporalibus sensibus, et illas quidem esse veritates, hæc autem imagines rerum.* Cousin in the preface to his translation of the *Phædo*, (vol. i. 172) remarks, 'in every thing the Idea is the interior and essential element, which adding itself to matter organizes it and gives it its form. The Idea is the internal type of a thing.—The Ideas of Plato are not merely directions for thought like the categories of Aristotle and Kent. At once principles and causes, they unite in themselves the *principium essendi* and the *principium cognoscendi*, which have been so unhappily severed by the schools.—Although, by their relation to the things which they animate and form, they fall accidentally into time and space, yet they are essentially strangers to the revolutions of time and space; they are eternal and imperishable.' Mr. Coleridge, who greatly insisted on confining the word to this use, at least, as expressing a form of thought says, 'that which contemplated objectively (i. e. as existing externally to the mind) we call a Law, the same contemplated subjectively (i. e. as existing in a subject or mind) is an Idea. Hence Plato often calls Ideas Laws.'—Constitut. of Church and State. p. 5. And this he affirms was the sense in which the word was always used in English previously to the Revolution.

† *Platon's Leben und Schriften*, p. 105.

is not very easy of explanation.] The plumage is light and buoyant, and is more than any other part of the whole affair participant of the Divine. The Fair, the Wise, the Good, and every thing of that sort constitute the Divine, and by such things the plumage is nourished and grows; while by the Ugly, the Evil, and other opposites, it pines and dies away.

‘In the many and blissful progresses which Zeus, accompanied by the other Gods, makes through the universe, arranging the affairs of his empire, he precedes, and the array of Gods and Dæmons follows: whoever pleases and is able may attend; for there is no grudging or jealousy in that holy company. On certain high occasions, when they go to feast themselves with celestial banqueting, they have to mount the high vault of Heaven—a steep and toilsome ascent. The Gods indeed move with their usual undisturbed ease; but a Dæmon finds it difficult and troublesome, being kept down by the grovelling temper of the baser steed unless it has been well kept and managed. The prize aimed at is the contemplation of the super-celestial region—which no bard has ever described suitably to its excellency nor ever can—the Colourless, the Shapeless, the Intangible, which Reason, the master of the car, can alone contemplate, and in the contemplation of which Reason finds its supreme fruition and satisfying food. Here it gazes on very Truth, very Righteousness, very Knowledge—not those fleeting objects which we call by those names, but as they are in their real and eternal nature. Some souls following in the divine train reach to a steady view of the blissful sight, sorely harassed however all the while by the unruliness of their cattle; others are only able to catch a glimpse now and then; but others again fail altogether in spite of their most strenuous efforts, running foul of, and trampling down, each other, and getting into almost inextricable confusion, some breaking their plumage, others their limbs. Nor is their loss trifling if they fail frequently in this enterprize. The feathers unnourished by that supercelestial food, pine and moult away; and the soul thus losing its buoyancy, sinks to the earth and enters a human shape, being found in a station more or less elevated according to the degree in which it has in its previous state discerned the True. The philosopher and the lover of the fair occupy the highest place; the sophist, the demagogue, and the usurper of unconstitutional power (*τύραννος*) the lowest. They who in their several positions live righteously gain a better place; those who live wickedly, a worse: but to the same position as that which the soul of each came from, it cannot reach till after the expiration of ten thousand years, being unable to regain its plumage in a shorter space, excepting those who have lived in the undisturbed pursuit of wisdom, or have fed their plumage by the pure and philosophical contemplation of human beauty (*φιλοσοφήσαντος ἀδόλως ἢ παιδεραστήσαντος μετὰ φιλοσοφίας*). When the third millenary of years has passed, and they have thrice successively adopted such a course, these are then privileged to rise to their lost elevation. The rest, when quitting their first life on earth, undergo a solemn trial, and, according to the result of this trial, they either have to go to the prisons under the earth to endure the penalties they have merited, or else are elevated to some region of heaven in a

state of suitable reward. When the thousandth year arrives, both parties come, and in the order which lot prescribes, choose what form of earthly existence they will a second time take, whether human or bestial. A soul which once animated a brute's body may now take possession of a man's body, and vice versa—only none can become a human soul, unless it have at some time or other in its *dæmonial* life gained to a view of truth: for man must have the faculty of forming general and abstract conceptions, while these again are only reminiscences of those supercelestial realities. Hence it is that the philosopher's soul recovers its plumage so quickly; his memory is always busy with the contemplation of those objects, the contemplation of which alone makes even God's nature divine. Passing his time in these lofty recollections, and initiating his soul into these holy and perfecting *mysteries*, he keeps himself aloof from the business of the world; and is therefore condescendingly reproved and advised by his fellow-men as one beside himself; but little do they know the divine inspiration under which he lives.

‘ Every soul, now in a human form, as has been remarked, must at some time have beheld those glorious objects above; but the recollection of them is not alike easy to all. Those find it difficult which then contemplated it but slightly—those, too, who in their nether state have been so unhappy as to be led by evil associates into unrighteous courses and have thus forgotten the sacred realities which they then beheld. Neither again are all Ideas alike easily recalled. Faint is the light which beams forth from all earthly exhibitions of Justice, Healthful-Mindedness (*σωφροσύνη*) and what else is most loved and valued by the soul; and the organs of perception which we possess are too dim to allow men (and those but few) anything more than an indistinct perception of the qualities so obscurely adumbrated. The Idea of Beauty alone presents itself clearly and distinctly, both because it was the most brilliant object which we then contemplated, and because it is apprehended by the acutest of our bodily faculties now. If the same faculty of sight would contemplate Wisdom or any of the other Ideas which the soul holds so dear, wondrously vigorous would be the emotions of love and admiration which it would enkindle; but as it is, this privilege is allotted to beauty alone. He indeed, whose perceptions of the Real took place at a great distance of time, or who has impaired the recollection of it by the indulgence of vice, is slow to apprehend the Idea when thus shadowed forth; and instead therefore of reverencing with meek and awe-stricken worship that in which so glorious a form is enshrined, he brutishly seeks in it nothing more than an occasion for indulging the basest appetites of his nature. The wise man on the contrary finds it a vehicle by which his spirit may rise to the perception of that after which it most passionately yearns.’\*

We cannot prosecute the passage any further, as it would lead us astray from our present purpose. Suffice it to say that it un-

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\* Phœdr. pp. 245—251.

folds at length, and in a strain of the most elegant writing (would that we could adequately represent it !) the benefit which the philosopher is to derive from the society of his youthful friend ( $\piαιδικά$ ). We are bound, however, in justice to truth, to say, that when a certain, then too common, but now, blessed be God ! unspeakable abuse of the relation contemplated is referred to, instead of denouncing it with those lightning words, which none could hurl with greater ease or greater effect, the speaker is content with faintly condemning it as a peccadillo, arising from the uncontrolled spirit of the baser 'steed,' which may indeed for a time, delay the 'fledgling' of the parties concerned, but would not necessarily have the effect of leading them out of that 'heavenward journey' on which they have unitedly entered.\*

Our readers may perhaps suppose, that in making 'the tender passion' (for it was in fact that which in an Athenian most nearly corresponded to the tender passion among ourselves, except, of course, in its moral character) a principal preparation for the future state, Socrates could only be following the jocose humour of the hour in the direction which the character of his companion would naturally give to it. We are however, disposed to think that there was a deeper and more serious meaning than this supposition would allow. There can be no doubt left by the perusal of the most solemn of Plato's writings, the *Phædo*, that what we understand by virtue, was not regarded by him as the only preparative or condition of future blessedness—at least, not of the highest blessedness. It was indeed a part, but it was not the whole, nor even perhaps the greater part, of the soul's preparation.† The practice of vice is often condemned as unnatural and odious in itself, but yet more as having the necessary effect of disabling the soul for acquiring just views of the True and the Real—the Ideal—by immersing it in thoughts and desires pertaining more or less directly to the body ; whereas, the desire and aim of the true philosopher is to separate the soul from the contagion of the body—to shut out from it the intrusions and falsehoods of bodily sensations, and to enable it 'purely and itself by itself to contemplate Truth as it exists in its own eternal nature.'‡ The great end of man is not, according to his view, to secure the approbation of a moral judge, but to gain to the knowledge of Truth, i. e. (for we must reiterate, this explanation being the very key of the Platonic philosophy), the Ideal. And we believe that Plato was perfectly serious in recommending the stu-

\* Ibid. p. 256. This matter is however referred to in a somewhat more satisfactory manner in the *Laws* (lib. i. p. 636. C.) The purity of Socrates' own character is placed beyond a doubt by *Sympos.* pp. 217—219.

† Cf. *Phædon*. p. 69. B. 82. B.

‡ Cf. *Phædon*, p. 67. A. B.

dy of beauty as the most excellent introduction into the 'heavenward journey' above described, and that too, for the reason which we have seen him give; the greater facility, to wit, of reaching the Idea here than in any other object of investigation.\* Moreover, in Plato's conception, the Fair and the Just were kindred, if not identical, terms; so that an acquaintance with the one would either involve as a previous condition, or else necessarily lead to, an acquaintance with the other. It no doubt formed another motive in his own bosom, that discourses of this character would be more likely than any other to arrest and fascinate the beauty-loving (*φιλόκαλον*) mind of a young Athenian. We dread to add, but we fear we must, that another darker feature in the Athenian character might have been considered by the philosopher as available to the same end; and that where he ought to have assumed the stern tone of the monitor of conscience, he preferred the more *prudent* course of playing with allusions to a popular crime in order to cheat men into the pursuit of wisdom. When however we assert that the approbation of a moral judge was not that which Plato propounded as the great object of man's desires, we would carefully warn our readers against inferring that he deemed there would be no judgment passed upon the soul on its quitting the body. Men *were* to be deterred from vice by the fear of future punishment; but the object of a wise man was to reach *beyond* that—beyond even the favourable sentence of the judge. These were merely auxiliary supports to the system, not its limits, as they are in the Christian religion.

The Gorgias is written with the general view of bringing into contempt that science of artificial rhetoric which was professed by the Sophists, and eagerly cultivated by the young men of Athens, as the great instrument of ambition; an accomplishment necessary, as was alleged by its advocates, for the purpose of defence, in a state in which, no doubt, eloquence was power. The Platonic Socrates contrasts with the demagogue orator, the student of wisdom; one who lives the life of a recluse, ignorant of all but the highest and truest knowledge, and liable, as the ambitious and unprincipled Callicles tells him and he allows, to be haled into court by any villain, who may covet what he possesses, or even aim at his life; 'there,' he admits, 'he may be incapable of making the least defence that would avail for his deliverance, and would stand gaping with astonishment and dizzy with confusion, the butt of his malignant adversary.' We cannot stop to detail the

\* We have felt greatly tempted to quote a passage in the Symposium, where the process is traced by which the mind is to rise *διὰ τὸ δρόῳ παιδεμοστίν* step by step, to the conception of the absolute Fair, unmixed, untarnished and unvarying. But we can only give our readers the reference: *Sympos.* pp. 210, 211.

argument in which Socrates maintains and proves the magnanimous principles, that iniquity is and must be misery—that prosperous iniquity is of all calamities the most disastrous—that next to not sinning at all, the happiest event that can befall a man is to be purified from his sins by chastisement and suffering. The wisest course, he asserts, if not for this state of being, yet certainly for the future, is to be, as he himself is, the virtuous and contemplative philosopher. To meet the argument of expediency, which must indeed have been strong under such circumstances as then existed, Socrates seeks to outweigh the worldly advantages attending an opposite course, by the future miseries which it will entail. For the gratification of our readers, we quote from this concluding part of the argument a passage, which will serve to illustrate Plato's notions concerning the punishments of the future life.

‘Hear now, as they say, a very pretty story, which you, I dare say, will think a fable; but I think it most sound truth, and as such I tell it you. As Homer tells us, Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto, on receiving from their father the empire which he left them, divided it. In the time of Cronus, as indeed it always was as well as is now, the law of proceeding respecting men was, that he who had passed his life justly and holily, should, after death, go away to the Islands of the Blessed, where he abode in all happiness beyond the reach of evil; whilst he who had lived unjustly and irreligiously, was to go to the prison of vengeance and justice, which they call Tartarus. In the time of Cronus, and even recently since Zeus has had the empire, men were judged in this life by living men, who passed sentence on them the very day on which they were about to die. In consequence the trial was not conducted fairly. So Pluto, and the stewards of the Islands of the Blessed came together to Zeus, and said that it was a common thing for men to come to each region who had no business there; upon which Zeus said, ‘I will put a stop to this: at present the trials are conducted badly, through the tried party being alive, and thus having a dress on; many with bad souls are dressed up with handsome bodies and various advantages of birth and wealth, and on the trial are attended by crowds of people vouching for the righteousness of their lives. By all these circumstances the judges are put out, having besides the disadvantage of being themselves dressed, having eyes and ears and their bodies generally operating as a veil between their souls and the objects which they are to consider.’

Zeus then tells them the new arrangement which he has made, which will appear presently. Then Socrates continues:

‘This, Callicles, is what I have heard, and I believe it to be true; and accordingly I reckon that the result is about as follows. Death, as it seems to me, is no other than the separation of two things, soul and body. On being separated, each has nearly the same qualities

that it had when the man was alive. The body still continues to exhibit its general characteristics as received from nature, as well as all those which arise whether from the personal habits of the individual or from impressions from without: if the body was large by natural conformation, or by the individual's manner of living, the corpse is also large; if fat, fat; and so on: if the man wore long hair, the corpse has long hair: if, again, he was one whose back was familiar with the whip, and he had dishonourable scars, whether of flogging or of other wounds, the corpse exhibits the same marks; and if his limbs had been broken or twisted awry when alive, they are so still, now that he is dead. In one word, just as he had got to be in person when living, so is he also either wholly or for the most part after death, at least for some space. Now just the same, Callicles, seems to me to be the case with the soul. When stripped of the body, everything in the soul comes to view, both in its natural circumstances and in those adventitious ones brought on by men's several habits when living. When, therefore, after death souls come before their judge, Rhadamanthus (or *Æacus*, whichever it may happen to be,) makes each one stand up before him, and he takes his view of it without knowing whose it is. Oftentimes, when he gets hold of the soul of the great king [of Persia], or some other king or prince, he sees nothing sound in it, but finds it covered all over with stripes and full of scars, impressed upon it by acts of perjury and wrong; everything awry through falsehood and vain pretension (*αλαζονία, humbug*)—nothing straight as it should be, because of its having received no nutriment of truth. Through power and luxuriousness, profligacy and want of self-control, it exhibits nothing but disproportion and ugliness. On inspecting it, the judge sends it away with ignominy to the prison-house, where it is to pass through the sufferings due to it for its crimes.

'Now every one who is suffering punishment, rightly inflicted, must either get corrected by the process, and so be benefited himself, or else be made thereby an example to others, that they seeing his sufferings, may take the alarm, and amend their courses. Those who are punished, with a view at the same time to their correction, whether by gods or by men, are those who have committed curable sins; the correction, however, can only take place by a process of pain and torments, whether here or hereafter; for there is no other way of becoming emancipated from sin. But as to those who have been guilty of extreme offences, and so have become incurable, out of these are made the examples that I spoke of. They, themselves, being incurable, no longer receive any improvement; but others do, seeing them on account of their sins undergoing the greatest and most painful and appalling sufferings for evermore, hung up as mere examples there, in *Hades*, in the prison-house, spectacles and warnings to all the wicked that come thither.'

After remarking that it is from among the high and ambitious ones of the earth that these examples are principally taken, he adds:

‘ At times, however, when the judge beholds a soul which has lived holily and in the society of Truth, whether in private life or otherwise, especially, according to *my* view, Callicles, the soul of a philosopher who has minded his own affairs, and has not busied himself with matters that do not pertain to him, [i. e. the objects of worldly ambition, wealth, power, pleasure, &c.,] of such a soul he expresses his admiration, and dismisses it for the Islands of the Blessed. Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and aim at exhibiting my soul to my judge in as sound and healthy a condition as I can. Bidding adieu, therefore, to the honours which the many seek or bestow, and devoting my soul to the contemplation of truth, I will strive as excellently as I can to live while I live, and die when I die. And I exhort all other men as much as I am able, and, in return to your advice to me, I now exhort *you*, to adopt *this* course of life, and enter upon *this* conflict—of greater moment, to my eyes, than all besides—and I charge it upon you, that you will not be able to help yourself when you come to that trial and judgment which I have now been speaking of; but that, when you appear before your judge, the son of Egina, and he takes hold of you to inspect your condition, *you* will gape and be dizzy quite as much *there* as you say I should in a court of justice *here*, and, it may be, some one may be then found who will smite *you* with those painful and ignominious blows you spoke of, and heap every expression of contumely and scorn upon *you*.’\*

There is no mention here of the millennial cycles, nor of the re-embodiment of the soul after it has once quitted the present life; and it might occur to some, that what had been said in the Phædrus on these points was not meant in earnest. The fact is, that it would have been quite out of place in the discourse with Callicles to have adverted to these doctrines; but that they entered into the serious convictions of Plato, appears from the Republic (Lib. x. p. 618,) and the Phædo (p. 107. E.) He had in all likelihood learnt them in the school of Pythagoras, and perhaps had been led to regard them as traditions derived from supernatural teaching. (Cf. Phædo, 70 C.) In reading such passages as we have above cited, we must always receive them in the spirit in which they were intended, as figurative or representative illustrations merely, of certain general truths, and not as historical or prophetic descriptions of particular facts. We may take the warning given to us in the Phædo, after that noble imagining of the future state with which the last dialogue of Socrates concludes.

‘ Resolutely to affirm that these things are as I have here particularized them, would not be consistent in a man of understanding; but that the facts pertaining to our souls and their abodes in the future

\* Gorgias fin.

state, are either these or somewhat similar, it being manifest that the soul is immortal,—this it does seem consistent to believe, and also to put every thing to risk upon the persuasion ; for glorious is the risk, and proper is it for a man to recite such imaginings to himself as an incantation ['to lull,' as he says elsewhere,\* 'the child within us which is frightened at the bug-bear of utter annihilation'] ; and it is with this view that I have now lengthened out the tale so much as I have done. However, considering these things, he should be of good cheer concerning his soul, who, whilst he has lived has renounced all other delights—those I mean which respect the body and its adornments—under the conviction of their being foreign to his real nature, and of their tending to evil rather than to good ; and has been zealous only for those pleasures which attend the culture of his soul ; and who, having decorated his soul, not with foreign ornaments, but with those proper to its being,—healthful-mindedness, justice, manliness, independence, and truth—is waiting for his removal to Hades, ready to go whenever fate shall call.<sup>†</sup>

We must now go on to consider the arguments upon which Plato chose to rest the proof of the soul's immortality. They are formally and dogmatically produced in the Phaedo. We shall recapitulate them in the order in which they stand, giving of course no more than the outline.

1. The ancient doctrine that the souls of the dead return to this earth, pre-supposes the existence of the soul after death.  
p. 70. C. D.

2. Universally, we find that opposites are generated from opposites—the great from the little, the strong from the weak, and vice versa. All 'becoming' ( $\gamma\iota\gamma\nu\epsilon\sigma\zeta\alpha\iota$ ,  $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\sigma\iota\zeta$ ) supposes the previous negation of the quality which a thing becomes. Between the opposites there is a two-fold sort of 'becoming,' a passing from the first to the second, and a returning from the second to the first : the great becomes little, and this is called decrease ; and the little becomes great, and this is called increase. So of the processes of mingling and separating, cooling and getting hot, &c. Now, as the *state* of sleep is opposed to the *state* of being awake, so is that of death to that of life. And these states pre-suppose a process through which it is arrived at those states : a person asleep has passed through a process of falling asleep, a person awake through a process of awakening. In like manner, then, a person alive has passed through a process of becoming alive, which pre-supposes a previous state of death ; and when we see a living man passing through the process of dying into the state of death, are we not to suppose a corresponding opposite 'becoming,' in which they who are in a state of death come to life again ? Must nature here be lame and imperfect in her

\* P. 77. E.

† P. 114.

operations? Why, if there were no such revolving vicissitude and interchange, but all things went only from life to death without returning, every thing at last would come to the same state, and there would cease to be any life at all—all would be death. The soul, therefore, does not by death cease to exist.—70 D. 72 E.

3. The intellection of Ideas by the soul, which Ideas, however, the soul cannot see in its present state—for the knowledge of them is not originated, but only suggested, by the adumbrations of them which sensible objects exhibit—proves a previous existence of the soul, in which it contemplated them immediately. For example, equal things suggest to the mind the Idea of equality (*αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον*) : we do not *see* the Idea; it is only recalled to our minds by association; just as a lover seeing the lyre or dress belonging to the beloved object is reminded of that object. The soul must then have existed before it came into the body, and possessed the knowledge of Ideas, or wisdom (*φρόνησις*, cf. p. 79. D.) It forgot it when it was born into this world, but is reminded of it by the forms of sense in which it is shadowed forth. The pre-existence of the soul rests upon the same ground of certainty as the existence of Ideas, i. e. of real Essence (*οὐσία*) : ‘and to my mind there is nothing so transparently certain as ‘this, that surely those things, which we talk of, the Fair, the ‘Good, and the like, are most real subsistencies.’ pp. 72—77.

4. All the objects with which our bodily senses are conversant are changing and composite in their character, whilst the objects of intellectual perception are incomposite and eternally the same. The body is connected with the former, the soul with the latter. Can we suppose it possible, that, while the body, connected as it thus is in its nature and perceptions with the mutable and visible world, continues after the stroke of death for some time at least—under certain circumstances, as when embalmed, for a very long time—the soul, connected in its perceptions and sympathies with the eternal intelligible world, should yet cease to exist? that the ruling part of our being, that which most approximates to the divine, should be thus short-lived, while the servile part yet continues to exist? Are we not compelled to suppose that the soul, if it have, during life, associated itself, by habitual contemplation, with the divine and immutable, without trammelling and ‘nailing’ itself down to the body by sensual or worldly habits, will after death forthwith go to that which is so kindred to itself? but that if it have attached itself to its bodily appetites, even though in a course of conduct which is deemed by the vulgar just and healthy-minded, it will yet continue to hover about that visible scene to which it is in its affections thus glued? pp. 78—84.

To the objection that the soul is a result of organization, like the harmony resulting from the proper disposition of the chords

of a harp, and will therefore cease to be when the organization is broken up, it is replied, (1) that it has been proved before by the recollection of ideas, that the soul existed before the body, and therefore cannot be a result of the body's organization; (2) that if soul was a harmony, there would be no distinction among souls of good or bad; all souls would be alike harmonious so far as they are souls at all; (3) that it is inconceivable that the result of an organization should control the organization itself, so far as even to oppose it in some of its most vehement appetites; the objection is therefore untenable. pp. 91—95.

5. Some may say, that its previous existence being admitted, and also the certainty of its existence being much more extended than that of the body, yet it would not follow that it will exist for ever. To obviate this, it is attempted to prove the essential deathlessness of the soul as follows: The cause of a man being great or little is only to be found, (so far as the speaker has been able to learn after an attentive study of the reigning systems of philosophy,) in the fact that the Ideas or Forms of Greatness and Littleness have attached to the man in question. Objects again become *two* or *three*, odd or even, through the impregnation of the Ideas of *Twoness* and *Threeness*, *Oddness* or *Evenness*. A man (A) may be great compared with a man (B), but little compared with another man (C). Now in such a case we are not to suppose that the Idea of Greatness in A can ever itself become the Idea of Littleness, for that is impossible; but the Idea of Greatness which attaches to A compared with B, comes when A is compared with C in contact with the Idea of Littleness, and either retires or perishes, leaving the Idea of Littleness in its place. Thus we arrive at *one* fundamental principle, viz. that no object can contain coexistently Ideas which are opposite to one another; the one or the other must either retire or perish. Again, Hotness\* and Coldness are different from fire and snow; Hotness is not the opposite to snow, nor Coldness to fire: it is Hotness and Coldness that are the opposite; yet we see, that if Hotness attached to snow, snow would retire or perish; hot snow is an absurdity. So of fire and Coldness. In like manner, *three* can never be even, nor *two* odd, *three* having the Idea of Oddness essentially connected with it, and *two* the Idea of Evenness. Hence we arrive at a *second* fundamental principle; that not only do not opposite Ideas admit of co-existence in the same subject at the same time, but subjects will not even admit Ideas, the opposites to which they contain in themselves essentially; if such Ideas are introduced, the subjects will either retire or perish. To apply this to

\* We must apologize for using such barbarously sounding words; but to give the force of the argument we do not see how we can help ourselves. *Heat* would convey a wrong sense here.

the present question : if asked why a man is ill, we may say, not merely that he has Illness, but that he has a fever ; or how a number may be made odd, we may say, by making it, for example, *three*. In like manner we may say that it is a soul which makes a man living or brings him life : the opposite of life is death ; therefore, by the second principle, the soul containing in it necessarily the Idea of Life can never admit the Idea of Death. If this Idea comes to it, it must either perish or retire. It would be as easy to conceive of a cold fire or of hot snow, as of a dead soul. But just as that which does not admit the Idea of Evenness is uneven, so also we call that which does not admit the Idea of Death, undying or deathless. But surely if any thing is imperishable that which is deathless must be so ; the soul therefore never perishes. When death comes, it fastens on the mortal or bodily part of us, while the soul escapes and is found elsewhere. pp. 100—106.

Such are the arguments (and we believe that we have presented all) by which a mighty spirit struggled to overcome the barriers of heathenism and natural religion. We *now* see that these efforts were in vain. Should *we* have been more successful under similar advantages ? If appeal be made to the incomposite, and therefore indiscerptible nature of the soul, we may quash the appeal by reference to the incontrovertible truth that *no created being can know itself*, and that therefore consciousness cannot tell us whether we, i. e. our own souls, be incomposite or not. If it be further alleged that the justice of the moral government of God requires an after life, we reply that no Christian will affirm that any man deserves future *happiness* ; the only question is, whether it is inconceivable that the wicked shall not hereafter be punished. But how can we tell, *a priori*, whether God is bound, or may see fit, *never* to relax *anything* of the punishment which a creature has incurred ? How the question may be answered with our *present* knowledge of God's character and government, appears to us doubtful. So far as we know, this argument, drawn from the moral government of God, never occurred to a heathen, obvious as we may think it ; and we are sure that some of their noblest philosophers would have put it aside by simply saying, that *sin is its own punishment, and virtue its own reward*.

On the whole, we are disposed to believe that the only certainty of a future state is derived from faith in the word of God. While others vaunt themselves on the sufficiency of their natural reason, we are content to cry with thankfulness and joy, ‘Lord ! ‘to whom shall we go ? *Thou* hast the words of eternal life.’ ‘Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who, ‘according to his abundant mercy, hath begotten us again unto a ‘lively hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead.’

Art. III. *The Chinese; a General Description of the Empire of China and its Inhabitants.* By JOHN FRANCIS DAVIS, Esq., F.R.S., &c., late His Majesty's Chief Superintendent in China. 2 vols. Illustrated with Wood-cuts. London: Charles Knight and Co.

FEW authors appear before the public with so good a title to the confidence of his readers as Mr. Davis. A residence of twenty years in the 'celestial empire,' added to a more intimate acquaintance with the language and literature of the country than falls to the lot of many Europeans, constitute no mean qualification for the task he has undertaken. His opportunities of observing the people, whose history, institutions, habits, literature, and general character he has depicted, give a weight to his testimony which is seldom due to the statements of foreigners respecting the countries they have visited. Amid the mass of ephemeral publications daily issuing from the press, it is gratifying to meet with a work stamp'd like the present, with the marks of cautious and extensive observation, and which lays before us the results of a more protracted and diversified intercourse with this singular and unknown people, than any other modern European has enjoyed. Several works are already before the British people illustrative of the condition and polity of China, but the opportunities enjoyed by their authors of observing the people described, were for the most part few and contracted. The embassy of Lord Macartney, in 1792, gave rise to the publication of Sir George L. Staunton, and subsequently to that of Mr. Barrow, while the equally fruitless mission of Lord Amhurst, in 1815, was followed by the works of Mr. Ellis, and of Dr. Abel. Still we wanted a general and systematic work on China,—such a work as long residence in the country, intimate acquaintance with its people, and an accurate perception of the bearing of European interests on its policy could alone produce. Such qualifications, though scarcely to be looked for, are happily blended in the volumes before us, with a power of writing at once appropriate and forcible.

The work is intended 'to give such an account of the manners and customs, the social, political, and religious institutions, together with the natural productions, the arts, manufactures, and commerce of China, as may be deemed interesting to the general reader;' and we shall best fulfil our duty as journalists, by supplying a somewhat extended analysis of its contents. It opens with an account of the early intercourse of Europeans with China, in which ample justice is done to the integrity of Marco Polo, whose account of the Chinese empire it was formerly the fashion to decry. Mr. Marsden's translation, in 1818, of the

'Travels' of the celebrated Venetian, had fully established the veracity of his narrative: and the justice which our fathers refused is at length consequently done to his merits. Some of our readers will be surprised to find that an empire, which is now so jealously guarded against the entrance of Europeans, was formerly open to their intercourse, and that several of its ports bore witness to the extent and value of the commerce they carried on. The present system has a Tartar origin, and was doubtlessly designed to protect the empire from those encroachments, which the 'barbarians,' as all Europeans are deemed, were known to have made in other quarters.

'Abundant evidence,' Mr. Davis remarks, 'is afforded by Chinese records, that a much more liberal as well as enterprising disposition once existed, in respect to foreign intercourse, than prevails at present. It was only on the conquest of the empire by the Manchows that the European trade was limited to Canton; and the jealous and watchful Tartar dominion, established by this handful of barbarians, has unquestionably occasioned many additional obstacles to an increased commerce with the rest of the world. We have already noticed the Chinese junks, which were seen by Ibn Batuta as far west as the coast of Malabar, about the end of the thirteenth century. Even before the seventh century, it appears from native records that missions were sent from China to the surrounding nations, with a view to inviting mutual intercourse. The benefits of industry and trade have always been extolled by the people of that country; the contempt, therefore, with which the present Tartar Government affects to treat the European commerce, must be referred entirely to the fears which it entertains regarding the influence of increased knowledge on the stability of its dominion.'

'According to the Chinese books, commerce, on its first establishment at Canton, remained free from duties for many years, but its increasing importance soon led the officers of Government to convert it into a source of gain. As in Siam and Cochin-china at present, the pre-emption of all imported goods seems at one time to have been claimed; but this did not last long, and the trade, after having continued to increase at Canton, was subsequently carried to other ports of the empire. The endeavour to prevent the exportation of silver, appears to have been an error very easily established; but the regulations on this subject, as might be expected, have always been as futile as they are at the present day.'

'It was not many years after the passage of the Cape by De Gama, that the Portuguese in 1516 made their first appearance at Canton. Their early conduct was not calculated to impress the Chinese with any favourable idea of Europeans; and when, in course of time, they came to be competitors with the Dutch and the English, the contests of mercantile avarice tended to place them all in a still worse point of view. To this day the character of Europeans is represented as that of a race of men intent alone on the gains of commercial traffic, and

regardless altogether of the means of attainment. Struck by the perpetual hostilities which existed among these foreign adventurers, assimilated in other respects by a close resemblance in their costumes and manners, the Government of the country became disposed to treat them with a degree of jealousy and exclusion which it had not deemed necessary to be exercised towards the more peaceable and well-ordered Arabs, their predecessors.'—Vol. I., pp. 19—21.

Considerable expectations of the conversion of the Chinese were at one time entertained by the papal church. Large numbers of Jesuit Missionaries flocked to the empire, and some of them obtained the countenance of the reigning emperors. But the disputes which arose among them, the intrigues they practised, and the authority which they claimed for the pope, awoke the jealousy of the Government, and led to their persecution and banishment. The monuments of their temporary success, as well as the relics of earlier Christian visitors, are yet to be seen in various parts of the country. The ruins of religious edifices tell a tale of former years, to which no counterpart can be found in the moral statistics of the present day.

The second and third chapters are devoted to the history of our own intercourse with China, and will be read with interest by those who are concerned in the mercantile relations of the two countries. The petty tyranny and gross impositions practised on our merchants, render it a matter of surprise that the trade should have been continued, while the absurd assumptions of the Government contrast most ludicrously with its innate instability and weakness.

Our author then proceeds, in chapters fourth, fifth, and sixth, to the Geography, History, Government, and Legislation of the Empire, on each of which topics, curious and valuable information is supplied. The Government is strictly despotic, and the emperor unites in his own person the civil and spiritual functions. No class of religious teachers is supported by the state; the emperor himself, or his immediate representatives, acting the part of high-priest in religious festivals.

'The Emperor worships Heaven, and the people worship the Emperor. It is remarkable that with all this the Sovereign, in styling himself, used occasionally this term of affected humility, 'the imperfect man'; which presents a contrast to the inflated and self-laudatory expressions of most Oriental monarchs. Every device of state, however, is used to keep up by habit the impression of awe. No person whatever can pass before the outer gate of the palace in any vehicle or on horseback. The vacant throne, or a screen of yellow silk, are equally worshipped with his actual presence. An imperial despatch is received in the provinces with offerings of incense and prostration, looking towards Peking. There is a paved walk to the principal

audience-hall, on which none can tread but the Emperor. At the same time, as if his transcendent majesty could derive no increase from personal decorations, he is distinguished from his court, unlike most Asiatic Sovereigns, by being more plainly clad than those by whom he is surrounded. In Lord Macartney's mission, while the crowd of mandarins was covered with embroidery and splendour, the Emperor appeared in a dress of plain brown silk, and a black velvet cap with a single pearl in front. Yellow, as the imperial colour, would seem at present rather to distinguish things pertaining to his use, or connected with him in other ways, than to constitute a part of his actual garments, except perhaps on very great occasions. The Sovereign of China has the absolute disposal of the succession, and, if he pleases, can name his heir out of his own family. This has descended from time immemorial; and the ancient monarchs, Yaou and Shun, are famous examples of such a mode of selection. The imperial authority or sanction to all public acts is conveyed by the impression of a seal, some inches square, and composed of jade, a greenish white stone, called by the Chinese *Yu*. Any particular directions or remarks by the Emperor himself are added in red, commonly styled 'the vermillion pencil.' All imperial edicts of a special nature, after being addressed to the proper tribunal, or other authority, are promulgated in the Peking Gazette, which contains nothing but what relates to the supreme Government, that is, either reports to the Emperor, or mandates from him. It is death to falsify any paper therein contained: but it must be observed, that these special edicts of the Sovereign, as applicable to the exigencies of particular cases, either in aggravation or mitigation of punishment, are not allowed to be applied as precedents in penal jurisdiction.\* There is more wisdom in this rule than in that which gave to the rescripts of the Roman Emperors, in individual cases, the force of perpetual laws,—a system which has very properly been called 'arguing from particulars to generals.'

'As Pontifex Maximus, or high-priest of the empire, the 'Son of Heaven' alone, with his immediate representatives, sacrifices in the Government temples, with victims and incense. These rites, preceded as they are by fasting and purification, bear a perfect resemblance to the offerings with which we are familiar in the history of antiquity. No hierarchy is maintained at the public expense, nor any priesthood attached to the Confucian or government religion; as the Sovereign and his great officers perform that part. The two religious orders of *Fō* and *Taou*, which are only *tolerated*, and not maintained by the Government, derive support entirely from their own funds, or from voluntary private contributions. This remark must of course be confined to China; for in Mongol Tartary the Emperor finds it expedient to show more favour to the Lamas of the Buddhist hierarchy, on account of their influence over the people of those extensive regions. It is a striking circumstance that the Confucian persuasion should have

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\* Penal Code, Sect. 415.

continued supreme in China, though the conquerors of the country were not Confucians.'—ib., pp. 204—206.

The character, manners, and customs of the people, are depicted in the seventh and two following chapters, and our author's remarks are, in the main, distinguished by sound judgment and trust-worthiness. The Chinese character is commonly drawn from the population of Canton, whom Mr. Davis represents as no fair specimen of the nation. Few Europeans have had an opportunity of observing it on a more extended scale, and they have, consequently, described it as a compound of all the vices which mercantile intercourse, conducted under a despotic and short-sighted government, is adapted to generate. The result has been a partial and unfair judgment, such as we ourselves have frequently complained of in the tours of foreigners. Every Englishman is aware of the injustice which would be done to our national character, if it were sketched from the spectacles witnessed at our sea-ports. The vices of a class are in such case transferred to the community, while the redeeming qualities of the latter are kept completely out of sight.

'The Chinese,' remarks our author, 'have, upon the whole, been under-estimated, or, rather, unfairly despised on the score of their moral attributes. The reason of this has probably been, the extremely unfavourable aspect in which they have appeared to the generality of observers at Canton: just as if any one should attempt to form an estimate of *our* national character in England, from that peculiar phase under which it may present itself at some commercial sea-port!'

'It is in fact a matter of astonishment that the Chinese people at Canton should be no worse than we find them. They are well acquainted with that maxim of their Government, by which it openly professes to 'rule barbarians by misrule, like *beasts*, and not like native subjects;' and they are perpetually supplied by the local authorities with every motive to behave towards strangers as if they were really a degraded order of beings. The natural consequence is, that their conduct to Europeans is very different from their conduct among themselves. Except when under the influence of either interest or of fear, they are often haughty and insolent to strangers, as well as fraudulent; and such is the effect of opinion among them, that even in cases where interest may persuade them to servility, this will not be exhibited in the presence of a countryman. A beggar has often been seen who, though he would bend his knee very readily to European passengers when unobserved, refrained altogether from it while Chinese were passing by. It was some time before the very coolies, the lowest class of servants, would condescend to carry a lantern before a European at night; and still longer before they could be induced by any wages, to convey him in a sedan even at Macao, where it is permitted. Is it surprising, then, that they should reconcile it, without

much difficulty, to their feelings to overreach and ill use, occasionally, these creatures of an inferior rank, who, as their Government phrases it, come to benefit by 'the transforming influence of Chinese civilization'; or, rather, is it *not* very surprising that so general a course of honesty and good faith, and so many instances of kindness and generosity, even, should have been experienced in their intercourse with us? If we deny to the Chinese their fair advantages, on a view somewhat more extended than the precincts of Canton afford, and if we condemn them ignorantly, it is the precise fault which we have most to censure on their part. 'We, in fact, become as illiberal as themselves.'

—ib., pp. 237, 238.

Many of our countrymen will be surprised at the extent to which education prevails. Its quality is undoubtedly very low, but the quantity far exceeds that of any other Eastern nation. 'Among the countless millions which constitute the empire, 'almost every man can read and write sufficiently for the ordinary purposes of life, and a respectable share of these acquirements goes low down in the scale of society.' The Government exercises a despotic sway over the education of the community. It prescribes the books to be studied, the process to be followed, and the rewards and punishments to be administered. The system is part of the machinery by which the rulers of the people seek to keep the national mind in subjection. It knows nothing of the generous and benevolent aspirations of Christian philanthropists, but resorts to instruction, rather than to force, for the maintenance of its arbitrary sway.

'The object of the Government, as Dr. Morrison justly observed, in making education general, is not to extend the bounds of knowledge, but to impart the knowledge already possessed to as large a portion as possible of the rising generation, and 'to pluck out true talent' from the mass of the community for its own service. The advancement of learning, or discoveries in physical science, are not in its contemplation. It prescribes the books to be studied; a departure from which is *heterodoxy*; and discountenances all innovations that do not originate with itself. In this we may perceive one of the causes, not only of the stationary and unprogressive character of Chinese institutions, but likewise of their permanency and continuance.'

'The process of early instruction in the language is this: they first teach children a few of the principal characters (as the names of the chief objects in nature or art) exactly as we do the letters, by rude pictures, having the characters attached. Then follows the *Santse-king*, or 'trimetrical classic,' being a summary of infant erudition, conveyed in rhyming lines of three words, or feet. They soon after proceed to the 'Four books,' which contain the doctrines of Confucius, and which, with the 'Five classics' subsequently added, are in fact the Chinese scriptures. The Four books they learn by heart entirely, and the whole business of the literary class is afterwards to comment

on them, or compose essays on their texts. Writing is taught by tracing the characters, with their hair pencil, on transparent paper placed over the copy, and they commence with very large characters in the first instance. Specimens of this species of calligraphy are contained in the Royal Asiatic Transactions. In lieu of slates, they generally use boards painted white to save paper, washing out the writing when finished. Instructors are of course very plentiful, on account of the numbers who enter the learned profession, and fail in attaining the higher degrees.—ib., pp. 273, 274.

It is not to be expected that among such a people the social affections of our nature should flourish. There is no free play allowed to the kinder and more generous impulses of the human heart; and the Chinese history is consequently destitute beyond that of almost any other people, of bright and attractive specimens of public virtue. The discipline instituted forms an artificial character, the consistency of which but poorly compensates for the absence of those high and commanding qualities which even barbarians frequently exhibit. The two parties interested in a projected marriage are perfectly passive in the arrangements which precede it, and the whole economy of domestic life is characterized by a similar disregard of the unsophisticated dictates of nature. The following is our author's account of the marriage ceremony.

‘ Some time previous to the day fixed, the bridegroom is invested ceremoniously with a dress cap or bonnet, and takes an additional name. The bride, at the same time, whose hair had until this hung down in long tresses, has it turned up in the manner of married women, and fastened with bodkins. When the wedding-day arrives, the friends of the bridegroom send him presents in the morning, with their congratulations. Among the presents are live geese, which are emblematical of the concord of the married state, and some of these birds are always carried in the procession. The bride's relations likewise send her gifts, consisting chiefly of female finery; and her young sisters and friends of her own sex come and weep with her until it is time to leave the house of her parents. At length when the evening arrives,\* and the stars just begin to be visible, the bridegroom comes with an ornamented sedan, and a cavalcade of lanterns, music, &c. to fetch home his spouse. On their reaching his residence, the bride is carried into the house in the arms of the matrons who act as her friends, and lifted over a pan of charcoal at the door; the meaning of which ceremony is not clear, but which may have reference to the commencement of her household duties. She soon after issues from the bridal chamber with

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\* In accordance with an epithalamium in one of their ancient books, in which is this line, ‘The three stars shine on the gate.’

her attendants into the great hall, bearing the prepared Areca, or betel nut, and invites the guests there assembled to partake of it. Having gone through some ceremonies in company with the bridegroom, she is led back to her chamber, where she is unveiled by her future husband. A table is then spread, and the cup of alliance is drank together by the young couple. Some fortunate matron, the mother of many children, then enters and pronounces a benediction, as well as going through the form of laying the nuptial bed. Meanwhile the party of friends in the hall make merry, and when the bridegroom joins them they either ply him with wine, or not, according to the character and grade of the company. When the hour of retirement arrives, they escort him to the door of the chamber in a body, and then disperse.

‘On the following day, the new couple come forth to the great hall, where they adore the household gods, and pay their respects to their parents and nearest relations. They then return to their chamber, where they receive the visits of their young friends; and the whole of the first month is devoted in like manner to leisure and amusement. On the third day after the wedding, the bride proceeds in an ornamented sedan to visit her parents; and at length, when the month is expired, the bride’s friends send her a particular head-dress; an entertainment is partaken of by the relations of both parties, and the marriage ceremonies thereby concluded. On some occasions, the bride is espoused at the house of her own parents, with some little difference in the forms. Both these modes are detailed in the novel of the *Fortunate Union*.’

—ib., pp. 268—270.

We are induced to make the following extract, not so much for the interest of the narrative, as from the pleasing incident it relates of Dr. Morrison, whose erudition and zeal were devoted with such single-mindedness to the enlightenment of this benighted and pagan people.

‘But the case of the French ship *Navigateur*, in 1828, was still more remarkable, and may be given nearly from the relation of M. Laplace, captain of the eighteen-gun corvette *La Favorite*, whose observations on the Chinese we have had occasion to quote in another place. The *Navigateur*, a merchantman, was compelled by stress of weather to put into Touron Bay, on the coast of Cochin-China. The disabled state of the ship, the difficulty of effecting the necessary repairs, and the well-known unfriendliness of the local authorities, forced the captain and crew to the necessity of selling her to the King of Cochin-China, and embarking themselves with their most valuable effects on board a Chinese junk, which was engaged to carry them to Macao. The voyage was short, but still long enough to enable the crew of the junk to conceive and execute a dreadful conspiracy against the Frenchmen. It was in vain that one of the oldest of the Chinese endeavoured by signs to draw the attention of the French captain to the danger which threatened him; the latter had contented himself with making one or two of his sailors keep watch by day, as well as during the night; but this charge was the more negligently executed, inasmuch as most of the people, in consequence of their previous sufferings, had to contend with fever or dysentery.

‘ The junk was already within sight of the great Ladrone island, the mark by which Macao is made in the southerly monsoon, and the Chinese passengers disembarked at once into boats, with an eagerness which ought to have roused the suspicions of the Europeans, had they not been blinded by the most imprudent confidence. The night passed quietly, and the dawning light seemed to propose a happy landing to the Frenchmen ; but it was destined to witness their massacre. These unfortunate men, the greater number still asleep, were despatched with hatchets and knives by the crew of the junk ; and their captain, assailed by the assassins in the narrow cabin which he occupied with his mates, after killing several of the Chinese, fell himself the last. One seaman, however, still remained, who, armed with an iron bar, continued to make a desperate resistance, although badly wounded in the head. Having reached the deck of the vessel, almost overcome as he was in this unequal conflict, he leaped into the sea, and appeared in this manner to ensure, by his certain death, impunity to the murderers.

‘ He contrived, notwithstanding, to swim to the nearest fishing-boat, but was denied succour, with the usual selfish prudence of the Chinese ; another boat, however, afterwards received him on board, and landed him by night on the shore at Macao. Sick and wounded as he was, the poor man wandered unknown for some time about the streets, but at length discovered the abode of the French missionaries, who with their ready humanity relieved him at once from his immediate wants. In the mean while the French consul had arrived from Canton, and the affair being brought by him to the notice of the Portuguese authorities at Macao, was placed by them in the hands of the Chinese mandarins. By means of the information obtained from the French sailor, the Chinese passengers who had quitted the junk previous to the massacre, and repaired in all haste to their respective homes, were summoned to Canton. From them was obtained a full evidence as to the criminals, and their design ; and a strict embargo was at once laid on all the vessels within the ports of Canton and the neighbouring province of Fokien.

‘ The assassins being soon arrested in their junk, were put into iron cages and conveyed to Canton for trial and judgment. On their arrival there, it was ordained by the Emperor’s strict order that the trial and punishment should take place in the presence of the Europeans at that place. Among the English spectators was the interpreter of the East India Company, Dr. Morrison, the author of the Chinese dictionary, whose labours have been so useful towards illustrating the literature of the country, and who was destined on this occasion to experience a very gratifying reward for his pains in acquiring the language. His attention having been attracted by the loud complaints of an old man, who, like the others, was shut up in a cage with iron bars, and who, in protesting his innocence, called for the French sailor whose life he had contributed to save, Dr. Morrison approached the old man’s prison, heard what he had to say, and promised him his assistance with the judges. In a word, accompanied by the Frenchman, he presented himself before the mandarins, pleaded the cause of his client, and

called to their recollection that maxim of Chinese law, and of humanity in general, that 'it is better to let even the guilty escape than to punish the innocent.' He obtained the consent of the court that the sailor should be confronted with the accused ; and these, on the first sight of each other, immediately embraced and shed tears, to the great interest and sympathy of the audience. The judges themselves yielded to the general sentiment, and at once absolved the old man. Out of twenty-four prisoners, seventeen were condemned and decapitated at once, and their chief put to a lingering death in presence of the Europeans.'—ib., pp. 385—388.

We pass over the two chapters devoted to the three principal cities of the empire, as well as those relating to its religion and literature, as we expect shortly to have an opportunity of entering more fully into the latter topics. We must, however, so far encroach on our limits as to transfer to our pages a literal prose translation of some stanzas from a poem on London, written by a Chinese in 1813. It has already appeared in other publications, but few of our readers will regret its transcription.

## I.

'Afar in the ocean, towards the extremities of the north-west,  
There is a nation, or country, called England :  
The clime is frigid, and you are compelled to approach the fire ;  
The houses are so lofty that you may pluck the stars.  
The pious inhabitants respect the ceremonies of worship,  
And the virtuous among them ever read the sacred books.  
They bear a peculiar enmity towards the French nation,  
The weapons of war\* rest not for a moment (between them).

## II.

'Their fertile hills, adorned with the richest luxuriance,  
Resemble, in the outline of their summits, the arched eyebrows (of  
a fair woman) :  
The inhabitants are inspired with a respect for the female sex,  
Who in this land correspond with the perfect features of nature ;  
Their young maidens have cheeks resembling red blossoms,  
And the complexion of their beauties is like the white gem :  
Of old has connubial affection been highly esteemed among them,  
Husband and wife delighting in mutual harmony. . .

## V.

'The two banks of the river lie to the north and south ;  
Three bridges† interrupt the stream, and form a communication ;  
Vessels of every kind pass between the arches,  
While men and horses pace among the clouds (fogs?) :

\* Written in 1813.

† 'Old London, Blackfriars, and Westminster bridges were then the only three in existence.'

A thousand masses of stone rise one above the other,  
And the river flows through nine channels :  
The bridge of Loyāng, which out-tops all in our empire,  
Is in shape and size somewhat like these.—— . . .

## VII.

'The towering edifices rise story above story,  
In all the stateliness of splendid mansions :  
Railings of iron thickly stud the sides of every entrance,  
And streams from the river circulate through the walls.  
The sides of each apartment are variegated with devices ;  
Through the windows of glass appear the scarlet hangings :  
And in the street itself is presented a beautiful scene ;  
The congregated buildings have all the aspect of a picture.—— . . .

## IX.

'The spacious streets are exceedingly smooth and level,  
Each being crossed by others at intervals :  
On either side perambulate men and women,  
In the centre career along the carriages and horses :  
The mingled sound of voices is heard in the shops at evening ;  
During winter the heaped-up snows adhere to the pathway :  
Lamps are displayed at night along the street-sides,  
Whose radiance twinkles like the stars of the sky, &c.'

Vol. II., p. 198.

The following chapters, from the seventeenth to the twenty-first inclusive, are devoted to the arts and inventions, the sciences, the natural history and productions, the agriculture and statistics, and the commerce of the Empire. Our notice of their contents must be very brief. The following account of the management of their silk-worms will be read with interest.

'Mr. Barrow, who observed the management of the trees and silk-worms in Chě-keang, confirms the usual Chinese accounts, by saying that 'the houses in which the worms are reared are placed generally in the centre of each plantation, in order that they may be removed as far as possible from every kind of noise ; experience having taught them that a sudden shout, or the bark of a dog, is destructive of the young worms. A whole brood has sometimes perished by a thunder-storm.' The chambers are so contrived as to admit of the use of artificial heat when necessary. Great care is taken of the sheets of paper on which the multitudes of eggs have been laid by the silk-worm moths ; and the hatching of these eggs is either retarded or advanced, by the application of cold or heat according to circumstances, so as to time the simultaneous exit of the young worms exactly to the period when the tender spring-leaves of the mulberry are most fit for their nourishment.

They proportion the food very exactly to the young worms by weighing the leaves, which in the first instance are cut, but afterwards, as the insects become larger, are given to them whole. The greatest precau-

tions are observed in regulating the temperature of the apartments, and in keeping them clean, quiet, and free from smells. The worms are fed upon a species of small hurdles of basket-work, strewed with leaves, which are constantly shifted for the sake of cleanliness, the insects readily moving off to a fresh hurdle with new leaves, as the scent attracts them. In proportion to their growth, room is afforded to them by increasing the number of these hurdles, the worms of one being shifted to three, then to six, and so on until they reach their greatest size. The hurdles, as well as the rest of the apparatus, were sent from Canton to St. Helena for the use of the Company's establishment there. When the worms have cast their several skins, reached their greatest size, and assumed a transparent yellowish colour, they are removed into places divided into compartments, preparatory to their spinning.

'In the course of a week after the commencement of spinning, the silken cocoons are complete, and it now becomes necessary to take them in hand before the pupæ turn into *moths*, which would immediately bore their way out, and spoil the cocoons. When a certain number, therefore, have been laid aside for the sake of future eggs, the pupæ in the bulk of the cocoons are killed by being placed in jars under layers of salt and leaves, with a complete exclusion of air. They are subsequently placed in moderately warm water, which dissolves the glutinous substance that binds the silk together, and the filament is wound off upon reels. This is put up in bundles of a certain size and weight, and either becomes an article of merchandise, under the name of 'raw silk,' or is subjected to the loom, and manufactured into various stuffs, for home or for foreign consumption. Notwithstanding the apparent simplicity of their looms, they will imitate exactly the newest and most delicate patterns from England or France. The Chinese particularly excel in the production of damasks and flowered satins. Their crape has never yet been perfectly imitated; and they make a species of *washing* silk, called at Canton *ponge*, which becomes more soft as it is longer used.'—ib., pp. 242, 243.

The Chinese are well-known to be greatly addicted to the use of opium. Their knowledge of this deleterious drug is one of the evils which have resulted from their intercourse with Europeans. Its importation has of late years exceeded the value of all other English imports combined, and the mischievous consequences flowing from it have attracted the serious attention of the government. In 1821, the quantity imported was 4,628 chests, while in 1832, it had attained the enormous amount of 23,670 chests. The frightful evils which must have grown out of the consumption of such an almost incredible quantity of opium, leads us to deplore the existence of a traffic, of which it forms so prominent an article. Few of our readers probably are prepared for the statement, which is nevertheless clearly established by Mr. Davis, that the amount of opium imported by us into China in 1833, exceeded that of tea exported by 2,284,418 dollars.

We must restrict ourselves to one more extract, which we take from our author's account of the manufacture of tea, a subject in which all are interested.

'We have seen before, that the fineness and dearness of tea\* are determined by the tenderness and smallness of the leaf when picked. The various descriptions of the black diminish in quality and value as they are gathered later in the season, until they reach the lowest kind, called by us Bohea, and by the Chinese (*Ta-cha*) 'large tea,' on account of the maturity and size of the leaves. The early leaf-buds in spring, being covered with a white silky down, are gathered to make Pekoe, which is a corruption of the Canton name *Pak-ho*, 'white down.' A few days' longer growth produce what is here styled 'black-leaved pekoe.' The more fleshy and matured leaves constitute Souchong; as they grow larger and coarser they form Congou; and the last and latest picking is Bohea. The tea-farmers, who are small proprietors or cultivators, give the tea a rough preparation, and then take it to the contractors, whose business it is to adapt its farther preparation to the existing nature of the demand.

'Green teas may generally be divided into five denominations, which are—1, Twankey; 2, Hyson-skin; 3, Hyson; 4, Gunpowder; 5, Young Hyson. Twankey tea has always formed the bulk of the green teas imported into this country, being used by the retailers to mix with the finer kinds. The leaf is older, and not so much twisted or rolled as in the dearer descriptions: there is altogether less care and trouble bestowed on its preparation. It is, in fact, the *bohea* of green teas; and the quantity of it brought to England has fully equalled three-fourths of the whole importation of green. 'Hyson-skin' is so named from the original Chinese term, in which connexion the *skin* means the *refuse*, or inferior portion of anything; in allusion, perhaps, to the hide of an animal, or the rind of fruit. In preparing the fine tea called hyson, all those leaves that are of a coarser, yellower, and less twisted or rolled appearance, are set apart and sold as the refuse or 'skin-tea,' at a much inferior price. The whole quantity, therefore, depends on, and bears a proportion to, the whole quantity of hyson manufactured, but seldom exceeds two or three thousand chests in all.

'The word Hyson is corrupted from the Chinese name, which signifies 'flourishing spring,' this fine sort of tea being of course gathered in the early part of the season. Every separate leaf is twisted and rolled by hand, and it is on account of the extreme care and labour required in its preparation that the best hyson tea is so difficult to procure, and so expensive. By way of keeping up its quality, the East India Company used to give a premium for the two best lots annually presented to them for selection; and the tea-merchants were stimulated to exertion, as much by the credit of the thing, as by the actual gain in price. Gunpowder, as it is called, is nothing but a more carefully-picked hyson, consisting of the best rolled and roundest

\* Chapter xix. p. 339.

leaves, which give it that *granular* appearance whence it derives its name. For a similar reason, the Chinese call it *Choo-cha*, 'pearl-tea.' Young *Hyson*, until it was spoiled by the large demand of the Americans, was a genuine, delicate young leaf, called in the original language *Yu-tsien*, 'before the rains,' because gathered in the early spring. As it could not be fairly produced in any large quantities, the call for it on the part of the Americans was answered by cutting up and sifting *other* green tea through sieves of a certain size; and, as the Company's inspectors detected the imposture, it formed no portion of their London importations. But the abuse became still worse of late (as we shall presently see), for the coarsest *black* tea-leaves have been cut up, and then *coloured* with a preparation resembling the hue of green teas.

'Nothing could be more ill-founded than the vulgar notion, once prevalent in this country, that the colour of green tea was derived from its being dried on plates of copper. Admitting that copper were the metal on which they were placed, it does not at all follow that they should assume such an appearance from the operation; but the pans really used on these occasions are of cast iron, of the same round or spherical shape as the tatch described under the head of chemistry. Each of these pans is bricked in over a small furnace. A quantity of fresh leaves are placed in the pan, after it has been sufficiently heated and stirred rapidly round by the hand, to expose them equally to the action of the heat, and at the same time prevent their burning. After being a little curled by this drying operation, they are taken out and twisted or rolled by hand to assist the natural tendency; and the process of curling is continued for a longer or a shorter time, according to the nature and quality of the tea. The hand seems to have most to do in the case of green teas, and the fire in that of the black. In the preparation of the finer teas, much care and attention is bestowed on the selection of the *best leaves* subsequent to drying, as in the separation of the *hyson* from its *skin*, or refuse—a business which falls to the lot of women and children. The tea, when prepared, is first of all put up in baskets, and subsequently packed by the contractors in chests and canisters. The black teas are trodden down with the feet, to make them pack closer: but the green-tea leaves would be crushed and broken by so rude a process; they are accordingly only shaken into the chests.'—ib., pp. 441—443.

The moral condition and destiny of such a people as the Chinese, constituting so large a proportion of the human race, and presenting so many features of varied and complex character, is a subject which demands the deepest consideration of every Christian mind. Is the dense population of this empire to continue shut out from other members of the human family, by the artificial restraints of a timid and semi-barbarous policy? Is the order of nature to be checked—the progress of intellect to be for ever stunted, by the policy of its rulers? Is it to exhibit a spectacle, sickening yet instructive—of intellect alive, but inactive,—of powers just awakened into being to be moulded by the

caprice of tyranny, or the iron-hand of custom. These are questions to which we hope speedily to recur; when the moral phenomenon of the case are fully before us. We rejoice to find that a Christian missionary of sober judgment, and of undoubted information is about to furnish us with his testimony. We wait for the appearance of his volume, and in the meanwhile render our thanks to Mr. Davis for his laboured and valuable work. The Society for the diffusion of Useful Knowledge, cannot better fulfil its vocation than by the re-publication of such volumes.

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Art. IV. *The Philosophy of Morals.* By ALEXANDER SMITH,  
M.A. 2 vols. 8vo. London: Smith & Elder.

FEW subjects of human inquiry have given rise to more various theories than the philosophy of human duty. Even in the most civilized,—nay, in Christian countries, where there is so general a practical agreement as to the actions we should do and those we should avoid, a diversity of statement and of sentiment, as to fundamental principles, has prevailed, often exceedingly perplexing to the honest inquirer after truth. Amidst a profusion of lights thrust upon his path, he has been rather confused and bewildered than broadly illuminated; and may have been sometimes almost tempted to imagine that the whole field of ethical investigation which lies beyond the acknowledged rules of conduct, is enveloped in a hopeless obscurity. This consequence has arisen in a great measure from the following distinctions not having always been kept clearly in view: *Why* is an action to be pronounced right or wrong? and *How* do we ascertain the presence of those conditions which mark its moral character? These two essential questions may be said to involve every subordinate inquiry; and much of the obscurity and inconsistency which are to be met with in writers on this subject, may be traced to their indistinct or partial discussion of these two leading points.

Nothing within the compass of ancient learning, is half so interesting as the attempts of some of the master-spirits of Greece to grope their way through the darkness of pagan superstition which surrounded them, to the temple of truth. Partially conscious of the disadvantages of their situation, and sometimes even admitting it in terms, we see them exhibiting that capacity for the perception of moral beauty, which has not been wholly effaced from the human soul, amidst all the marks of ruin which it bears. If these extraordinary men were content to omit some of the moral questions which it would seem natural for them to have discussed; or if they inconsistently or but incidentally

treated of those which they did bring forward,—this arose partly from their always pressing on to some immediate practical result. Among us the ordinary rules of virtue are established by effective sanctions, our controversies relate chiefly to principles. *They* had to sustain the double character of moral law-givers and philosophers; and it is no wonder that, in their circumstances, they rested in that degree of theory which seemed to them to answer the end of pointing out a reason for the rules of life. Socrates was a practical moral teacher. Nor was his great disciple Plato less so. Though an air of mystic sublimity always characterizes him, it is easy to discern in his disquisitions the perpetual aim at practical instruction. His theory of morals, if he had any that was definite, is not very prominent. His appeals are chiefly addressed to the *love of the beautiful*. To him virtue was the harmony of all the moral principles of the soul; it consisted in what is becoming; in the knowledge of the first good and the first fair. His acute and less mystical pupil, Aristotle, placed it in a medium between extremes, one of which is vicious through excess, the other through defect. Cicero, in his *Academical Questions*,\* observes, that the moral views of the Academics and the Peripatetics, differed more in words than in things; and his remark is applicable to the great founders of these two schools. Both arrived at nearly the same end by different roads, which were respectively suited to the sublime and esoteric genius of the one, and the acute and comprehensive mind of the other. The Platonic harmony of life, according to the balance of the fundamental types of the soul, or inborn ideas, may readily have been expressed by the colder and more logical genius of Aristotle as living by the golden mean, or maintaining a mediocrity of the affections under the government of reason. Virtue and happiness were to both the supreme good of man; though it was of Plato's nature to indulge more in contemplating virtue as *in itself* good and fair; while Aristotle was more in the habit of regarding the practice of it as excellent, peculiarly on account of its producing happiness. Both united their talents in stemming the torrent of vice and error with which the Sophists threatened to inundate the whole regions of learning, by their atheism, their cupidity, their quackery, and their destitution of all practical moral principle.

The contest which subsequently commenced between the schools of Zeno and Epicurus, was a match of more worthy combatants on both sides. The Stoics originated from the Cynics; so called, as Aristotle says, on account of their rude (doggish) way of rebuking: indeed, they affected to carry their contempt of external things to an extreme which often degenerated into the

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\* *Quest. J. 4.*

greatest coarseness and indecency. From what can be collected of the opinions of the more honourable and celebrated sect of the Stoics, it appears that those of them who most closely followed their master Zeno, held that virtue consists in living according to nature; and that every man has a capacity of discerning and of following nature's law. Virtue is explained to be the true harmony of man within himself, independently of all reward or punishment. It raises him to an apathy towards the pleasures and pains of sense, and gives him such a dominion over the body, as permits even suicide; which was exemplified in the case of Zeno himself, and of his disciple and successor Cleanthes, who both at an advanced age put themselves to death. Apart from this strange and awful perversion of that self-denial which was the practical element of the Stoical morality, this system must be allowed to possess no small moral elevation. In some respects the Stoical doctrine symbolizes with Christianity, especially as we find it in the writings of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, who lived after the commencement of the Christian era; but the self-denial of Stoicism would, if carried out, wither up all the most cherished affections of man; and the piety it enjoins is scarcely more than a tame submission to an iron necessity. The founder of the Porch would seem to have placed the fundamental principle of ethics in the moral sentiments.

Epicurus, on the contrary, based his system on the tendency of actions to promote happiness. *Prudence* is his master virtue, from which all others flow, and by this, he maintained, we are taught that to live pleasurable and to live virtuously, are the same thing.\* By pleasure, he meant the greatest possible amount of enjoyment in the present life; and, according to the Epicurean doctrine, every virtuous action must have its motive in the design to benefit the agent. It must be conceded to Epicurus that his system lays a much greater claim to clearness and simplicity than that either of Plato, Aristotle, or Zeno. In short, it is much more of a system. It has the merit, too, of placing in a strong light the momentous truth, that virtue is an inseparable ingredient in happiness. Hence this philosopher was evidently more or less a favourite with many of those superior minds who, in modern times, have promoted the restoration of philosophy to the province of reason, as Bacon, Gassendi, Hobbes, Newton, Locke, and others. But it is easy to perceive how readily the ethical system of Epicurus might degenerate into a plea for the most sordid self-interest, and the abandonment of all law but inclination. There was justice in Cicero's remark, *nil generosum, nil magnificum sapit*; and its true tendency

\* Diog. Laert. lib. x.

was fully manifested when in the hands of men less intellectual and well-inclined than its author, it gave consolidation to all that was base in human conduct, and furnished the libertine with the garb and the language of the philosopher. Hence, in the worst period of Roman morals, Epicureanism became another name for that abandoned licentiousness which marked the waning power of the masters of the world.

From the time when the Athenian schools were closed by Justinian, to the rise of modern science, a whole millennium elapsed. These dark ages still require to have more of the light of research thrown back upon them, in order to enable us fully to appreciate the mode in which the human mind has found its way, at every step, from the speculations of antiquity to its present opinions respecting all the grand topics involved in the civilization and the knowledge of the western world. Aquinas was the great moralist of the schools; and reigned for three centuries as a kind of minor Aristotle; the ethical part of his *Summa Theologiae* being the text-book of most of the writers on morals of those times. Neither Aquinas, however, nor any of his followers appear to have made a point of distinguishing the main principles of moral science; those, namely, which relate to the nature of virtue, or the criterion of right and wrong; and to the mode in which this distinction is apprehended by us.

Grotius, may, in some respects, be regarded as the father of modern ethics; his celebrated work, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, printed in 1635, having eminently served to give a new direction to the studies of the learned, and to encourage a more independent tone of thinking on philosophical subjects, than had prevailed previously to the seventeenth century. But, though Grotius and Puffendorf gave a powerful impulse to inquiry, they have not maintained their reputation with the increasing demand of students in the moral sciences for clearness and logical accuracy; and the vague and indeterminate character of their researches, the chaotic aspect of their discussions, and the want of self-consistency in their views, have brought them justly under the animadversion of Stewart, Bentham, and other critics.

The germs of most of the subsequent systems may be found in the ancient schools. All these theories may in some way be brought under the following statement: that virtue is founded in *prudence* or *propriety*, or *benevolence*; and that it approves itself to us by *self-love*, or *reason*, or a *moral sense*. We shall now, briefly, further illustrate some of these views.

The ethical system of Hobbes, and of that satirist of human nature, Mandeville, is the most complete enthronement of selfishness which it is possible to conceive. Hobbes not only represents self as the ultimate object of every moral action; he reduces even the instinctive love of parents to their children to the mere *pride*

of power ; saying that this natural affection ‘consists in a man’s conception that he is able not only to accomplish his own desires, but to assist others in theirs.’ As to pity, he defines it ‘the imagination of future calamity to ourselves, proceeding from the sense of another man’s calamity.’\* On his system, love to our fellow-creatures is impossible ; and there is no conceivable motive for human conduct but self-love. In short, Hobbism is the most gross and selfish form of Epicureanism. It is no wonder that a system embracing such elements should, when it was first propounded to the world, have called forth the most strenuous opposition from the press. Warburton says, that, ‘against the author of it, the whole church militant took up arms.’ It had been well if the church had always been militant on as good grounds, and with equally legitimate weapons.

Among the most distinguished philosophical opponents of Hobbes, were Cudworth and Clarke ; with whom Price and Wollaston substantially agree. According to these writers, virtue consists in a sort of *propriety* ; that is, in acting agreeably to the eternal fitnesses of things,—a mode of expression which may be so interpreted as to coalesce with every theory of virtue which recognizes the immutability of moral distinctions. According to Clarke and his school, we feel ourselves irresistibly determined to approve some actions and to disapprove of others. Reason perceives right and wrong by intuition ; and hence the obligation to act accordingly, apart from the will of God ; which always chooses in harmony with these fitnesses. But this system does not clearly point out in what these fitnesses consist, and it makes no adequate provision even for the limitation of the faculties of moral agents, not to say for the error and vitiation which may attach to their moral perceptions. What finite nature can grasp the boundless range of the eternal and universal abstract relations of things !

Cudworth and Clarke sought for the source of our moral sentiments in reason alone : in Lord Shaftesbury’s *Inquiry Concerning Virtue*, we discern the element of the theory of a *moral sense* ; unless Dr. Henry More meant the same thing by what he somewhat oddly calls, in his *Enchiridion*, the ‘boniform faculty.’ Butler and Hutcheson, who pursued Shaftesbury’s idea, agree in maintaining that there is a distinct moral faculty in human nature ; but both are obscure in consequence of their describing the moral sense, and virtuous actions, reciprocally by each other. Virtuous actions are said to be those which are approved by the moral sense, and the moral sense is that faculty which approves virtuous actions. Thus the nature of good, and the perception

\* *Treatise on Human Nature* ; chap. ix.

of good are confused. Butler's theory does not clearly reply to the question, What is it that constitutes an action right? He says, indeed, agreeably to the doctrine of the Stoics, that virtue consists in 'following nature,' or that complex constitution of man of which conscience is the regulating power. To live according to nature, therefore, is to live according to *conscience*. But on this principle exclusively, conscience ought to be a constant and not a variable impulse; whereas, the history of the world proves that conscience may, by its darkness and perversion, lead a mother to sacrifice her babe to the Ganges,—an act surely the most opposed to 'nature' and to all rational moral practice. Butler does not distinctly point out in what conscience consists. When the perceptions of a moral agent, with regard to duty, become by any means erroneous or obscure, the decisions of the moral faculty require to be rectified, if it be admitted that a permanent relation subsists between the nature of virtue and moral agency. Notwithstanding the superior merits of Butler's system to many others, we cannot bring ourselves to think that he has satisfactorily cleared up the question relating to the criterion of moral actions.

Hutcheson was the first of the Scottish metaphysicians since the Restoration; and to his school, with more or less of modification, belong Hume, Adam Smith, and Brown. These, if we may be pardoned for using a sort of German compound, may be called nature-moral-sentiment philosophers. Hutcheson calls conscience the *moral sense*; having for its object a general benevolence so disinterested, as to exclude personal prudence from the sphere of moral approbation; a view of virtue which, as Sir James Mackintosh observes, is 'contradicted by every man's "feelings." With Hutcheson the moral sense is analogous to our organic senses; being an internal instead of an external faculty. As we distinguish white from black by the eye, so we feel by this inward sense that an action is right or wrong; and this faculty is a sure arbiter of morality. Here, virtue has no foundation but in our moral faculty; and our estimate of it ought to be equally uniform with the operation of our senses. When we say of an action that it is *right*, all we mean is, that the contemplation of it excites pleasure in our minds, and *vice versa*. It is obvious that the fact is here overlooked, that right and wrong express qualities of actions, independently of our perceptions, however closely related to them. According to this theory, an alteration in our estimates of actions would change their moral quality from bad to good, and the reverse. Adam Smith's doctrine of sympathy, detailed in his beautiful philosophical romance, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, equally renders all morality merely *relative*; and it makes no adequate provision for answering the question, Why is one action right and another wrong?

Similar defects attach to the system of Dr. Brown. Like Hutcheson and Smith, he places virtue simply in the constitution of the human mind. He comes the nearest to Hutcheson, denominating *that* an original susceptibility of moral emotion, which Hutcheson calls a moral sense; but he still more clearly avows that all we mean by the moral differences of actions, is their tendency to excite one emotion rather than another.

That extraordinary theologicometaphysical genius, Jonathan Edwards, came in some respects between the abstract intellectual school of Cudworth and Clarke, and the natural-sentiment school of Hutcheson and Adam Smith; inasmuch as that he introduced emotion into virtue, though without lowering it, like the latter philosophers, into a mere sentiment, or a kind of instinct. He makes virtue to consist in 'love to *being* in general;' a system too abstract to be reduced to practice; and which, to adduce no other objection, does not make adequate provision for the private affections; for these obviously depend on grounds too limited to admit of being included, in the above principle, among the virtues.—Very different was the system proposed by David Hume. So far as his views on our moral sentiments are concerned, he seems to have blended the theories of reason and internal sense; but in examining what actions are pleasing or displeasing to the beholder, as approving themselves to our minds, or the contrary, he finds that the merit of actions depends wholly on their usefulness or natural tendency to add to the sum of human happiness. He may, in short be regarded as at the head of those philosophers, in this country, who have distinctly advocated the doctrine that *utility* is the foundation of virtue. This system, which evidently has its germ in that of Epicurus, has prevailed with various modifications, more than any other; and it has enrolled on the list of its supporters, some of the acutest minds; witness Paley, Bentham, Mill, and others; among whom we do not hesitate to include our author.

Mr. Smith so far agrees with Paley as to maintain that it is essential to a right action that it should conduce to *happiness*. On other important points, as we shall see, he is decidedly at issue with that most popular of English moralists; whose lax practical application of the principle of utility, has fostered a prejudice against it which later speculations have often tended only to confirm. Hence those who are chiefly acquainted with the doctrine as it is embodied in a tangible shape in Paley's chapters on Lies, and Subscription to Articles, or in the still grosser forms in which it has sometimes more recently appeared, are little aware of the very different complexion it may assume in the hands of others:—for example, of that more refined and elevated moral thinker, President Dwight. Mr. Smith admits that some of the utilitarian philosophers have attempted to deduce conse-

quences from the general principle, which, if carried out, would furnish excuses for the most horrid crimes, subvert the established rules of human duty, and speedily dissolve the whole fabric of society. Hence the violent prejudice, he thinks, which has prevailed among many against the very term *utility* or *expediency*, in reference to morals; as though it were opposed to the idea of strict right and justice, and implied that every man's own desire might be his law, to the neglect of certain general principles, bearing on the various relations in which utility should be viewed.

In consequence of the diffusely analytical and desultory mode which has been pursued in these volumes, those who are accustomed to admire the eminently lucid synthesis of Paley, will miss it here, creditable as the work is to the thinking powers of the author. He seems not to have been unconscious that he has sometimes 'lost his way,' and 'wandered far about'; but he alleges, that he adopted this circuitous method because it promised 'most entertainment' to himself. His readers would, probably, have been equally 'entertained,' and more profited, if he had conducted them by a more direct course. As it is, they are frequently led fatiguingly over the same ground, and their progress is sometimes impeded by the digressions which, however important the subjects, would have been more valuable had these volumes been digested into a more harmonious whole. As a consequence, the work is too long; and should it go to a second edition, we would strongly recommend the author to affect a stricter method, to condense his repetitions, and to reduce the whole by at least one-third. We shall now endeavour to bring together, in as short a compass as we can, the leading principles which are laid before us, as we have been able to gather them in the course of our perusal.

Mr. Smith rejects the hypothesis that moral approbation, and disapprobation, are to be resolved into a mere *feeling*. In the decisions which moral agents pronounce on actions, he says, *reason*, and no other faculty, is competent to be their guide, whether its operation be in any case intuitive or deductive. Admitting this principle, the author does not object to call the faculty which thus discriminates, a *moral sense*, or to regard it as identical with conscience. He takes for granted that there is something immutable in morality, something right which never can be wrong, and *vice versa*, independently of the feelings or the judgment of moral agents. Something is in its own nature obligatory—why we cannot tell, he says, any more than why a whole must be greater than its part. The order of our moral judgments is this:—that from the very conception we form of pleasure and pain arises the first principle of morals; namely, that it is fit *à priori* that every sentient being should be happy rather than

miserable. The notion of fitness next involves that of obligation. We cannot perceive that a thing is fit to be done, without perceiving that it is what an agent ought to do, rather than the contrary. The idea of obligation implies that it is fit that the state of *him* who *chooses* to do what is obligatory should be better than it otherwise would be: and we must feel some complacency in a being who desires to do what is obligatory, and the reverse. Obligation and fitness are expressive of entirely simple ideas, and therefore do not admit of definition. In proportion as the effects of any action, whether taken as an individual, or as representing a class, are fit or unfit, there exists an obligation to perform or to avoid that action. 'This principle,' says the author, 'without any other, is sufficient to explain all the rules of morality.'

In explanation of the criterion of right and wrong, Mr. Smith professes to have treated with more care and minuteness than other writers the apparently conflicting relations of utility; and we think this claim is just. We must not, he observes, simply ask wherein the goodness of an action consists, but wherein lies its fitness, its obligation, its virtue, its merit. The notion of a moral action is complex: an effect is produced,—a sentient being or beings receive pleasure or pain. The effect may be fit or unfit to take place, without reference to the character or intention of the agent. Obligation is a certain situation in which an agent is placed in relation to this effect; he is under an obligation to produce it; there is a reason why he should do so. Different agents may be under different degrees of obligation to produce effects of the same fitness. *Virtue* is a quality of an agent's mind or disposition, by which he is more or less sensible of the influence of the motive which obligation furnishes; but a general definition of virtue is impossible, as it is applied to a variety of qualities. Where two agents are under the same obligation, and are naturally formed with equal degrees of regard to its influence, if one makes a voluntary exertion to fulfil the obligation, and the other none, this exertion is *merit*; and it is opposed to guilt. Thus virtue consists in the spontaneous disposition, and merit in the voluntary choice, to do something which reason is capable of perceiving to be obligatory. A notion of obligation may exist without an immediate reference to any species of effect; but cannot be originally formed without such reference. A sensibility to moral obligation must always be distinguished from mere natural affection of any kind. Virtue is a regard for moral obligation: a regard for this is a regard for fitness; and this again is a regard for the promotion of *happiness*. Virtue, in its simplest essence, is a regard for the good of all sentient beings, including the agent himself:—so understood, the author thinks that the system that virtue is founded in benevolence is unexceptionable. Our notions of merit and of guilt are ultimately contained in those of happiness and misery.

When we ask why we pronounce an action good, we must consider, says our author, whether in so calling it we have respect to its effect,—to the amount of reason why any or some one agent should perform it,—to the disposition leading to its performance,—to the energy of will or self-command employed in choosing to perform it independently of present inclinations; in short, whether the action be characterized as a fit end merely, a special duty, a virtue, or a merit. The practical judgments of mankind are generally founded on a sort of general view of all these particulars. It is further remarked, that those who agree in regarding some common quality as characteristic of all good actions, may assign different reasons *why we ought* to perform such actions: accordingly Mr. Smith holds, with Paley, that utility is the criterion of virtue, while he rejects that writer's theory of obligation. Paley's definition of virtue is 'the doing 'good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the 'sake of everlasting happiness. According to which definition,' adds Paley, 'the good of mankind is the subject, the will of God 'the rule, and everlasting happiness the motive of human virtue.' The author of the 'Philosophy of Morals,' is of opinion that, understanding every effect to be of utility which is more or less beneficial, '*the utility of actions is the sole principle from which their obligation can be deduced.*' It appears to us that Mr. Smith here differs from Paley in one point, which it is of great importance to maintain. For can it be doubted whether the solemn sanction of virtue which is found in the idea of a Supreme Moral Governor, should ever be kept away from the fore-ground of a system of morals? For this omission we think no attempt at metaphysical accuracy can atone. Mr. Smith successfully vindicates Paley from the charge of theoretically sacrificing truth and justice in maintaining the 'subject' of human virtue to be 'happiness'; and remarks, that a regard to this kind of utility, or benevolence, cannot exist without justice. To say that we ought not to sacrifice truth to utility, is, he observes, to say that we ought not to sacrifice our health to our happiness. There cannot be a regard to utility without a regard to truth. A benevolent man may violate truth, as a benevolent judge may let a criminal escape; but this kind of benevolence is a mere instinctive affection; or is one that mistakes its object. Taking utility in its general and absolute, instead of its specific and relative import, there is no action reckoned morally obligatory of which utility is not the distinguishing characteristic. Yet the utility of an action is not that by which we estimate the virtue or merit of an agent; this merit consists in his endeavour to fulfil moral obligation. Utility does not explain wherein the moral virtue of an agent consists,—but wherein consists the obligation of the action; or why it should be performed. The opponents of utility

affirm that on this principle every man must be left to decide for himself what actions are of utility; but no—says Mr. Smith; whether a certain species of actions will produce good or evil effects, is a point in regard to which there is a true and a false; and the knowledge of this must be gained like other knowledge. Men often act on trust without reference to utility; but when they *do* judge of their duty, they judge from views of utility. If it were to be alleged as an objection that, on the principle of utility, a small theft might, in certain cases, do little or no harm, —the reply is, we must look to general rules: if it be said that men do not always think of general rules, this is no proof that they ought not. Mr. Smith also states that neither the supporters nor the opponents of utility have generally perceived that there is no opposition between it and the doctrine of a moral faculty. Conscience, however, is not a blind instinct. Its easy or uneasy state does not discriminate between a right and a wrong action, irrespectively of the view taken by the agent, of its nature and tendency. This discrimination is not made without a consideration of the effects of the action. Many a man mistakes right for wrong, and *vice versa*. The decision of conscience is according to our estimate of right and wrong,—our conception, that is, of the action as having a certain tendency or effect. Whether conscience be regarded as a judgment, or a feeling, or both,—the action cannot be distinguished as right or wrong, in the sense of obligatory, independently of its effects. The above may be regarded as a summary of the doctrines contained in these volumes, collected from various parts of the work. If some of the statements are ambiguous, or seem to clash with each other, we can only say that we have as much as possible confined ourselves to the author's own phraseology, wherever it was of consequence to do so. As a further illustration of his views of moral obligation, we extract as follows:

'Some religious persons are fond of maintaining that the merit of any action consists entirely in its being performed to please God. Now I hold it to be exceedingly clear that the smaller and fewer the motives from which a moral agent fulfils a moral obligation, his virtue and merit are the greater: consequently, a man who performs an action simply because he believes it to be right, and for no other reason, may have more virtue and merit, than one who partly performs it for that reason, and partly because it is agreeable to the Deity; more especially as in the latter case, he may be acting from a principle of selfish prudence, a hope of reward, or fear of punishment; and his act must in this single respect be less approved by the Deity. But the Deity, though approving the agent for *acting* without the motive, may yet condemn him for *being* without it.'—Vol. II., p. 79.

'If it be said that the ordinary rules of morality ought to be followed because the observance of them is commanded by the Deity,

we must inquire what are the various specific reasons why we ought to obey the will of the Deity. Now we ought to obey it either because we perceive the obligations of his laws in their own nature, and without regard to their being commanded ; or because we assume that being commanded they are of intrinsic obligation, whether we can perceive the grounds or not ; or because we shall be rewarded for obedience, punished for disobedience, whether they are in their own nature obligatory or not ; or because God has been beneficent or merciful to us, and therefore we ought, in return, to do what is pleasing to him. The first reason resolves itself into the general inquiry. The like may be said of the second. The man who believes himself bound to act on the principle of utility may believe himself bound to follow the divine will, as the most unerring guide in the application of that principle. In regard to the third reason—if we ought to obey the divine commands, merely in order to obtain the rewards of obedience, is our obedience rendered for any thing else in this case but its utility—to ourselves ? In regard to the fourth reason, if we ought to obey the divine laws in order to please the divine Being, on account of his benefits bestowed on us, does not this suppose that our obedience is of utility—is pleasing to the divine Being ? Did we not think or fancy that our obedience is *agreeable*, we should not have the notion of being bound or obliged in gratitude, as distinct from every other reason, to obey the Deity. Thus I have endeavoured to show that *utility*, in a more or less extended meaning of the term, is the source of all our moral notions ; and that however a regard to it may be mixed up with, or even superseded by, other principles of conduct, it is the utility, real or apparent, of an action, and that alone, that can ever produce in the mind of an agent the perception of its being *morally obligatory*.

—ib., pp. 189—197.

It must be admitted that Mr. Smith has redeemed the general theory of utility from the necessity of lying under those prejudices which have arisen against it in the minds of many reflecting persons, in consequence of its association with the coldly-calculating school of the modern utilitarians. These juridical moralists are sadly wanting in their estimate of the moral beauty of virtue for its own sake, and in their hands it is in danger of being sunk into an affair of narrow expediency and self-interest. Our author is not of the second school of Epicurus ; and he has well defended the doctrine he espouses from the charge of being a mere earth-born, selfish calculation. We think, however, that he has erred in not introducing more of the sanction of religion at the foundation of his moral scheme. Though we regard Paley's theory of *motive* as much too selfish, and his practical views as often too lax ; yet, whatever be his faults, Paley deserved the name of a 'Christian moralist,' in contradistinction to Hume and many others, by placing in the fore-front of his system 'the will of God,' so far as it can be known, as the rule of virtue ; and, insisting on this, as 'the whole business' of mo-

rality, Mr. Smith, we think, keeps this important ingredient of a moral system too much in the back-ground. We do not mean that he overlooks—much less denies that a regard to the will of the Deity is a part of virtue:—but he treats it rather as an isolated duty, than as an element which ought to pervade moral agency in the form of a presiding principle. He merges it too much in the general doctrine of utility, alleging that, after all, *this* is ‘the sole principle from which moral obligation can be deduced.’ We agree with our author that, so far as induction can lead us, we are able to conclude that all the actions to perform which there is an ascertained moral obligation, will be found universally characterized by utility—that is, they tend directly or indirectly to promote happiness: but we think that the general question, Why *ought* a certain action to be done—why is it obligatory?—is not adequately answered when it is replied that its binding force lies in its perceived utility—that this is the ‘*sole principle*’ of moral obligation. This answer seems to us too much to overlook the Deity as the prime source of all moral relations. It is making utility somewhat like the *fate* of the ancients, which seemed to have an indefinable, shadowy existence, apart from that of the gods, and which bound Jupiter himself in chains. We would rather say that utility, understood in its widest and highest possible sense, and in all its relations, is, so far as we have the opportunity of judging, the *mark* that is borne by those actions which are in harmony with the moral nature of God, the original source of all moral relations, as his physical being is the source of all other existence. To say that the obligation of an action *lies* in its utility, even supposing that we could always perceive that utility, appears too much like placing all those objects of human agency which have not God for their *immediate* object, out of the sphere of religious obligation; which, as Paley remarks, is the same as moral. If an action be obligatory, it is so as more or less bearing the impress of the divine will. Not that we believe it to be the expression of the divine will that *makes* an action *fit as an end*, so as to *constitute* its fitness, any more than the stamp on the coin constitutes it gold or silver; the stamp is only an evidence of its being such. The expression of the will of God, whether definitely given in revelation, or gathered satisfactorily from nature and Providence, is a proof that what is indicated will promote happiness, as being in harmony with the constitution, if we may so say, of the divine mind, which was prior, by infinite ages, to the existence of creatures, and consequently to the relations they now sustain. We would, therefore, not look beyond the nature of the Deity for the foundation of rectitude. There is a moral propriety in acting in harmony with the ideas of the divine mind, because, here, all is perfection. We would take a more Platonic view of the subject than our author seems

to admit, and say that the 'first fair and the first good,' is the abyss where, to creatures, all calculations are merged and lost; and that when we have said that God has pointed out to man a certain train of action as his duty—that the perfection of the divine nature is the source from which these indications emanate,—and that happiness on the grand scale necessarily follows in the train of these actions, as the shadow follows the substance, we have come to an ultimate principle, and can go no farther. Reason dictates the belief that the Creator can have no possible ends in view but his own glory and the happiness of his creatures; and reason approves these as worthy ends. Of this decision of reason the voice of revelation is more than confirmatory—these ends are its sole avowed design, though to trace the manner in which they are promoted and harmonized, is not always within human power; because a darkness rests on the whole subject of moral evil, which reason is not able, and revelation does not profess to dispel. We admit that, by a refined analysis, the glory of God, and the happiness of man may *both* be brought under the category of utility; for the divine glory may, so far as it relates to the Divine Being himself, be regarded as the divine happiness. Yet we think that to say that the sole adequate motive, to us, for acting virtuously is utility, is, at the least, going somewhat far about, rather than near at hand, for the source of obligation. As to the ultimate *fitness* of an end being its tendency to promote happiness, Mr. Smith's views will be found not to differ from those of Dr. Dwight; but we are much mistaken if Dwight would admit that the 'sole *obligation* of an action is utility:' nor would he give so little distinctness and relief to the will of God, so far as known, as the only safe rule and standard of virtue. We cannot bring ourselves to believe, with Mr. Smith, that in any case an action is more acceptable to the Deity because a man has performed it simply from a view of its utility, and without any reference to the divine will.

Our author ably refutes the sentimental school of Hutcheson, Adam Smith, and Brown, on the subject of a moral sense. He resolves conscience, we think agreeably to truth, into an exercise of judgment attended with certain corresponding feelings termed emotions. But we are not sure, whether by leaning a little too much to the intellectual, in order to avoid the sentimental hypothesis, he does not fail to give adequate prominence to the peculiarity of those pleasurable or painful feelings which attend a judgment formed of our *own* moral actions, as distinguished from that of which the actions of others are the object. The volumes before us, however, we may inform the reader, are in general distinguished by much originality and acuteness, considerable power of analysis, and some facility of illustration. The author seems to us to have been particularly successful in exposing the chief

objections that have been brought against the principle that utility, on the grand scale, is a criterion of all virtuous actions.

In the chapter on Liberty and Necessity, Mr. Smith attempts to overthrow the doctrine of philosophical necessity so triumphantly established, nearly a century ago, by that profound thinker Jonathan Edwards. Our author alleges that he 'can find no room in the system of necessity for our notions of merit and guilt, or *desert of reward and punishment*.' He therefore makes a staunch thrust at that irrefragable fact in man's nature—that his moral choice is always determined by the strongest inducement; or that the phenomena of human volition are, like those of nature, only to be explained on the principle of causation—a fact which it must be allowed is rather unhappily associated, by the term employed, with the idea of something irresistible, or with *physical* necessity. Whatever difficulties we may still feel in attempting perfectly to harmonize this fact in the consciousness of man, with some of the bearings of his accountableness, certain it is that the difficulties which attach to the opposite hypothesis are much greater, for they amount to the utmost absurdities and contradictions. Here the attempt to steer clear of Charybdis produces an entire shipwreck on Sylla. Mr. Smith would fain, if he could, cashier motives altogether from having any thing to do necessarily with our volitions; but, finding that this would be rather too much of a hecatomb to be sacrificed to the shrine of his self-determining power, he thinks better of it, and labours to combine the doctrine of the strongest motive with that of the supreme prerogative of the will to determine *itself*—the very scheme which Edwards demolished with such grave irony, and irresistible power, as the offspring of Mr. Chubb. But let the author speak for himself, that our readers may judge of the manner in which he deals with the subject:

'I shall not stop to suggest the numberless cases in which a man acts without any motive, that is to say, the least assignable, either by himself or others. I shall not advert to the circumstance that a man may act not only without a motive, but contrary to a motive, merely in order to prove his free agency, because it may be contended that his desire to prove his free agency is, in such case, a motive. I shall freely admit, for the sake of argument, at least, that the will never acts without a motive. The doctrine of free agency does not suppose that the will in any case acts without a motive; but only that in following one motive rather than another, it is not in every case, drawn or impelled by a power in the motive, but chooses to act from that motive in preference to the other, by a power of its own: a power exerting itself independently of the strength of either motive. I say that the will is not *in every case* impelled or drawn by a power in the motive; because, as the advocates of free agency need not deny that the will always acts from regard to a motive, so neither need they deny

that motives exercise an influence on the will: an influence greater or less in every case; an influence in some cases irresistible; and, to all intents and purposes, excluding free agency. It is sufficient for the argument that one case can be shown to exist in which the will is not determined by the strength of the motive, but by its own power of choice.'—Vol. II., p. 98.

And what is the case our author adduces? precisely that, because a man may at one time, when in the water, 'suffer himself 'to be borne along by the current, whereas he might stem it,— 'because at another time he is carried with the current in spite of 'all his exertions,' it does not, 'therefore' follow that he has no power over his own motions! We cannot afford room to point out the confusion which here takes place of physical with moral necessity; or the total irrelevancy of the example, if it be meant to prove a self-determining power: but we are irresistibly reminded by it of the Scotchman, who, having unluckily fallen into the water, cried out, 'I will be drowned, nobody shall help me.' Seriously, the above passage, which is a fair specimen of the whole chapter, involves such a mass of contradictions, such a medley of inconsistencies, in regard to the obvious phenomena of causation, the meaning of the term motive, the distinction between physical and moral inability, and the very notion of human freedom, that we are almost tempted to imagine that the author can never have studied the controversy as exhibited in the pages of the great transatlantic moralist, where he would find all his arguments most thoroughly examined, and as thoroughly annihilated.

Though, as our readers will have seen, we think the author does not formally enough introduce the direct sanction of religious obligation into his *theory* of morals, a defect by no means uncommon among philosophical moralists,—yet in his concluding chapter he touches 'on the relation of morality to religion natural 'and revealed; his chief object being here 'to deduce the special duty of examining the evidence of revealed religion.' His remarks on the Deistical Controversy, and on the General Evidence of Revelation, are for the most part highly valuable, though we should not choose even here to follow him implicitly. He justly observes on this subject:

'There is a *primâ facie* case for the truth of Christianity, from the circumstance that it has been believed by many able and enlightened men, in all countries and ages. If Christianity is a cheat, it is a cheat that has imposed on some of the most enlarged and comprehensive intellects that ever existed—such as Bacon, Newton, Butler; upon some of the most acute, subtle, and penetrating—such as were possessed by

Clarke, Berkeley, Locke: it has imposed upon some men of the soundest and clearest practical judgment—such as Watson and Paley: the very last sort of persons to be easily taken in by groundless pretensions.'

—ib., p. 284.

We are sorry to be obliged, before parting with the author, to add that his work, exhibiting as it does so much real talent, has one great blemish, which will pain the minds of many who might otherwise have read it with considerable interest. We refer to his going out of his way, as it appears to us, repeatedly to attack a vast class of individuals who differ from him in their theological sentiments. We have not the least personal knowledge of Mr. Smith, nor have we any external means of knowing to what party he belongs: but we the more regret his unfair treatment of those alluded to, because it stands out in remarkable contrast with his extreme candour towards Hume, Gibbon, and Voltaire, in particular, whom he hesitates to regard as decidedly disbelieving Christianity. He loses none of his self-possession in speaking of Hume's vagaries in attempting to disprove miracles, and the distinction between virtue and vice, and his own and every body else's existence. He is willing to regard Gibbon's 'attack upon Christianity' as a sort of foible resulting from his being always ready to seize occasions for exercising that delicate irony in which he excelled. Nor does Voltaire fail of obtaining the excuse, that with 'the idea of Christianity exhibited by the French church of his day, he *must* have been a deist, or a fool.' Our author is only disturbed from his philosophic calmness by those who maintain a 'certain theological system, much in vogue in the present day:' nor does he accept even of their '*sincerity*,' (which he admits,) as any excuse for them. From a totally mistaken apprehension of their views, he thus exclaims :

'— Whence the preposterous, the insane raving, about human depravity—the more than childish ringing changes upon the depth of our corruption, our utter and desperate wickedness, and so forth? Are we to set a Scriptural figure of speech against a plain matter of fact? What is the truth? this, that a man's desert of punishment arises neither from his natural appetites, nor the constitutional weakness of his sensibility to obligation, but *from the wrong exercise of his free will.*'—ib., p. 63.

Now this is the precise description of the opinion of all the most enlightened individuals among those who are so unfortunate as to have to run the gauntlet which Hume, Gibbon, and Voltaire escaped. They hold, with Mr. Smith, that guilt consists in 'wrongly exercising free-will,' in 'choosing to neglect or violate

'moral obligation.' But let us have a nearer view of these offenders ; who 'seem absolutely engaged in a competition who 'shall run farthest in the race of absurdity—as if there were no 'way of honoring God, but by depressing man below the level 'of a rational and moral being. When we find those who are 'perpetually declaiming against the pride of the human heart, 'coolly declaring their assurance of being specially distinguished 'from the mass of mankind as the objects of the divine favour, 'privileged to determine between truth and falsehood, to discri- 'minate between the accepted and the rejected --when it is assi- 'duously inculcated that the most daring sin a man can be guilty 'of, is to endeavour to please God by doing what is morally 'right—when we are alarmed by the most harrowing representa- 'tions of the future damnation that awaits us, only to be told in 'the next breath that we can do nothing to help ourselves—when 'we are assured that our faith will necessarily produce good 'works, while we are yet required to make it the very first article 'of that faith, that good works can avail us nothing—'

But we will go no farther, though there is much more to the same purpose. Mr. Smith ought to have known, as a man of sense, and a philosopher, that all this is a most violent *caricature* of the avowed religious opinions of all the Protestant churches in Christendom, with scarcely an exception. There are fanatics in all communities ; but the opinions of a body of men are not to be judged of from the exceptions. Mr. Smith's *candour* has here wofully forsaken him ; and he has, from whatever cause, fallen into the grossest misrepresentations. We are willing to hope that he has sinned ignorantly, as this is the most charitable supposition ; and before he writes again about those who revolt him so much more than Hume, Gibbon, and Voltaire, let him read the sermons of Robert Hall, and Dr. Chalmers, in order to know what opinions he condemns.

Art. V. *The Life of Richard Earl Howe, K.G., Admiral of the Fleet, and General of Marines.* By SIR JOHN BARROW, F.R.S. 8vo. London: Murray. 1838.

WE frankly confess that we open such a volume as this with very different feelings from most of our brother journalists. It brings up a train of reflections which sobers and saddens our mind, and disposes us to moralize where others indulge in indiscriminate and wholesale eulogy. We are far from being insensible to the many noble qualities which centered in the character of the hero, nor do we wish to depreciate the value of the service he did his country. But the perusal of such a volume leads us from the individual whose biography it records, to the revolting character of the system which he so vigorously and successfully worked. Nothing is more easy than to dilate in general terms on the gallant bearing and generous intrepidity of our navy,—the old bulwark and pride of England. The glowing picture feeds our national vanity, and leads us to exult in the land of our birth. The heroes who swept the seas of our enemies, and rode off their coasts as the emblems of British supremacy and valour, are regarded as tutelar saints, whom it is impiety to deify, and worse than treason to undervalue. So universal is this feeling that it may be recognized in every grade of society,—may be traced in classes the most dissimilar, and in ages the most remote. The old man tottering beneath the burden of years, and the school boy just warming into life,—the senator, the demagogue, the philosopher and the priest,—the irreligious worldling, and the sincere disciple of the gospel of peace, all these and many other subdivisions of society may be seen yielding themselves to the pervading sentiment, and giving utterance, each in his appropriate phraseology, to an impassioned admiration of military renown. The feeling is so omnipotent, that it is almost impossible calmly to test its propriety, while the utterance of an unfavorable judgment is sure to subject the man sturdy enough to hazard it, to the contempt or indignation of his countrymen. It is a light punishment to have his patriotism suspected,—a thousand to one, but he is charged with a pusillanimous spirit and base desertion of his dearest interests. The stripling despises his cowardice, and the old man points with a look of significant scorn to the long list of British heroes.

And yet the case does not to our mind admit of doubt. It appears to be one of the simplest problems of moral science, a fact on which two judgments cannot be formed by a right-minded and unperverted heart. The *profession of arms*, we do not hesitate to aver, is in utter hostility to the whole scope and genius of the Christian system. No ingenuity can reconcile it with the

spirit of the gospel, or bring it into harmony with that scrupulous conscientiousness which the principles of religion inculcate. The man who *willingly* adopts it (for of such only be it remembered we are speaking) surrenders himself, for the paltry consideration of pay or fame, to the will and caprice of another. He becomes, deliberately, and with design, part of a complicated machinery, over the movements of which he possesses no control;—a machinery ordinarily worked by irreligious and ambitious men, and in ninety-nine cases out of the hundred rendered subservient to deeds of aggression and blood, the most charitable recital of which stains with infamy the page of history. From the moment a youth enters the army, he is bound by the terms of his engagement to obey implicitly the commands of his superiors. To whatever service he may be appointed, he is the mere machine with which others work, the living instrument which ambitious men use for the achievement of their designs. He may be employed against freedom in her purest and noblest struggles; he may be commissioned to desolate the peaceful hearth, to depopulate the busy city, to crush the rising energies of a people strong in the conviction of their rights, and yet he dares not hesitate,—the murderous mandate has been issued, and he is pledged to obey. We are not now speaking of wars, strictly *defensive*. They are of rare occurrence, and are out of the scope of our reasoning. We speak of the profession of arms, of the science of war, of the system so awfully prevalent and popular among us, whereby immense masses of human beings are trained to the work of destruction, so as to be pointed at any moment, with the most deadly effect against such as have wounded the pride, or threatened the interests of their employers. All the advantages of combination and discipline are sought to render them more skilful in the slaughter of their fellow-men, and he is usually regarded as the most successful who can point to the greatest number of battle-fields over which his victorious banner has been unfurled. It is no defence of the system to allege that armies are sometimes employed in the defence of unprotected innocence, and in the establishment of national rights,—that the progress of an ambitious conqueror has occasionally been arrested, and the prey snatched from his grasp,—that the fellowship of the human family calls for and enforces an interposition on behalf of a neighbouring nation imploring help against some formidable aggressor;—all this may be allowed, so far as our argument is concerned, and yet the obvious discrepancy of the military *profession*, with the spirit and requirements of Christianity, be made out. Such cases are the exceptions, few and far between, and not the rule. They are the accidents of the system, and not its ordinary fruits. Our charge against the system is

this, and if we make it out, we care not what minor pleas are urged, that it converts the many into the mere tools of the few, the unreflecting, though still in a moral point of view the responsible, agents of their will. No human being is justified in placing himself in such a position. He cannot so far divest himself of the attributes of a moral nature, nor transfer to another the responsibility of actions of which he is the agent, and for which God holds him responsible. Human laws may pronounce him guiltless, but before a purer tribunal he will inevitably be condemned. The blood of millions will finally be demanded at the hand of the kings and heroes of our race. Upon them the chief condemnation will fall, but their blind and unscrupulous agents must not expect to escape. We confess that this consideration very seriously modifies our estimate of the character of George the third, whose private worth we cordially admit. The destructive wars of his reign were the passion of the monarch, and we would not have the guilt they involved lying upon our souls, for all the dignity and wealth which his crown conferred.

We have made these remarks in no querulous spirit, nor with the most distant idea of engaging the attention of the statesmen of the day. Our duty is with the religious public, and we are solicitous of inducing them seriously to reflect on the degree in which they are implicated in this national crime. Our conviction is that that degree is anything but trifling, and if this conviction be correct it becomes them instantly to repent of and abandon the sin. The nations of Europe, exhausted by a long struggle, have now enjoyed an unwonted degree of repose. This has been the result of necessity rather than of choice. The 'sinews of war,' and not the spirit of strife have been wanted, and statesmen have consequently been content to carry on their schemes by other means. But the political atmosphere of Europe is yet charged with inflammable elements, and a thousand accidents may cause them to explode. It therefore becomes the Christian part of our population to bethink themselves during this period of leisure,—to try their principles,—to test their spirit,—to be prepared in a word for the crisis which must come, when our statesmen having gathered up their resources will seek again to plunge the nation into war. Shall they be permitted to do so, and not only be permitted, but as in times past shall they be cheered on and encouraged by the disciples of that religion which proclaims 'peace on earth, good-will towards men.' The religious people of this country are sufficiently numerous and powerful to determine this case, and if they fail in their duty, God will not hold them guiltless. But we must pass on to the biography before us.

Sir John Barrow, in the preface to his volume, anticipates two questions as not unlikely to arise, respecting his publication.

The first regards the new materials put forward, and the second the competency of a landsman to do justice to the subject chosen. Respecting the former he tells us,—

‘The fresh materials consist of something more than four hundred letters, all in the hand-writing of Earl Howe, and all addressed to one individual, long and high in his confidence, embracing a period between the years 1776 and 1799, on a great variety of subjects, professional and otherwise;—of several private letters to and from the Earl of Chatham;—of the noble Admiral’s private journal during the time his flag was up, very full, and written entirely by himself;—of various communications received from several flag-officers and others, who served under him, and now living;—and of a few very interesting letters from his Majesty George III., and George Prince of Wales, to a member of the Howe family.’

The latter inquiry is met in an equally satisfactory manner, though not without severe, but merited reflection, on ‘our naval writers of novels and romances,’ who are represented as having failed in their duty to one of the chief ornaments of their profession. His late majesty is known to have taken much delight in the naval service, and the following passage from the preface of our author will not be read without interest.

‘If I entertained doubts of engaging in the task, which I certainly did from the want of all private correspondence with or from the noble Earl, that could throw any light on his moral character, his opinions or sentiments, previous to his arriving at his flag, those doubts at once gave way to the flattering approbation, and the expression of a desire on the part of his late Majesty, that I should undertake it. His commands on this occasion were personally conveyed to me only a few days before the commencement, or rather indication, of the fatal illness which deprived the nation of a Sovereign eagerly devoted to its honour and its interests—of a Prince punctual in the discharge of his public duties, easy of access, and always ready to oblige, and do a good-natured act—of a man kind-hearted, amiable, and affectionate in all the relations of private and domestic life.

‘His Majesty was pleased to say that, having understood I was about to employ myself in writing the life of the late Lord Howe, he was glad to hear it was likely to fall into such safe hands, for the Admiral was a great favourite with his father, and indeed a sort of connexion of the family; that he knew the present Earl had for some time past been desirous of finding some one qualified to write the life of his grandfather, and ought to consider himself fortunate. . . . The King then entered into the history of Lord Howe’s life, went over the leading features and events that distinguished it, which an extraordinary memory enabled him to do with a degree of correctness quite surprising; he pointed out some passages in the Earl’s life, not generally known, and which he said would require caution in touching upon, and that he was desirous of mentioning them to me. Though

this interview, with which I was honoured, happened on the Sunday immediately preceding the last levee he ever held, I could not discover, on that day, any difference from his usual cheerfulness, manner, or appearance.'

Richard Earl Howe, the second son of the Right Honourable Scrope, Lord Viscount Howe, was born in 1725, and is supposed to have received his education at Eton. His course of education must have been very brief, as he entered the naval service as midshipman, about the age of fourteen. He rose rapidly in his profession, being made lieutenant of the *Comet* bomb in 1744, and commander in the following year. He was shortly afterwards advanced to the rank of captain, and was appointed to the *Triton* on the 20th of April, 1747. His intrepidity and success led to his appointment in June, 1756, to the command of a squadron for the protection of Guernsey and Jersey then threatened with an invasion from France, and the skill with which he conducted this service, confirmed the favorable judgment previously formed of his character. His subsequent promotion is identified with the naval history of his country, and need not be here particularized. He was chosen by George the Second as the tutor of the Duke of York, the elder brother of George the Third, and the following anecdote of what took place on Howe's introducing his royal pupil to the captains at Portsmouth is strikingly characteristic of the simplicity of seamen.

' In the case of the Duke of York we have a pretty specimen of the economical mode then in practice, of launching forth into the world a young prince, the heir presumptive to the throne. Captain Howe having equipped his young *élève* in the true Portsmouth fashion, the captains of the navy then present attended him in their boats on board, where they were severally introduced to the young midshipman. An anecdote is told, which being highly characteristic of the true simplicity of seamen, is not unlikely to have occurred. A sailor standing with some others on the forecastle, and observing what was going on, whispered his messmate, ' the young gentleman a'nt over civil as I thinks: look, if he don't keep his hat on before all the captains!' ' Why, you stupid lubber,' replied the other, ' where should he larn manners, seeing as how he never was at sea before?'—pp. 59, 60.

The coolness, moderation, and firmness of Howe, combined with his private worth, and the high professional character he had established, pointed him out to the ministry of the day as the commander best qualified for the American station, and he consequently proceeded to the Colonies, then in a state of revolt, in the early part of 1776. He had previously met Dr. Franklin, at the house of his sister, Mrs. Howe, and though the negotiations which ensued failed to accomplish their object, they appear to

have laid the foundation for a mutual respect not wholly devoid of important consequences. The American royalists, in the true spirit of infuriated partizans, condemned the moderation of the British commander, who instead of laying waste the coast of the revolted colonies, regarded his commission as best fulfilled by combining a spirit of conciliation with the display of his naval superiority. Howe was a tory in politics, not of the ultra and rabid tribe which flourish in our own day, but of that more respectable class in whom the feeling of ancient loyalty to the crown is the absorbing passion. It was not therefore to be expected that he should sympathize with the colonists in the principles they avowed, or perfectly understand the nature of that mighty impulse by which they were moved. Still he endeavoured to arrest the progress of war, and to bring the disputants to an amicable arrangement. His efforts indeed were unsuccessful, but they do honour to the spirit of the man who made them. The following account of his overtures to Congress, displays alike the difficulties of his position, and the clear-sightedness and determination of the men with whom he had to deal. We are not answerable for some of the terms used by the narrator.

‘Before, however, he put his forces in motion to intimidate, rather than at once commit any direct act of hostility against, the rebellious colonists, his first act was to send ashore, by a flag, circulars to as many of the late governors of provinces as were in the neighbourhood, acquainting them with his powers, both civil and military, and inclosing a declaration, granting general or particular pardons to all such as, in the confusion of the times, might have deviated from their just allegiance; and who were willing, by a speedy return to their duty, to reap the benefits of the royal favour. These papers were immediately forwarded by General Washington to the Congress, and the Congress as speedily published them in all their gazettes, for the purpose, as was stated, ‘that the good people of these United States might know of what *nature* were the concessions, and what the *terms*, with the expectation of which the insidious Court of Great Britain has endeavoured to amuse and disarm them.’ In fact, the declaration of himself, and his brother Sir William, came too late; not that a few months, sooner or later, would have made much difference, for the Congress, had, on the 4th July, issued a declaration, ‘that the United Colonies of America, are, and of right ought to be, *Free and Independent States*, and that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown.’

‘Lord Howe, however, unwilling to resort to extremities, so long as the least hope remained of conciliating the colonists, next attempted to open a communication with General Washington, and sent some of his officers with a flag and a letter addressed to ‘George Washington. Esq.’ which he refused to receive, as not being addressed with the title, and in the form, due to the public rank and capacity which he

held under the United States. On the 20th of the same month, Adjutant-General Paterson was sent to New York by General Sir William Howe, with a letter also addressed to 'George Washington, Esq., &c. &c.' Washington received him with great courtesy, and dispensed with the usual ceremony of blindfolding in passing through the fortifications, but he declined to receive the letter. The adjutant, on his part, trusted there might be no difficulty owing to any informality in the address, assuring him there was no intention of derogating from his rank. The General replied, 'that a letter directed to any person in a public character should have some description or designation of it, otherwise it would appear to be a mere private letter; that it was true the *et ceteras* implied *everything*; but they also implied *anything*; and that he should absolutely decline any letter directed to him, as a private person, when it related to his public station.' Some conference took place about the treatment of prisoners, but nothing satisfactory could be obtained from General Washington.'—pp. 91—93.

Howe's conduct does not appear to have been fully approved by the Admiralty, and we should have been glad if his biographer had been more explicit on this point. He consequently relinquished his command as soon as was consistent with the public service, and being informed on the eve of doing so, that he had been appointed Vice-Admiral of the red squadron, he expressed his feelings by saying, 'though impressed with a just sense of the 'king's most gracious patronage, I cannot cease to lament the 'public testimonies of their lordships' disesteem, which I have 'experienced by a repeated separation from the class of flag- 'officers, with whom I was first advanced to that rank.' These were strong words for Howe to employ, who was one of the most patient and enduring of men, and it would have been well for the purposes of history if the secret springs of such treatment had been minutely traced. It is well known that the most absurd and unstatesmanlike views of the resources and energy of the Colonists were entertained by the British government at the commencement of the struggle. The language employed was that of proud ascendancy and contempt. All that was thought to be necessary to awe the Colonists into submission, was an adequate demonstration of British strength. With this view, Howe was sent out, and when he failed to realize the utopian expectations of his employers, their chagrin knew no bounds.

The year 1782 was distinguished by the gallant defence of Gibraltar, then assailed by the combined forces of France and Spain. The garrison was happily commanded by General Elliot, an officer of determined and resolute bravery, who was assisted by a marine-brigade of gun-boats, under the orders of Capt. Curtis. The preparations made for the assault exceeded anything which Europe had witnessed. They are thus briefly described by our author:—

‘ The account of the tremendous preparations, on the part of Spain, for the siege of Gibraltar, had reached England, but the government was not aware of their extent, or that they were such as, from their nature and magnitude, had never before been attempted by any power in Europe ;—the huge floating batteries, so constructed as to be deemed impervious to shot, and so contrived with tubes supplied with streams of water, by means of pumps, as to render them incombustible by red-hot shot, which had previously and successfully been used by the garrison in setting fire to some of the blockading ships and boats—all these preparations had satisfied the Spanish government that these novel machines, the invention and construction of an ingenious Frenchman, could neither be set on fire nor sunk, and that the destruction and capture of the fortress were now inevitable.’—pp. 130, 131.

Though many of our readers are probably acquainted with the detailed narrative of the siege, published by Colonel Drinkwater, we cannot abstain from quoting the following extract from the manuscript of an Italian officer in the service of Spain.

‘ On the morning of September 13th, 1782, the floating batteries got under way with a fair wind to proceed to Gibraltar, and at seven o’clock they had arranged themselves for the attack ; whilst thus employed, our batteries from the land side redoubled their fire upon the garrison. At nine o’clock the floating batteries had got within gunshot of the walls, when a tremendous fire was opened upon them by the British garrison, by which however the commanders were not disconcerted, but in a short time placed them in line so as to be able to open their fire together.’ [They were completely moored, says Drinkwater, in little more than ten minutes.]

‘ The brunt of their fire was directed against the fortifications on the Old Mole and the south bastion, and we conceived great hopes, from the cool and intrepid manner of beginning the attack, that our success was certain. The floating batteries were so constructed, that the shot, which pierced their sides or roofs, would at the same time pass through a tube which should discharge a quantity of water to extinguish the fire which it might create ; this hope however proved fallacious. From nine till two they kept up a well-directed fire with very little damage on their part ; but our hopes of ultimate success became less sanguine when, at about two o’clock, the floating battery commanded by the Prince of Nassau (on board of which was also the engineer who had invented the machinery) began to smoke on the side exposed to the garrison, and it was apprehended she had taken fire. The firing however continued till we could perceive the fortifications had sustained some damage ; but at seven o’clock all our hopes vanished. The fire from our floating batteries entirely ceased, and rockets were thrown up as signals of distress. In short, the red hot balls from the garrison had by this time taken such good effect, that nothing now was thought of but saving the crews, and the boats of the combined fleet were immediately sent on that service.

‘A little after midnight the floating battery, which had been the first to show symptoms of conflagration, burst out into flames, upon which the fire from the rock was increased with terrific vengeance; the light produced from the flames was equal to noon-day, and greatly exposed the boats of the fleet in removing the crews.’ [The light thrown out on all sides by the flames, Drinkwater says, enabled the artillery to point their guns with the utmost precision, whilst the rock and neighbouring objects were highly illuminated, forming, with the constant flashes of our cannon, a mingled scene of sublimity and terror.] ‘During the night one or other of these batteries was discovered to be on fire; they were so close to the walls that the balls pierced into them full three feet, but being made of solid beds of green timber, the holes closed up after the shot, and for want of air they did not immediately produce the effect. At five A.M., one of them blew up with a very great explosion, and soon after the whole of them, having been abandoned by their crews, were on fire fore and aft, and many of their gallant fellows were indebted to the exertions of the English for their lives. As the English boats were towing one of these batteries into the Mole, not supposing her to be on fire, she also blew up.’

‘It was at this tremendous moment,’ adds Sir John Barrow, ‘that the national spirit and character of Englishmen for rescuing fellow creatures in distress shone in their true light, and were never displayed with greater lustre. Brigadier Curtis with his little gallant crew in his pinnace were close to this floating battery when she blew up, and were by the explosion involved in one vast cloud of fire and smoke, and masses of burning wood, by which the coxswain was killed, and several of the crew wounded; one of these timbers went through the pinnace’s bottom, and she was only saved from sinking by the sailors stuffing their jackets into the hole. All the other gun-boats were equally exposed, in dragging from the wrecks that had already exploded, and from amidst the mutilated carcases of the dead, the wounded victims that were still alive, and in picking up from logs of wood steaming in the sea, the miserable wretches not yet deprived of life. ‘Notwithstanding the efforts of the Marine brigade,’ says Colonel Drinkwater, ‘in relieving the terrified victims from the burning ships, several unfortunate men could not be removed. The scene at this time exhibited was as affecting as that which, in the act of hostility, had been terrible and tremendous. Men crying from amidst the flames for pity and assistance; others on board those ships where the fire had made little progress, imploring relief with the most expressive gestures and signs of despair; whilst several equally exposed to the dangers of the opposite element, trusted themselves on various parts of the wreck to the chance of paddling to the shore.’ —pp. 133—136.

Howe was employed to relieve the garrison, and the manner in which he discharged the service, won the applause of enemies as well as of friends. ‘It was not in England only,’ said Mr. Fox, when speaking on the address of thanks on the peace of this year, ‘that the character of Lord Howe was admired, a foreigner of distinction had written from Paris in the following terms: ‘Every one here is full of admiration at the conduct of Lord Howe. All

'praise his bravery and humanity. All wish to take his conduct for their example. This makes us think that *in your country*, a court-martial will be appointed to try him whenever he arrives in England.'

The most splendid and important service of Lord Howe's life, was the victory of the first of June, 1794. It revived the ancient fame of the British navy, and led to the subsequent triumphs of Sir John Jervis and Nelson. Though less decisive in its immediate results than the engagements of Cape St. Vincent and the Nile, yet as occurring at the commencement of the war, it exerted a more powerful influence. It re-kindled the resolution, and gathered up the flagging spirits of British seamen, and emboldened them to those desperate, but triumphant displays of courage which followed. Lord Howe's temperament was vastly different from both of his illustrious contemporaries, yet it is not too much to assert that he prepared the way for their triumphs by the spirit he diffused through the navy. He put to sea on the 2nd of May, and after searching fruitlessly for the French fleet for some weeks, discovered it on the 28th 'very far distant in the south-east, the wind blowing fresh from the south by west, with a rough sea.' This and the three following days were employed in a series of manœuvres, which led to no decisive result, but on the 1st June the fleets engaged in good earnest. The following brief account of the battle is quoted from Mr. James, the indefatigable and accurate historian of naval actions.

'The enemy was discovered this morning about three or four miles to leeward in order of battle, under an easy sail, to the westward. The fleet being duly arranged in the same order on the larboard line of bearing, and notice given of the intention to pass through the enemy's line for engaging them to leeward, at about thirty minutes after eight, A.M., the signal (36) was made for each ship to steer for and engage her opponent in the enemy's line; whereupon the fleet bore up accordingly. The action commenced on the part of the British fleet soon after nine. The Defence, Marlborough, and Royal George, Queen, and Brunswick, being the only ships which pushed through the enemy's line, together with the Charlotte, for engaging them to leeward. The Gibraltar omitted to cross the French admiral for engaging his second ahead, as his station required. The Caesar's main-top-sail was backed, and whilst distant from the enemy, though the signal for closer engagement was abroad.

'Soon after ten A.M., the French admiral, engaged by the Charlotte, drawing ahead (as he had continued to do from the beginning of the action, though the main-sail, top-gallant-sails, &c., were set in the Charlotte for keeping him on the same bearing when standing down to fetch under his stern), he bore away to the northward. The fore-top-mast, and soon after the main-top-mast (of which the weather-leech of the sail had been some time before cut in two and the sail rendered useless), in the Charlotte going over the side, no hinderance of the

movement, or pursuit of the French admiral could be made. But he hauled to the wind again on the larboard tack, about three miles to leeward, and formed with eleven or twelve more of his ships not disabled by the loss (at least) of any of their masts. Ten of the enemy's ships, almost all of them totally dismasted, were left to windward; but three of them with their sprit-sails, or sails raised on the stump of the fore-mast, joined the French admiral; the ships of the fleet being either so much dispersed, or disabled in their masts and rigging in the different actions, as to be prevented from opposing the escape of those French ships, or of assembling in force to renew the engagement. And when those three ships had joined the others, the enemy stood away large to the northward; leaving seven of their dismasted ships in our possession, one of which sunk while the prisoners were removing, and many of the crew perished with the ship.'—pp. 232—234.

Sir John Barrow has interwoven in his narrative, the accounts furnished by several eye-witnesses of the engagement, and the daring heroism detailed is highly illustrative of the intrepidity of British seamen.

'The conduct of the Marlborough,' he remarks 'as described partly by Captain Berkeley and partly by her First Lieutenant, Monckton, after the former was carried off deck wounded, is so noble, and at the same time attended with such remarkable circumstances, that it ought not to be passed over:—

'The Marlborough engaged the Impetueux for about twenty minutes, when she payed round off and dropt with his bowsprit over our quarter, where he lay exposed to a very heavy raking fire which we kept up. Every creature was driven from her decks, and some of my men boarded her, but were called back. I had now the satisfaction to see all his masts go over the side. At this moment a seventy-four, which was astern of the Impetueux, attempted to weather and rake us; but he met with so severe a reception that he dropt on board his consort's quarter, and then luffing up, boarded the Marlborough upon the bow; but the steadiness of our troops, and the good use made of our guns and caronades, prevented him from availing himself of his situation. In a few minutes I had the pleasure of seeing this ship's masts follow the example of the other, and they both lay without firing a gun, or without any colours, which makes me suppose they had struck, as not a soul was upon deck to answer; and what confirmed me in this opinion afterwards, when we were dismasted and lay along-side the Impetueux, within half-pistol shot was, that no attempt was made against us, until our own fleet came up and took possession of them.'

'I now attempted to back off from the two wrecks, and unfortunately accomplished it just as the French admiral came under our stern, who backed his maintopsail and raked us, by which he did us considerable damage, and carried away our three masts. It was from this ship I received my wound, and therefore the remainder is the account of my first lieutenant.'

'Lieutenant Monckton thus proceeds:—'At the time Captain Berkeley was obliged to quit the deck, we were still on board, but

Backing clear of our opponents ; our masts being then shot away by the three-decker under our stern, carried away the ensign staff, and deprived us of hoisting any colours for a few minutes. I ordered the wreck to be cleared away from the colour chest, and spread a Union Jack at the spritsail-yard and a St. George's ensign at the stump of the foremast ; but perceiving that the latter was mistaken by some of our own ships for the tri-coloured flag, I ordered the flag to be cut off. At this time we were laying along the Impetueux, within pistol-shot ; and, finding that she did not return a gun, and perceiving she was on fire, I ordered our ship to cease firing at her, and suffered them quietly to extinguish the flames, which I could easily have prevented with our musketry. While clearing away the wreck, the rear of the enemy's fleet was coming up, and perceiving that they must range close to us, and being determined never to see the British flag struck, I ordered the men to lie down at their quarters to receive their fire, and to return it afterwards if possible ; but being dismasted, she rolled so deep that our lower-deck ports could not be opened. The event was as I expected ; the enemy's rear passed us to leeward very close, and we fairly ran the gauntlet of every ship which could get a gun to bear, but luckily without giving us any shot between wind and water, or killing any men, except two, who imprudently disobeyed their officers and got up at their quarters. Two of their ships, which had tacked, now came to windward of us, and gave us their fire, upon which one of their hulks\* hoisted a national flag, but upon our firing some guns at her she hauled it down again ; and a three-decker having tacked also, stood towards us, with a full intention, I believe, to sink us if possible : the Royal George, however, who I suppose had tacked after her, came up, and, engaging her very closely, carried away her main and mizen-masts, and saved the Marlborough from the intended close attack. I then made the signal for assistance on a boat's mast ; but this was almost instantly shot away. At five the Aquilon took us in tow, and soon after we joined the fleet.'

'Captain Berkeley then concludes the report by stating, that 'the perfect discipline and well-directed fire which the officers kept up at their quarters, could only be equalled by the coolness, obedience, and bravery of the men ; and the very trying and critical juncture in which Lieutenant Monckton took the command of the ship, and kept the British flag triumphant until the victory was decided, demands my utmost praise.' This brave fellow was made commander a month after the battle, and captain the following year.'

'A curious incident is said to have occurred on board this ship. When she was entirely dismasted, and otherwise disabled, by the extreme severity of the conflict,—the captain (the Hon. G. Berkeley), and the second lieutenant (Sir Michael Seymour), severely wounded, the latter having his arm shot off, and the ship so roughly treated, that a whisper of surrender was said to have been uttered, which Lieutenant Monckton overhearing, resolutely exclaimed, 'he would nail her

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\* Dismasted ships that had struck.

colours to the stump of the mast.' At this moment a cock, having by the wreck been liberated from the broken coop, suddenly perched himself on the stump of the main-mast, clapped his wings, and crowed aloud; in an instant three hearty cheers rang throughout the ship's company, and no more talk of surrender. At the same time the Aquilon frigate, commanded by the Hon. Sir Robert Stopford, seeing the helpless state the Marlborough was in, came to her assistance and towed her out of the line. The gallant admiral, in reply to a question about the *cock*, says, 'it partakes of a cock-and-a-bull story, but there is no mistake in the cheers of the crew on my taking her in tow.' It is nevertheless a true story: through the kindness of Sir Thomas Hardy, an inquiry was made among the old pensioners of the Marlborough in Greenwich hospital, and two of the most intelligent, Alexander Boswell and William Brett, fully corroborate the circumstance; and the latter states that, on the arrival of the ship at Plymouth, the cock was given to Lord George Lennox, the governor, by desire of Captain Berkeley. Lady Hardy has been good enough to ascertain from her aunt, Lady Mary Lennox, that the story is perfectly true, that the cock lived to a good old age, and that while the Marlborough remained at Plymouth it was daily visited by parties of her crew.—pp. 271—276.

The following anecdote of Captain Gambier will be read with pleasure, and is in happy accordance with his subsequent character.

'The Defence, Captain Gambier, behaved most gallantly, and was terribly cut up and totally dismasted; she was one of the few that passed through the enemy's line, got into the midst of the French ships, and lost her main and mizen-masts. Captain Gambier was an excellent officer, and a gentleman of strict principles of religion and morality. At the close of the action, Captain Pakenham, a rattling, good-humoured Irishman, hailed him from the Invincible, 'Well Jimmy, I see you are pretty well mauled; but never mind Jimmy, whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth.' Another incident took place in the little Defence: the lieutenant of the after-part of the main-deck, seeing a three-decker, the Republican, (which shot away her remaining mast,) suddenly bearing down towards them, struck with a kind of momentary panic, ran up to the quarter-deck, and addressing the captain with great eagerness, exclaimed, 'D— my eyes, Sir, but here is a whole mountain coming upon us; what shall we do?' Captain Gambier, unmoved, and looking gravely at him, said, in a solemn tone, 'How dare you, Sir, at this awful moment, come to me with an oath in your mouth? Go down, Sir, and encourage your men to stand to their guns, like brave British seamen.' On asking Captain (then Lord) Gambier, some years afterwards, if the story was true, he replied, he believed something of the kind occurred.—p. 277.

The whole nation was enraptured by the tidings of this victory, and the following letters which passed on the occasion between George the Third and Mrs. Howe, the sister of the Admiral, sufficiently bespeak the importance attached to it.

‘Windsor, 11th of June, 1794.

‘Mrs. Howe's zeal for the great cause in which this country is engaged, added to her becoming ardour for the glory of her family, must make her feel with redoubled joy the glorious news brought by Sir Roger Curtis ; she will, I hope, be satisfied now that *Earl Richard* has, with twenty-five sail of the line, attacked twenty-six of the enemy, taken six and sunk two :\* besides, it is not improbable that some of the disabled ships of the enemy may not be able to reach their own shore. I own I could not refrain from expressing my sentiments on the occasion, but will not detain her by adding more.

(Signed) ‘GEORGE R.’

To which gracious communication Mrs. Howe returned the following admirable reply :—

‘When Mrs. Howe heard last night of the victory obtained by your Majesty's fleet, she did not feel a possibility of any addition to her felicity, but the approbation expressed by your Majesty of what has been performed, and the honour done her by so precious and so gracious a notice of it, under the hand of her adored Sovereign, has proved the contrary : and she has only to regret that a woman cannot throw herself at your Majesty's feet this morning at the levee, and there to have endeavoured to express her heartfelt gratitude.’—pp. 263, 264.

Having already indulged so copiously in extracts from this volume, we must pass over several which we had marked, and restrict ourselves to the following comparison of Howe, St. Vincent, and Nelson, three of the most distinguished names occurring in the naval history of our country :

‘Howe unquestionably led the way. He was his own sole instructor in naval matters—not brought up in any particular school—hardly indeed can it be said there was any school in the early part of his career. Whatever he gained, from the various commanders under whom he served, must have been by comparison, observation, and reflection. At that time, there was very little system observed in the navy, and still less of science. Naval tactics, evolutions, and signals were then but feebly creeping into use, in humble imitation of the French, and had made but slow progress—rarely attempted indeed to be carried into practice except by one individual—the talented and unfortunate Kempenfelt, who perished in the *Royal George*. After him, Howe seriously took them up, and never lost sight of these important objects until he had completed a system which long bore the name of ‘Howe's Signals.’ In the perfecting of this system he was indefatigable—whether on shore or afloat, theoretically or practically this favorite and most useful object was uppermost in his mind. It is scarcely necessary to repeat that Howe was professionally and characteristically bold, cool, and decisive—a thorough seaman in theory and practice—and his knowledge was conveyed to others mostly by mildness, persuasion, and the force of example.

\* ‘A very common error at this time.’

In tactics and in discipline, St. Vincent was a disciple of Howe. In giving his opinion on the expediency of a night action with a superior enemy, the former decided against it, on the ground of being in such a case deprived of the great advantage of Howe's signals. In discipline the scholar may be said to have carried his mode of instruction beyond the master. Where Howe was patient, gentle, indulgent, and kind, by which he won the attachment of both officers and seamen, St. Vincent was rigorous, peremptory, and resolute, rigidly maintaining that the life and soul of naval discipline was obedience—his favourite word was *obedienza*. The one obtained his object by pursuing the *suaviter in modo*—the other by the *fortiter in re*. The mutinous seamen at Portsmouth, but half subdued, were at once completely reduced to order by the kind and gentle treatment of, and the confidence they placed in, Lord Howe. The mutiny in the fleet off Cadiz no sooner sprung up, than it was crushed by the prompt and vigorous measures of Lord St. Vincent, whose determined and resolute conduct, on that occasion, was absolutely necessary to prevent that spirit of insubordination from spreading which had manifested itself in many of the ships employed in blockading a distant and an enemy's port.

These two gallant admirals, pursuing different modes of attaining the same ends, and of very different temperaments, had the greatest respect and deference for each other. St. Vincent always spoke of Howe in terms of the highest praise and regard. He used to say he was a man of few words, but what he said was always to the purpose, and well worthy to be remembered. The kindly feelings of men towards each other are frequently discovered in trifling incidents or expressions: Lord St. Vincent, on entering the breakfast-room, would often say, 'Well, I have got on my blue breeches this cold morning; Lord Howe wore blue breeches, and I love to follow his example even in my dress.' On the other hand, St. Vincent was considered by Howe as the first naval officer of his day. In a letter already quoted, he says, 'I will only commission you to assure him (Lord St. Vincent) in my behalf, in simple veracity, that his eminent services have not exceeded my expectations.\* He was unquestionably a fearless and intelligent commander, bold in design and prompt in execution, free in his opinions, generous, and charitable without ostentation; a keen observer of mankind; indulgent to minor offences, severe in those of an aggravated nature. In politics he was a Whig, firmly attached to his party; but his friends always maintained that he never allowed his political feelings to interfere with his professional duties. As an officer his talents were certainly of the highest order, and many excellent commanders were educated and brought forward under his auspices. With all this merit, which public opinion duly appreciated, he is said (by one who knew him well) to have affected, as well when afloat as under circumstances on shore, the character of a blunt tar, obstinate in his resolutions, and rough in the manner of exercising his authority

\* A beautiful and highly-prized letter was written by Lord Howe to St. Vincent on his victory of 1797, which by some means or other is said to have disappeared from the family papers, to the great regret and annoyance of the surviving connexions.

over the officers of his fleet ; but notwithstanding this, the feature by which he was best known in society was that of a refined courtier, smooth and complimentary in his address. His professional character, however, was steady resolution and firmness of purpose.

' The character and conduct of Nelson were widely different from both of the above-mentioned officers. Without being a thorough seaman, he knew well how to stimulate exertions and to animate zeal. He had the peculiar tact to make every officer, from the highest to the lowest, believe that his individual share in any enterprise contributed mainly to its success—thus giving encouragement and inspiring confidence to each in his own exertions. In the result he was singularly fortunate : where he led all were anxious to follow. Nelson was indeed a being *sui generis*—' none but himself could be his parallel '—and it may be feared he has left few of the same breed behind him. That he had his weak points cannot be denied, but what human being is exempt from them ? He has been unjustly compared with an Anthony, ready to sacrifice the world to another Cleopatra—than which nothing can be more incorrect ; with one unfortunate exception, which in a moment of infatuation, has cast an indelible stain on his memory, he never suffered the deplorable influence alluded to in any way to interfere with his professional duties. Whenever such demanded his presence, all pleasures and indulgences gave way ; neither these nor the least care of life occupied for a moment a share in his thoughts. A passionate and insatiable love of fame was the ' spur ' to Nelson's noble mind.' To be ' Crowned with Laurel or covered with Cypress '—' a Peerage or Westminster Abbey '—' Victory or Westminster Abbey '—these were the *words*, the signal for each terrible conflict. He never anticipated defeat, but went into battle with the full conviction he was to conquer or die. The *words* were the ebullition of that feeling, which carried his feeble frame through exertions and energies, that nothing short of his ardent and spiritual nature could have supported. The strength and elasticity of his mind got complete control over bodily pain and infirmity. These in the scale of human affliction were to him as nothing, when in sight or pursuit of an enemy. An ambitious love of distinction, a thirst for the acquisition of honours, or a glorious death, was the ruling passion, and his destiny led him to experience them all. Conqueror of ' a hundred fights,' he died at last, as all true heroes would wish to do, in the arms of victory !—pp. 426—431.

Sir John Barrow's volume is a valuable addition to this department of biography. Though wanting the charm which so eminently characterises Southey's *Life of Nelson*, it will be read without weariness by all classes, and must certainly leave an impression highly favourable to the private character, as well as to the professional services of its subject. It is not free from the false morality which unhappily pervades the higher classes of society. We refer especially to some remarks occurring at page 421, respecting duelling, the most absurd and palpably unchristian of modern fashions. When will men bearing the form and claiming the attributes of a rational nature, cease to dishonor themselves, and throw contempt on their Maker ?

Art. VI. *General Introduction to a Course of Lectures on English Grammar and Composition.* By HENRY ROGERS, Professor of the English Language and Literature, University College, London. William Ball. 1838.

THESE lectures have a claim on our notice which the generality of such performances do not possess. Besides a full and perspicuous declaration of the objects of the course to which they are introductory, and the mode in which it is proposed to secure them, they contain the discussion, and we think the determination of certain questions, upon which opinions have been hitherto divided, or altogether erroneous. For these reasons we proceed to draw the attention of our readers to the little volume whose title stands at the head of our remarks.

In what the author justly calls a singularly eloquent article on Montague's Life of Lord Bacon, contained in a late number of the Edinburgh Review, and attributed to Mr. Babington Macaulay, a view is taken of what Bacon accomplished by his *Novum Organum* and *Advancement of Learning*, which we think with Professor Rogers, implies a low and unjust estimate of the influence these immortal works have had on the spirit of physical research, and an erroneous judgment of the mode in which that influence has been exerted.

The method of investigation which bears Bacon's name, and will carry his fame down to the latest ages, was certainly not originated by him. It is that by which all discoveries have been and will be made from the beginning to the end of time; and the misconception of this point is most happily ridiculed by the reviewer. But though it is the only way to success, it was not the only way taken. A natural impotency to discern or pursue it, has ever been among the evidences of the fall. With few exceptions, up to Bacon's era, men had done little else than blunder in the wrong one—asking their toiling fancies for that information which can only be obtained by observation and comparison of facts. Since that time we know the case has been different, and we only subscribe to the opinion of all subsequent philosophers, in giving Bacon the credit of having instituted the true and natural mode of interpreting the laws of our economy. This he did by giving us a perfect account of the steps by which it is pursued. The close observation of his own consciousness brought to light the facts involved in this process, and the exact order of their succession (and this is all the wise ever attempt in their researches). He thus became the discoverer, for so practically he may be considered, of the natural method of investigating truth, by the exercise of that method itself. Unable to confer lesser benefits, as he has shown himself, his labour created a

patent that will be prolific of happy inventions while the world endures—as long as the known, and as yet unknown laws of nature continue to be the rich inheritance of mankind.

The utility of this achievement is disputed by the reviewer, because 'it was only telling the world to do what all the world 'was doing before,' and he illustrates his meaning by what we think Mr. Rogers's pages will prove to be an unfortunate reference to—systems of Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric. It is not too much to say that had the acuteness of a rare sagacity been reinforced by a severer discipline in the studies he condemns, the distinguished author of the views in question would not have lent his genius to the support of a fallacy, nor so successfully have hindered its detection by many of his readers, by surrounding it with a dazzling eloquence. He would have been unable to do the one, and unwilling to do the other. 'A process,' says the reviewer, 'is not likely to be better performed because men 'know how they perform it.' Upon this our author joins issue with him.

We cannot profess to do justice to Mr. Rogers's able refutation of this position, for our limits confine us to very brief extracts. He is of course principally concerned in it, as it excuses from the study of Grammar and Rhetoric—but if it be shown not to hold good in these cases, it must be surrendered as inapplicable to any. In an Appendix a more specific defence, on this ground, of Bacon's philosophy, is undertaken. After stating that the systematic exposition of the principles of induction corrected the spirit in which men applied them; and secondly, gave uniformity to the conduct of philosophers, our author says :

'As to the first; it is quite true, as the Reviewer has remarked, that no accurate rules can be laid down for determining when any particular induction has been properly performed, 'what collection of facts is scanty, or what number of experiments are sufficient to determine' a point; but surely the *spirit* in which such inquiries will be conducted, will be prodigiously affected by our knowledge or ignorance even of those general rules, to which the Reviewer attaches so little importance. To be put distinctly on our guard against those various errors and prejudices, which Bacon has so fancifully yet beautifully described under the name of *Idola*, and which so often vitiate the conclusions of the vulgar, (however naturally sagacious they may be,) must surely tend to render our inquiries more enlarged, liberal, and comprehensive, and to diminish the chances of our failure. If not, we must adopt the paradoxical conclusion, that if two men, of equal sagacity and skill, one of whom was thoroughly and systematically acquainted with Bacon's principles, and the other totally ignorant of them, were requested to attempt an explanation of some complicated phenomena, both would be *equally* liable to error;—to rest contented with a hasty induction or slight collection of facts; to be imposed

upon by those numerous prejudices, against which the one is distinctly put on his guard beforehand, while the other is left in ignorance of them, or must detect them by that which the whole history of philosophy shows is not sufficient for this purpose,—his unaided sagacity.—I believe there is not a person in the world who would receive this statement. Here, as in other cases, ‘to be fore-warned is to be fore-armed;’ and to me it appears, there would be as great a difference between the two men, as there would be between two skilful military commanders, one of whom is well acquainted with the general localities of the country he is traversing, and with the points in which danger or ambush may lie concealed, and the other entirely ignorant of both.

It is no argument to reply, that many philosophers now act upon the inductive philosophy in the most enlarged spirit, who have never perused the writings of Bacon. The spirit, which he first inculcated, has been universally diffused; his principles have been transferred to innumerable volumes, and illustrated by a host of examples. It is a natural consequence attending the wide diffusion and practical adoption of certain great principles, that we become, in some degree, ungrateful to the memory of him who at first propounded them. Nothing can be more true than the statement of a great modern writer, that the ‘philosophy of one age becomes the common sense of another;’ it may be added with equal truth, that when it does thus become familiar ‘common sense,’ we often forget to recognise its philosophical origin.

As to the second point;—Bacon’s distinct enunciation of the inductive method made the adoption of that method *uniform*. Though all men had performed the inductive process on some occasions, it does not follow that all men performed it whenever they ought; on the contrary, we know, from the history of philosophy, that they often did not: in other words, they were (to use the language of Bacon) ‘anticipators,’ not ‘interpreters,’ of nature. The Reviewer, indeed, tells us there is no distinction between them, except that the former perform the process of induction ‘ill,’ the latter ‘well.’ Yet he himself admits the contrary; for he acknowledges that men may form their conclusions not only from a hasty and scanty induction, but *on no induction at all*,—‘from premises grounded on assumption.’ Thus, he admits, the schoolmen often acted, and thus, we may add, the *generality* of the ancient philosophers acted: it is true, they often instinctively adopted the method which Bacon recommends, but as their adoption of it was *only* instinctive, as they had *no distinct consciousness* that this was the sole method by which they could discover the truth they sought, they did not adopt it *uniformly*. Now it is precisely this clear perception of the principles on which we act, which makes all the difference between a vague and indeterminate, or uniform and steady application of them.’—pp. 121—125.

We should gladly quote more largely, but there is yet another topic which invites us. This occupies a great part of the second lecture, and we therefore cannot pretend to do more than create a desire to see in its entire state, what we must be content to produce in a broken and imperfect abstract. In speaking of

that large class of compositions which have the communication of pleasure for their object, the author disputes Dr. Whateley's definition of poetry, that metre is its essence. Ordinary language, (for it must be recollected that this is a question about the popular meaning of a term,) is, he alleges, opposed to this. For nothing is more common than to hear passages of Jeremy Taylor called 'noble poetry.' And this is done when it is manifestly the object of the writer, for the time at least, to please. Nobody, however, would term them 'noble verses.'

' For, according to this theory, Euclid's Elements, Mrs. Dalgairn's Cookery-book, Dr. Johnson's Dictionary, the Companion to the Almanac, the Eton Grammar, or the London Directory, *done into verse*, would be poetry ! ' True,' it would be replied by a disciple of Dr. Whately, ' it is poetry, but it is *very bad* poetry.' If it were admitted to be poetry at all, there would be no doubt of that. But in popular estimation, it would not be considered poetry at all ; showing, that while we ordinarily restrict the term only to metrical composition, we do not consider its essence to be metre ; but that to constitute it poetry, certain other conditions must be complied with. What, then, are those conditions ? I do not know that any other answer can be given, than that the general structure of the composition must be *designed and adapted* to impart pleasure, this being the end of this species of composition. This, of course, involves a limitation to such subjects as are, in some way or other, capable of pleasing.—If it be said, that this account of poetry does not tell us what that particular quality of thought or style is which produces the pleasure, I answer no ; because there is no *one* such quality. The elements which produce it are manifold, and may be mingled in all kinds of proportions ; and the answer to such a question, therefore, could only be given by an analysis of the various causes which conspire to produce this pleasure.

\* \* \*

' Poetry, then, as the term is generally used, (and here I am happy to have the entire concurrence of Dr. Whately,) does not consist in any one particular quality of thought or style, but is a *species of composition*. The topics of which it treats may be treated in other species of composition : the faculties of mind it more peculiarly demands—imagination and fancy—are employed by the orator, and the historian, as well as by the poet ; the various powers of language, whether proper or figurative, are none of them exclusively its own : comparison, simile, metaphor, and every kind of trope, are found, though used in a different way, nearly as often in the pages of South or Burke, as in those of Milton or Byron. In a word, the materials or elements of eloquence and poetry may be the same ; it is the manner in which they are employed, the proportions in which they are mingled, the shaping which is given them to adapt them to the object, which form the sole distinction.

\* \* \*

' The essential conditions of poetry then, are, that the subjects shall

be capable of imparting immediate pleasure, either in themselves, or from the fidelity and truth to nature with which they are exhibited, and that the language in which they are clothed shall be designed and adapted to promote the same end. Any such thoughts so expressed have, in my opinion, the *essence* of poetry, and if expressed in a metrical form, are poetry in the *ordinary* sense.'—pp. 86—91.

We apply the term poetry then,

'To Milton's *Paradise Lost*, and to Pope's *Rape of the Lock*; to Byron's *Childe Harold*, and to *Hudibras*; to Spenser's *Fairy Queen*, and to Thomson's *Seasons*; to Scott's *Marmion*, and *Crabbe's Tales of the Hall*; to Milton's *Comus*, and Burns's *Tam O'Shanter*; to Dryden's *Ode on Cecilia's Day*, and to Prior's *Alma*; to Cowper's *Task*, and to Pope's *Dunciad*; to Gray's *Elegy*, and Philips's *Splendid Shilling*.

'If these views be correct, it is easy at once to see the inadequacy of those definitions of poetry, which have made its essence to consist in some one quality of thought or diction, rather than in the *general mode* of exhibiting the immensely varied subjects of which it treats, in pursuance of the primary design of imparting pleasure. Thus to take one example, (and I have no time to advert to more,) poetry has been sometimes defined as consisting in the various forms of what is called figurative language, as comparison, simile, metaphor. It is true, indeed, that these are amongst the characteristic excellencies of poetry, and one of the *many modes* of employing language by which it succeeds in attaining its end of imparting pleasure. It is also true, that there are some forms of such language which are more peculiarly proper to poetry. It is easy, however, to see, that this definition is, in one respect, too wide, and in another too narrow: it is too wide, for it would give the formal character of poetry to every sentence in any historical or argumentative work which contains a brilliant metaphor; and it is too narrow, inasmuch as it would take it away altogether from much which all agree in allowing to be poetry of a highly pleasing order,—I mean from innumerable passages of descriptive poetry, and the poetry of sentiment and passion. To restrict myself to the former; it would be easy to point out many passages of the most vivid description, which do not contain a single comparison or metaphor in them; in which, in fact, every word is strictly proper, and used in its literal sense. The following examples will suffice.'—pp. 93—95.

The examples given are, Goldsmith's *Description of the Village before it was Deserted*; Thompson's, of the *Traveller Lost in the Snow*; and Cowper's *Picture of the Woodman Going to his Work*; and happier could not have been pitched upon. Three beautiful passages from Shakspeare; the *Laughter of Achilles*, in *Troilus and Cressida*; the *Dying Apostrophe of Anthony to Cleopatra*; and the pathetic words uttered by Lear after his restoration to reason; to which a writer in the *Edinburgh Review* is compelled to refuse the title of poetry, because they are desti-

tute of imagery, although their claims, we suppose, would be supported by the whole world.

The fact that poetry appears generally in the garb of metre is accounted for, by that contrivance being one means of attaining the end in view, viz. delight. But it may fairly be doubted whether the comparatively modern origin of prose compositions that contemplate the same object, be not the reason why any difficulty is felt in classing them under the head of poetry. Mr. Rogers enumerates their points of similarity with the acknowledged models of poetry, and thus justifies the grouping in one common class of Homer's *Iliad* and Scott's *Ivanhoe*; *Don Juan* and *Hudibras*; *Gulliver's Travels* and the *Rape of the Lock*; &c., &c. He acknowledges the want of a term by which all persons would be content to express their belief in the propriety of this classification. He has supplied argument sufficient, we think, to make them extend the sense of the old one.

As long as clear conceptions are felt to be desirable, and while there are people who are not satisfied with phraseology of uncertain meaning—who prefer that the current coin of discourse should be assayed before it is issued, such discussions as these will possess a value apart from their subject. The impatience of laxity in expression will be generated and increased by every instance of its correction. But there is such a thing as literature, and people will criticise, justly or not, and therefore we thank Mr. Rogers for determining as we think he has, a much vexed question—ridding us, for the future, as far as lay in his power, of much writing on these subjects which is erroneous and inconsequential.

It is unnecessary for us to characterize his volume,—we have, in part, enabled our readers to do this for themselves; and he is already familiar to them by our reviews of the only biography of John Howe worthy so noble a subject, and of the valuable preliminary Essays he has contributed to the collected works of Jonathan Edwards, Jeremy Taylor, and Burke. One merit in these lectures we cannot pass over which augurs well for the class under his tuition, as Professor of English Literature—the propriety of his style for his purpose. This is to instruct and convince, and to it every thing is subordinate and subservient. He is no where willing to use the common license of an Introductory Lecture, for what is called fine writing. His object is to carry his readers with him, not to make them stop to admire. That is an after process to be performed by the judicious. But does a composition so perspicuous and energetic, need such frequent italics? We do not remember being indebted to their admonitions for one of the emphases we gave to his sentences as we read them.

Art. VII. *Two Memorials Addressed to the General Meeting of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, on the Alleged Corrupt Character of some of its Publications.* 8vo. London: L. & G. Seeley.

THE Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, is generally described by the epithet 'venerable,'—that is, the orthodox churchmen generally thus describe it. The term may refer to its *age*, as it has existed for more than a hundred years; or it may refer to its staid, sober, dignified character,—so opposite to the noisy, bustling, platform activity of modern institutions; or it may refer to the fact, of its concentrating in its support the great mass of the clergy, and being thus so completely identified with the Establishment, as to merit an epithet universally employed as descriptive of *it*. Whatever be the cause, such is the custom; and no one, we believe, who knows any thing of the subject, will doubt, that whatever terms of admiration or respect the Establishment itself deserves from her sons, the very same terms may be applied to the 'Society,' as combining in its members the rank, dignity, learning, and official and personal support of the clerical body, which, in popular language, is the church. The influence of the Society is immense; its books and tracts are circulated zealously and extensively; they have exerted, and do exert, no ordinary power over the formation of the religious opinions of church people, especially of the lower and the higher classes. With the orthodox of the latter, it is almost a point of honour to support the institution; even the Evangelical party very generally subscribe to it, although the late Mr. Simeon, of Cambridge, was 'repeatedly black-balled,' (to use the words of the 'Record,') before he could gain admission,—all admitted to membership having to be regularly proposed and formally voted in, we believe by 'the ballot.'

As Evangelical principles have become diffused among the clergy, the eyes of many have been opened to the Pharisaical and unscriptural nature of the theology inculcated in the publications of the 'Venerable' Society. The 'Record' and 'Christian Observer,' have, for years past, been occasionally dilating upon this topic; while frequent and great contentions have taken place in the meetings of the Body itself, between the advocates of the Evangelical system and those of the old formal and Pharisaical orthodoxy. It is admitted, on all hands, that the numbers of the latter are very far beyond theirs whom *we* deem Scriptural in their doctrine, and that the great mass of the Society's publications, represent, very naturally, the creed and principles—the theological 'image and superscription,' of the majority of its members.

Among the means by which a reformation in the Society's publications has been attempted, certain clergymen have had recourse to that of memorializing the General Meeting, in order to secure the appointment of a Committee for this purpose. This effort having proved fruitless, they have thought proper to publish to the world what they had hoped it would have been enough to submit to the Society. The pamphlet at the head of this article, consisting of no less than 110 octavo pages, contains 'Two Memorials,' as the title states;—it contains, however, also, the resolutions of the Society upon them, and the letters of the Secretaries conveying the resolutions to the memorialists. The 'Memorials' as published, and forming almost a volume, are preceded by the following dedication, which we give, as at once showing who the memorialists are, and the deep importance which they attach to their object.

'To the King's most excellent Majesty, the Right Rev. the Bishops, the Rev. the Clergy, and to the General Body of Members of the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, and its District Committees; the following Correspondence Respecting the Alleged Errors of some of the Publications Circulated by the Society, is Respectfully Dedicated by their Fellow-Members and Memorialists:

} Essex.

- Hastings Robinson, D.D., Rector of Great Warley,
- Henry Budd, M.A., Rector of White Roothing,
- Guy Bryan, M.A., Rector of Woodham Walter,
- Charles Isaac Yorke, M.A., Rector of Shenfield,
- Henry B. S. Harris, B.A., Rector of Leaden Roothing.'

Every body has heard of Mr. Binney's 'celebrated sentence'; it has become so familiar that we need not repeat it. Now, we speak in perfect, calm, sober seriousness, when we say, that the point which the pamphlet before us aims at establishing, is this—that '*the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge*,' probably 'destroys more souls than it saves.' This, to use Mr. Binney's words, is the 'deep, serious, religious conviction' of its authors; and, we hesitate not to add, that such *must* be the conviction of any man, or any number of men, who regard Scriptural views of Evangelical truth as necessary to salvation, and who sympathize with the apostle Paul's vehement hostility to 'another Gospel':—'if I, or an angel from heaven, preach it, let him be accursed.'

In our number for November last, we reviewed the pamphlet entitled 'What? and Who says it?' by John Search,—a production, which unanswerably shows that Mr. Binney has said nothing but what churchmen themselves have said both before him and since. It required no talent—no argumentative ability to do this; the unanswerableness of the pamphlet referred to, consists

in the simple citation of the words of the 'Christian Observer,' the 'Record,' Dr. Chalmers, &c., in which statements are made, and opinions expressed, *identical*, in substance, with those of 'the person,' whom Dr. Burton described, as 'a man whose heart was 'untouched with the charity of the Gospel, and whose conversion was not to be effected by human means?' Those who have seen '*What? and Who says it?*' will remember the use that its editor makes of the presumption in support of the 'celebrated sentence,' from the character of the Christian Knowledge Society's publications, as depicted by *churchmen*. He quotes one, as acknowledging that he concealed the whole twelve volumes of its Tracts from the eyes of his family, as containing unsound and delusory statements of truth!—another, as affirming, that many of its publications perverted the Gospel, or blended it with vital and fundamental error;—and, not content with this, who went on farther to express his 'conviction' that the *preaching* of the men, whose views accorded with such books—men constituting 'an overwhelming majority' of the clergy—'led their hearers down to the chambers of death.' It is to be regretted that Mr. Search has made no use of the Memorials before us. They had not, we suppose, fallen into his hands, for, if they had, he could not fail to have perceived the importance of their testimony. They are not hasty leading articles of a newspaper,—nor rapidly written reviews for a magazine,—nor driving, dashing declamation like what is indulged in by Chalmers,—nor any thing, in fact, which, while writing, the author might feel was intended only for his own circle, and would not be scrutinized by the eyes of opponents. They are the deliberately composed and adopted Memorials of five clergymen—presented to a General Meeting of the members of a 'Venerable Society,' the majority of which Body was known to be strongly opposed to their views;—the second is a long, laboured exposition and support of the positions of the first;—there could be nothing hasty in the business, for it necessarily occupied several months, and could only have been begun after much thought, frequent consultations, and many prayers;—and, finally, after the writing, and transcription, and adopting, and forwarding, and waiting for replies, they are not only committed to the press, but formally dedicated to the secular head and the spiritual dignitaries of the church; and publishers are appointed, not only in London, but at *Cambridge* and *Oxford*, as if to facilitate their being procured, examined, and '*Searched*' by the members of their erudite and 'venerable' Universities!

The first Memorial was presented to the Society in June, 1836, in consequence of a letter from the Secretary, six months previously, in answer to *another* Memorial which had been presented before, requesting the republication of 'Fox's Acts and

Monuments,' which request the Society thought proper to decline. It is not our intention to go into the discussion of matters connected with a Society to which we do not belong ; our object will be, to select a few passages from the pamphlet, showing in what way *five clergymen* speak of an Institution whose influence on the religion of the nation, and consequently on the final condition of multitudes of immortal souls, is necessarily great. The complaint of the memorialists originated in the Society's want of Tracts against Popery,—in its ceasing to issue some such Tracts, which it had once published—and in its declining a direct request for the republication of the 'Acts and Monuments.' This last circumstance led the memorialists into a statement respecting the origin of the Society, and the objectionable nature of many of its publications ;—and, this being followed by no result, led them to reiterate their accusations, and to support them by proofs, which constitutes the *second* and more elaborate Memorial of the two.

They begin by showing, that the 'Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge' arose out of the efforts of certain bishops to counteract the doctrine of *justification by faith*, as explained in the Homilies, some expresssions in which, they conceived, were carried too far, and needed mitigation. A scheme, it appears, was entertained of getting up another set of Homilies, and some were actually written ; the entire plan, however, was never fulfilled, but it led, ultimately, to the formation of the Society in question, and infused into its publications that character, which they have always exhibited, and still maintain. This is stated in the following passage :

' The Undersigned submit to the General Meeting, that the character of these Homilies intended for an Essay, is dry and unevangelical, and directly opposed in their spirit to the doctrine of '*Justification by faith only*,' as held by our Church throughout all her formularies, and by all the Reformed Churches. Let the following extract serve as a specimen taken from the second Homily in this volume, p. 249. 'A charitable man that has had much occasion given him to forbear and forgive others, and to do good for evil, *dares lay claim to mercy and pardon*, with much humble assurance ; for though he is very ready to call the debts of others to him, as the owing a few *pence*, while he acknowledges he owes many talents to God ; yet from a forgiving temper in himself, he gathers both an argument to *plead for forgiveness*, and a *character* that makes him conclude, that 'much is forgiven' him, because he feels 'he loves much.' He has a brightness in his mind while he looks up to God, and he is sure that such prayers, joined with pure and tender affections to all about him, are as a sweet-smelling savour before God.' Among the manifold errors of this passage, it is only necessary to remark, that any charitable man, however self-denying his charities, should '*dare lay claim to mercy and pardon with much*

humble assurance,' is in fact, to arrogate to himself that claim to justification which a lively faith finds in the blood and merit of the Saviour alone. Hence his justification is made to proceed from himself, and not from the mercy of God in Christ Jesus, applied by faith to himself through the Spirit.

*Such was the divinity provided for the Church of England, BY THE DIVINES IN WHOM THIS SOCIETY ORIGINATED*, extracted from a Homily, which was composed by Bishop Burnet, 'corrected very justly and critically' by Bishop Lloyd; and with which Archbishop Tillotson 'was so pleased,' that 'he told' the author, he 'must take for his share the whole Ten Commandments.'

*'And, as they submit, it has been proved above that the first founders of the Society held and recommended a style of divinity DIRECTLY OPPOSED to the great leading doctrine of the Reformation; so it seems equally evident from the character of THE GREAT BODY OF THE SOCIETY'S TRACTS AND PUBLICATIONS, that the same erroneous style of doctrine has prevailed from the very origin of the Society to the present day.'*—pp. 7, 8.

The memorialists proceed to state, that the 'fashionable divinity' prevalent at the time, when this Society was formed, being *against* the doctrines and views of the Reformers, none of their 'admirable Tracts on Doctrine and Practice' were selected by it for circulation—'but,' instead of this, they observe,

'As the necessary consequence of the operation of the principle above asserted, 'the claim' of justification by human merit in opposition to *justification by faith alone*—the great fundamental doctrine of the Reformation,—they are not aware that one single work of the Reformation (the Bible and Prayer-Book excepted) was received on the original list of the Society's books and tracts.'—p. 9.

Again :

'The early tracts very naturally partook of the sentiments of the Founders of the Society, which were, *in the great fundamental principle of faith and practice*, as shown by one of the most influential of them, Bishop Burnet, *at variance with the recorded doctrine of the Reformation*: neither does it appear, that at the present day, the works of the Reformers are adequately recommended by the Society; or that the evangelical sentiments of the Reformers (so far as the books and tracts circulated by the Society testify the fact) are those which the Society considers itself as engaged EITHER TO ADOPT OR TO CIRCULATE.'—pp. 10, 11.

As to correcting such publications they observe,

'Where the principle is generally defective, the correction of an objectionable passage, or the insertion of an explanatory paragraph, must be utterly unequal to correct the evil. If the principle be defective,

the superstructure is defective : and like the walls of a house built on an imperfect foundation, the only effectual corrective is to rebuild it. That the Tract Committee therefore to whom such references were made, should report, that having given the best endeavours to fulfil the wishes of the Board as to the correction of the tracts already on the list of the Society, they felt themselves unable to perform them, and therefore begged to relinquish that part of their office which respected the correction of such tracts, was but to be expected. An impossible task was imposed on them, and they could not but feel themselves unable to perform it.'—pp. 11, 12.

The two following passages will show the light in which the memorialists, with their views of Evangelical truth, and anxiety for the souls of men, necessarily view the deluging of the nation with such 'unsound,' 'delusory,' and 'destructive' statements, of the *way to be saved*.

'The Undersigned then, solemnly contemplating the numbers, pecuniary resources, varied means of usefulness, extended influence, and *professed* object of the Society, as a Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, a Society venerable for its antiquity, and *possessing confessedly the largest means of Promoting Christian Knowledge in the land, through the medium of the Established Church*, and therefore, most awfully responsible for its proceedings both to God and man ; do most earnestly implore the General Meeting to take into their serious consideration, the objections which are so repeatedly, and, as it appears to the Undersigned, *justly brought against the general principle of the Society's tracts*.'—p. 12.

'If an apology be sought for the length of this Memorial, it must be found in *the awful importance of its subject* ; which relates to the correction of the publications of a Society, which, while for more than the last hundred and thirty years, it has been a blessing to the land, by the circulation of tens of thousands of Bibles and Prayer Books ; raises a doubt, whether *from the questionable character of many of its accompanying publications, it has not been exercising a contravening influence, AND IMPEDED THE PROGRESS OF DIVINE TRUTH BY AN UNHAPPY ADMIXTURE OF ERROR*.'—p. 16.

These extracts are all taken from the *first* Memorial, and sufficiently indicate its character and aim, together with the views and feelings of the memorialists. They are obviously men strongly attached to the great doctrine of justification by faith—the essence of the Gospel—the doctrine of a standing or falling church—and as strongly impressed with the *unsound character and most dangerous tendency of the Christian Knowledge Society's publications*. The manner in which the Memorial was received and disposed of will be seen by the following extracts from the letter of the Secretaries to the memorialists.

\* \* \* \* \*

‘The Standing Committee also regret, that any Members of the Society should think it necessary at this distance of time, to bring charges of unsound doctrine against several eminent Prelates of our Church, who were connected with the Society in the earlier periods of its history; and they trust that you will see the propriety of their declining on the part of the Society to enter upon the discussion of such a question.

\* \* \* \* \*

‘With reference to those parts of the Memorial which relate to the *Doctrines* contained in the Society’s publications, we are directed to transmit to you the following Resolution of the Board, agreed to [at] a numerous meeting held the same day on which the Memorial was read, *his Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury in the chair.*

‘RESOLVED,

‘That on the re-appointment of the Tract Committee, the Board feels it right to repeat the declarations which its Secretaries were instructed to make to the District Committees in the year 1834, namely, that *it is not disposed to yield to UNREASONABLE OBJECTIONS, nor to give up those principles of SOUND DOCTRINE WHICH IT HAS SO LONG MAINTAINED*: and that *it is most anxious to maintain UNCHANGED the character of the Society, as an institution formed for the purpose of promoting sound Religious Knowledge according to the doctrine and discipline of the United Church of England and Ireland.*’—pp. 17, 18.

The memorialists constantly aver and reiterate, that the doctrines taught by the Society, are *not* in accordance with those of the church; that they are unsound and dangerous, and an impediment to the progress of truth; and that the entire character of the Society’s divinity should be changed: but, a numerous meeting of the members of the Society itself, with the Archbishop of Canterbury at its head, ‘resolve’ that all this is *very ‘unreasonable’*—that the principles of doctrine are most ‘*sound*’—and that they will maintain their theology *unchanged*, because it *is* in accordance with the ‘doctrine and discipline of the united church of England and Ireland! and, if the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the General Meeting of a Society embracing 99 hundredths of the clergy, do not know what accords with the doctrine of the church, where are we to look for information respecting it? What is the church? printed papers, or the living body of ecclesiastics at any one time existing and teaching? What is the *doctrine of the church?* the views expressed in printed documents, or the sentiments uttered and enforced from her pulpits? On the *first* supposition, the Archbishop and the Society are either right or wrong;—if right, the memorialists must regard the church as most dangerous to salvation; and if wrong, what security is there in subscription for either honesty or truth? if the latter supposition be taken, the Archbishop and the Society *must*

be right, for they must know what *they themselves think* 'sound doctrine'—and *then* the Memorialists must feel, that, *with their views*, they cannot but conclude, that his Grace himself, and the great mass of their brethren, are, every Sunday, 'impeding the 'progress of divine truth,'—connecting so much of it as they teach 'with an unhappy admixture of error,'—and giving currency to those 'unsound and delusory statements' which Mr. Budd, *one of the Memorialists*, told the 'Christian Observer,' he most 'CARE-FULLY CONCEALED FROM THE EYES OF HIS FAMILY!'

The first memorial having received the reply given above, the memorialists composed a second, which occupies ninety pages of their present publication; it repeats, as we have said, the allegations of the first, but it is extended in consequence of its adducing *proof* in support of these allegations. This consists of several long extracts from 'Nelson's Fasts and Festivals,' and 'The 'Whole Duty of Man;' two works most extensively circulated by the Society, which constituted a sort of standard of Church of England religion, almost universally, during the greater part of the last century; and which still hold an undisputed place in the estimation of the great majority of the clergy as sound exponents of doctrine and duty—the *Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bartlett's Buildings' Society* being *witnesses*. If any one is anxious to see the case in full, he can purchase the pamphlet itself; we shall content ourselves, after this general account of it, with merely selecting some of the expressions of the reverend memorialists to illustrate the way—not in which *Dissenters* speak—but in which *churchmen and clergymen can speak of the ruinous influence of their own national institutions*.

In introducing the two works above mentioned, which they describe as of 'the longest standing,' and as having met with the 'largest circulation' of any of the Society's publications, they say, that 'both these works set forth a *Christianity unknown both to the Bible and to our church*; a Christianity *as dishonourable to the mercy of God* as it is oppressive to the incapacity of man.' They say, that they do not wish to convey the idea that they have nothing to recommend them, for, 'they admit, they have so 'much of what is really good *as to make their errors more dangerous*,' and that

'They afford practical illustrations of the evil tendency of the design recommended by Archbishop Tillotson, and other early founders of the Society, to improve on the Reformation, as Bishop Burnet expresses it, by 'mitigating the height' to which our Homilies 'have carried justification by faith only'; the practical adoption of which sentiment by the Society your Memorialists cannot but deem the fruitful source of the false doctrine of human merit, which, in their judgment, distinguishes so many of the Society's publications.'

After having gone through Nelson's Book, contrasting, in parallel columns, its doctrines with those of the Homilies, they sum up the examination of it by expressing '*the utter hopelessness of correcting it so as to adapt it to general circulation,*' as '*the poison of false doctrine pervades it from first to last?*' a work, be it remembered, which *has* been generally circulated for a hundred years, and *is* generally circulated still! They then add the following,

'Such is the saint built upon Nelson's system, *and on that of* the large proportion of the Divines of the Church of England of his day, and of **THE GREAT MASS OF THE SOCIETY'S PUBLICATIONS**;—*the man of meritorious conditions*, which his incapable nature is unable to perform; a man who is in fact to arrive at heaven by the merit of his own good works, as those works are measured by a mitigated Law, and helped out by a weak and conditional Gospel; which brings neither comfort to ruined man, nor honour to the free mercy of a forgiving God! *And the prevalence of this system in our Church*, your Memorialists beg leave to press on the Society, *fully accounts for the unevangelized state of the Church of England* FROM THE TIME OF THE RESTORATION TO THE PRESENT HOUR; a state, which your Memorialists apprehend also, *must continue, so long as THE GREAT INFLUENTIAL BODY OF THE CLERGY AND LAITY, CONSTITUTING THIS SOCIETY, continue to circulate publications which uphold a system as Scriptural and Christian, which is opposed to the doctrines and spirit of the Reformation*, as scripturally exhibited in the Homilies, Articles, and Liturgy of our Church.'

After this they proceed to the examination of the 'Whole Duty of Man,' a work, they say, 'unhappily of equal celebrity' with Nelson's; 'long and largely circulated by the Society; ' built on the same false and unscriptural principles; ' neither 'suited to the wants of men, nor honourable to the mercy of 'God.' They admit, that it contains 'some excellent observations,' but '*they protest against the scheme of salvation interwoven throughout, as being essentially DEFECTIVE, UNSOUND, and DANGEROUS.*'

The following language, also, is by no means measured, which occurs in the body of their remarks.

'Your Memorialists offer no apology for the length to which the above remarks on this confusion of the two covenants of the Law and the Gospel have extended. *They deem it the MASTER-MISCHIEF of the modern system of Divinity*—the Author having degraded the second covenant of mercy into a covenant of works, is necessarily driven into the **GROSS IMPIETY and MONSTROUS ABSURDITY** of *Mitigating the Divine Law, or sinking the perfection of Godhead to meet the sinful imperfections of fallen man.*'

Again, in page sixty-four: ‘*So mighty and so prevalent a mischievous* is this characteristic error of the modern school of divinity.’

Again:

‘But, further, the *practical evil* of this modern system is most awful. So far from hiding pride from man, by admitting him into a share of saving himself by his *conditional* righteousness, it elevates his pride, stimulates his presumption, and is the most effectual bar to that humility which is the appropriate soil in which alone the mercy of the Gospel can flourish: the full vessel refuses to be a recipient. It ‘makes the heart of the righteous sad, whom God hath not made sad,’ (Ezek. xiii. 22.) by encumbering the free Gospel of the covenant of grace with impossible *conditions*. It banishes grace out of the Church by elevating the congruity of nature into spiritual power, and thus misrepresenting the meetness of mere nature as divine grace, *as the prevailing system of modern divinity from the time of the Restoration to the beginning of this century* too lamentably proves; and as is sufficiently apparent to any one conversant with the style of sermons of that long period, which usually, with a Scripture text, begin by informing us what natural reason or the religion of nature say on the subject; and then conclude with a scant and meagre mention of this motley confusion of grace and conditional works as the Gospel of Christ, or rather as the subject of ‘revealed religion,’ without even giving us the name of the Gospel. *And it is with a still more distressing apprehension of the PRACTICAL EXTENT of this evil, that your Memorialists contemplate the probability that a LARGE PORTION OF THE CLERGY WHO PATRONIZE THIS SOCIETY, ALSO PATRONIZE THIS SYSTEM OF THE MODERN SCHOOL OF DIVINES, AS EXHIBITED IN THE SOCIETY’S PUBLICATIONS.*’

In concluding their review of the work in question, they say, ‘your Memorialists would ask the standing committee, whether ‘*this* doctrine, which the Society has so long maintained’ among its ‘principles of sound doctrine,’ is not *in direct contradiction* to ‘the great principle of the Reformation?’ and they urge that, instead of determining ‘to maintain *unchanged* the character of ‘the Society,’ they ought immediately to set about the work of correcting their errors, and excluding from publication some of their most favoured productions.

The Memorial concludes with noticing two or three *Tracts* of the Society in which the Memorialists find the same ‘unsound’ and ‘dangerous’ sentiments, addressed to youths, in ‘the First ‘steps to the Catechism,’ ‘Pastoral Advice,’ &c.

In page eighty-six occurs the following:

‘The second extract from Lewis, is, as your Memorialists apprehend, the master-error of *this doctrine of confusion, the grand characteristic of this modern school of Divines*; of which Archbishop Tillotson,

and the *Divines* who originated the *Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge*, were the *Patrons and Assertors*; and which so abundantly characterizes THE GREAT MASS of the *tracts* of the *Society*, viz. the representing 'faith and repentance as the meritorious *conditions* of the forgiveness of sin.'

They speak, also, in the next page, of this 'master-error as 'the impure leaven, corrupting some of the leading works, and 'many of the elementary tracts of the *Society*.'

The last sentence of the letter containing the *Society's* reply to the *Memorial*, is as follows:—

'The Standing Committee do not see any sufficient reason for recommending to the Board the appointment of a Committee for the revision of the *Society's* publications, in the manner suggested by the *Memorialists*.'

Thus rejected, the *Memorialists* have had recourse to their last hope—*publishing* their *Memorials*, and dedicating them to the King, the Bishops, and the members of the *Society*—with what success time must show. Another Monarch is now upon the throne; a Queen—buoyant, beautiful, and young! one, it is said, who likes the lightness of the Italian *Opera* better than the heavy *opera* of the *Reformers*, and who, therefore, probably understands very little about the questions here submitted to her; and, what she does understand, as the *Archbishop of Canterbury* is her chief pastor, is most probably *against* the *Memorialists*. They have made out a sad case against a *Society* which unquestionably represents the *general* state of opinion and feeling in the church, and by doing so, have told a terrible tale about *it*. We have room for but few comments; a word or two, however, must be added.

We request, then, our readers to turn to our number for November last, and glance over, in connexion with this article, that which they will find there on the pamphlet of *John Search*; or, if they have the pamphlet itself, so much the better. Let them listen to the language of churchmen not only respecting their own church, but respecting their own brethren—their brethren, charged with destroying souls by their personal preaching, and with combining to support a *society* which, for the last hundred years, has been filling the land with 'delusory' and 'destructive' doctrines, 'vital and fundamental error.' Let them hearken to *Mr. Budd*, who tells us that he 'conceals' the 'twelve 'volumes' of this *Society's* tracts 'from the eyes of his family' as so much spiritual poison; let them mark that he says this in the pages of the '*Christian Observer*', and that the editor publishes and sanctions the accusation; let them observe how the '*Record*' speaks of the vast majority of the clergy united in the

society in question, as 'blind leaders of the blind,' men 'ignorant of the gospel, and who *cannot* preach it;' and who, by what they *do* preach, are 'leading their hearers down to the chambers of death;' let them notice the manner in which the same authority describes many of the Society's publications as *not* containing the gospel, or so encrusting it with error, that the 'unhappy readers are led away to *another* gospel, which is not *another*;' let them listen to the editor of the 'Christian Observer' affirming that the *working* of the Establishment, from the opposition of patrons and persons of influence to the doctrines of Holy Writ, has been 'most ruinous as regards the salvation of the souls of men;' let them hear the editor's witness, Dr. Chalmers, whom he calls to substantiate his position, and who *does* substantiate it by the most vehement assertions; who describes patrons and prelates—ministers of state and ministers of the sanctuary—as inflicting, annually, an immense sum of 'outrage' on all that is good—withering and blighting piety and order—'by their systematic opposition' to the 'only system of doctrine which has the truth of heaven impressed upon it—the alone system that can either regenerate the people for heaven, or Christianize and moralize the families of the land;' let our readers, we say, hearken to all this, and then let them observe, how five grave and reverend clergymen, in two solemn memorials to the guilty Society itself, dedicated to the King, the Bishops, and the clergy generally, actually support and reiterate all those accusations—describe the books they object to, as pernicious and destructive—the mass of the ministers of the church as sympathizing with their doctrine—patronage, as having been employed to sanction such, and to discourage the holders of opposite tenets—the only tenets that are true, saving, and protestant: let all this be listened to and looked at, and THEN let any Dissenter wonder, if he can, or any churchman point, if he dare, at 'the person' who *thought* that the Establishment destroyed more souls than it saved!

Mr. Binney, and the Dissenters who think with him, may be wrong; the Essex Memorialists may be wrong; the editor of the *Observer* may be wrong; Dr. Chalmers may be wrong; the *Record* may be wrong:—the Archbishop of Canterbury and the 'venerable Society' may alone be right, *their* system may be the only true one—this is a question we do not entertain: but we do entertain and assert *this*, that if the sayings and sentences, the recorded opinions and convictions of men, are to be looked at and compared, *churchmen* have said, repeated, sustained, surpassed *all* that could be included in, or meant by, those few words, which, for four years, have led them to roar and redden with indignation. If there has been any propriety in the language applied to the author of the 'sentence,' it might, with greater propriety, be applied to the writers in question. How would it sound? 'The

‘*thing* Budd.’ ‘The person Robinson.’ ‘The yahoo Yorke,’ with ‘blustering Bryan,’ that ‘bullies and bawls, and curses the ‘Society’ as the enemy to salvation.’ ‘The Scotch corrosive ‘sublimate.’ ‘The bitterness and blasphemy of the Essex Me-‘morialists.’ ‘T. Chalmers, the mouth-piece of an evil spirit,’—‘the spirit of the first apostate—*the devil*.’ ‘There are men who ‘shrink from the contact of such a man as Mr. Wilks,—a very ‘humble degree of right feeling is necessary for *that*.’ But we cannot go on: all this is sickening and disgusting—yet it is all *deserved* by clergymen as much as it was by the minister of the Weigh-House, for many have expressed themselves as offensively as he. Far, however, be such reviling from us, for, as we contended in our number for November, we *claim* for churchmen the same liberty we ask for others, that of expressing their *opinions*, whatever those opinions be; but we have put the language they have used respecting Mr. Binney, into a form in which it might be used against themselves, and we trust it will have a moral effect, and preserve them from indulging in it in future, as the drunkenness of a helot taught the Spartans, what the drunkenness of Spartans taught them not.

We once intended to enter into the inquiry, whether the Memorialists are the men to produce any great effect in the Society they are solicitous to reform. Space, however, or rather the want of it, warns us to desist from farther remark. Our opinion, we may just mention, is, that they are not. They seem good men; pious, honest, devout;—sincere, and simple-minded in seeking an object which they conscientiously and properly feel to be of awful importance. But, we cannot say, either that their views themselves, on some things, are the most correct, or their arguments likely to have weight with others. Their *explanations* of truth we separate, as we do those of other writers, from the truth itself; and while we believe the same truth with them, we should be sorry to hold it exactly in the same manner. Their mode of explaining the atonement, for instance, expels, in our opinion, every thing like grace or mercy, from the Gospel, and reduces it to a system of hard, rigid, rigorous law; it gives the Supreme Ruler, as the representative of law, *twice* over, what as such, he demands; and it gives to the sinner a positive *claim* on his justice, instead of simply opening a way for mercy not to be inconsistent with it. They indulge in much that is intended for *reasoning*, but we frankly confess that we have no hope of its carrying any conviction to the minds of their anti-evangelical brethren, but that of their sincere belief of some opinions which both reason and Scripture compel *them* to reject. One of the most extraordinary passages which we ever remember to have met with is the following:

‘If God had intended to ‘take off from the hardness of the law’ in the second covenant, or to sink its perfections to the level of fallen man’s incapacity, *would he have expanded the law from one precept originally given to Adam in Paradise, into ten precepts, as he did in the republication of the same law to Moses on Sinai?* The Sinai covenant, by enlarging the requisitions of the law *from one commandment to ten*, increased the hardness of the law *in a ten-fold degree.*’

—p. 65.

Do these writers suppose that the moral law did not exist in Paradise? Do they really think that *moral* precepts depend merely on the divine pleasure? Do they mean to tell us that the one *positive* precept given to Adam was a law similar *in kind* to the decalogue? that the decalogue was an expansion of that precept, or a republication of that law? There seems some strange confusion here in the minds of the Memorialists. In the same page they say, ‘Where ‘sin abounded’ in *oceans* of transgressions and offences, ‘grace did much more abound,’ in an ‘universal deluge of mercy, which swallowed up *all the oceans* of ‘sin, however numerous or extended.’ Yet, if we understand their theology aright, it is of that kind that *limits the extent* of the atonement to a specific number of persons, in such a sense, as that, for *others*, there is, and *can* be, really and in fact, *none!* The men, we repeat, are good men, sincere, spiritual, holy; but, we do not think that they are fitted, judging by their Memorials, to produce any great effect on the un-evangelical members of the Society, many of whom, we suspect, are too strong and too clear-headed not to perceive the confusion and inconsistency of such passages as the above, and thus to be in danger of charging truth with the faults of her advocates, and of refusing submission to the one from their just conviction of the weakness of the other. The Memorialists may be zealous and useful as parish ministers—they may be respectable and respected in private life—we agree with them in their judgment of the Society’s publications—but we much fear, that they are quite out of their proper place, in attempting to be the *Knoxes* and the *Luthers* of the present age. We *wish* them better success than we dare to *hope.*

1. *Minutes of Evidence before the Select Committee, on the Affairs of Lower Canada in 1834.* Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, March 11, 1837.
2. *Report of Commissioners on Grievances complained of in Lower Canada.* 1837.
3. *The Canadian Portfolio. Nos. I. II. III. IV. V.* By J. A. ROEBUCK.
4. *The Speech of the Right Hon. Henry Brougham and Vaux, in the House of Lords on Jan. 18, 1838.* Ridgeway.
5. *A few Words on the subject of Canada.* By a BARRISTER. Longman.
6. *Canada ; Emancipate your Colonies !* An unpublished argument, by JEREMY BENTHAM. London : Effingham Wilson. 1838.

THAT a revolution, assuming the nature and the name of a popular revolution, should have been attempted in any part of the British dominions, during the administration of the authors of the Reform Bill, or rather their more radical successors, and that such revolution should have been so attempted during the first year of the reign of one who was born, nursed, and matured by parents devoted to the cause of popular liberty, is a matter most strange and wonderful, and not to be accounted for upon any of the ordinary principles of political action. Yet such is the case ; rebellion has stalked through a valuable portion of our colonies, in defiance of a professedly liberal government, and at the commencement of an avowedly liberal reign ; and what we have to inquire now is, the *why*—the *how*—and the probable *end*.

Before, however, entering into the immediate subject, we may be pardoned for a preliminary inquiry into the justice or propriety of rebellion under any circumstances. We deprecate war, and the consequent spilling of human blood, *per se* ; we especially deprecate *civil war*, as being an *enlarged fratricide* ; but still we think there are circumstances in which even civil war may be justified ; that rebellion may not only be shown to be right, but expedient ; and that names are associated with popular revolutions, of the best, the brightest, the most exalted, and the most excellent of our fellow-creatures.

It is at once a libel and a fallacy, to say that success has any thing to do with the true reputation of men who have embarked in revolutions. Algernon Sydney, Lord William Russell, the Scottish Covenanters, the French Huguenots, William Tell, George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, and Kosciusko, owe nothing to the accidents of success or failure, for the feeling which is entertained towards them. The cause in which each embarked was just. It lives in the pages of history, unobscured by the momentary mists of party feeling. It is seen in its naked character, and men can now judge of it without passion or prejudice.

Let us therefore begin our strictures upon this Canadian rebellion, with an admission, that if its leading features are similar to those of the great events to which we have referred, they will merit praise rather than blame. If the cause of freedom demanded, and the well-being of society required, the dreadful alternative of civil war, those who engaged in it deserve our sympathies and support. But if, on the contrary, the name of liberty has been taken in vain; if there has been a desecration of her altars; if she has been used as a mask to conceal selfishness and tyranny working upon ignorance and cupidity; if our sympathies are sought to be enlisted on false pretences—we have only one duty to fulfil, which is, not to permit our readers to be led astray by mistaking a mischievous and delusive movement, for an emanation from the pure and bright spirit of liberty.

There is, however, a middle course. The Canadian rebellion may be ostentatious in its leading pretences, and yet real in many of its operative causes. It may choose to unfurl banners that do not belong to it, and yet it may have others which it might honorably use. It is our opinion that both may be proved to be the case.

In 1759, Canada, then called the County of Quebec, was conquered by a British army. In the peace which followed, in 1763, that conquest was formally ceded to us by treaty. At that period, Upper Canada was a 'waste howling wilderness,' and Lower Canada was inhabited by Frenchmen, having no political liberty, no representative body, and subjected to the old feudal system of tenures, from which England had freed herself in the reign of Charles the Second. What the position of Canada then was, is well described by Mr. M. Martin, a warm partisan of Canadian reform. He says,

'The population of Canada on its conquest by the British was about 65,000, inhabiting a narrow strip of land on the banks of the St. Lawrence, and chiefly employed in agriculture; no people had a greater right to be thankful for the cession of the country to Great Britain than the Canadians; Bigot, the intendant or king's financier, and his creatures, plundered the colonists in every direction; a paper currency termed card money, founded on the responsibility of the king of France, for the general support of the civil and military establishments of the colony, and which, having been faithfully redeemed during a period of thirty years, enjoyed unlimited credit, enabled Bigot to conceal for a long time his waste and peculations; and while the British were capturing Canada by force of arms, the French monarch was destroying the commerce and prospects of his subjects by dis honouring the bills of exchange of the intendant to whom he had granted absolute power, thus involving in ruin not only the holders of 12,000,000 livres (£500,000 sterling), but also those who possessed any paper currency, which at the conquest amounted to £4,000,000

sterling, the only compensation received for which was four per cent on the original value.

'Civil and religious liberty was granted to the Canadians ; and in the words of the writer of the Political Annals of Canada, ' previous history affords no example of such forbearance and generosity on the part of the conquerors towards the conquered—forming such a new era in civilized warfare, that an admiring world admitted the claim of Great Britain to the glory of conquering a people less from views of ambition and the security of her other colonies than from the hope of improving their situation and endowing them with the privileges of freemen.'

In 1774, an act was passed to make the old French laws, to which the people had become habituated, and were unprepared to change, the general law of Canada. This act enacted, that, 'in all matters of controversy relative to property and civil rights, resort should be had to the laws of Canada, as the rule for the decision of the same.' Provided always, that such laws should not affect lands then and thereafter granted in 'free and common soccage.' At the same time a Legislative Council was created for the government of the whole province.

In 1791 an act was passed for dividing the Province into two parts, under the names of Upper and Lower Canada ; and to grant to each a representative form of government. Before this time, nothing like a representative form of government had been known in Canada ; and this bestowal of it, by Mr. Pitt, evidently took place from the dread which that minister entertained, that if he did not voluntarily give it, the Canadians, animated by the neighbouring States of North America, would take it. The division of the Province, however, made Lower Canada necessarily French, and Upper Canada as necessarily English. The representatives being chosen by the majority, such majority in Lower Canada carried all before them. The minority (i. e. British settlers) being vandyked among the majority, could of course do nothing ; they were scarcely any where in sufficient force to secure even one representative.

In this act there were some very important provisions. The government of the Provinces was authorized to make allotment for the support of a Protestant Clergy. In Upper Canada, future grants of land were to be in 'free and common soccage' ; in Lower Canada they might be so if required, subject to such alterations, with respect to the nature and consequences of such tenure of 'free and common soccage' as might be established by any laws which might be made by his Majesty, with the advice, &c. of the Legislative Council and Assembly of the Province. In addition to this, there is a clause for regulating the navigation and commerce of the country, and confirming a previous act, that no internal taxation should be permitted to be levied by the Imperial Parliament, but that the Legislative Councils and Assemblies of

Canada, should have the power to act for themselves in all such matters. This act is held to be the first Charter, or Constitution, of Canada.

The Executive Council, appointed by this act, was to consist of eleven members—which may be called the Council of the Crown. The Legislative Council, or the House of Lords, was to consist of fifteen members (since increased to 34). The Representative Assembly, or House of Commons was to consist of 50 members (since increased to 88): and the object of the whole clearly, and in fact, *avowedly*, was to imitate the principles and form of the British constitution.

This law, in theory, remains the same to the present period; the changes since then having been of detail and not of principle. Concessions after concessions have been made by the Crown and the Imperial Parliament. All the hereditary revenues of the Crown have been given up, to be disposed of by the Native Legislature for their own purposes. The army and the navy are paid, not out of Canadian taxes, but out of British taxes. Their staple article of commerce, timber, is protected, and forced into our markets, at an annual sacrifice of a sum of money nearly equal to the whole revenue of the Canadas. They are at once untaxed and unfettered. Not even a stipulation or proviso was entered into, that with the vast property surrendered to them, they should be bound to make a permanent, or even periodical provision for their own civil expenses; and, being left to themselves, what have they done? In the first place, for the ostensible object of effecting further changes in the constitution, to which we shall hereafter refer, they *stopped the supplies*. Not the supplies, be it remembered, of the army and navy, which everywhere might be justifiably done, when the Executive set itself against the Representative body, and used, or exhibited any inclination to use, such army and navy in trampling upon the people and their representatives, but the supplies that the Assembly of Lower Canada stopped, and for years continued to stop, were supplies necessary for the ordinary and every-day protection of property and administration of justice. What the objects of those supplies were, we cannot better illustrate, than by quoting from the evidence that was given before the Select Committee in 1835.

Mr. Sewell, Sheriff of Quebec, called in, and examined.

What degree of inconvenience in the sheriff's office was experienced in the district of Quebec, through the stoppage of the supplies?—The persons who supplied the gaol were not paid; I had no funds in my hands to pay them. I have advanced from my own resources some part of these expenses, for the remainder I gave a conditional bond, payable when the Government should pay me.

What is the amount of the claims on Government for money either

advanced by you, or for which you are responsible?—About £2,500, excluding the salaries to the sheriff, the gaoler, and the turnkeys.

Have you had any payment since the sum of £782, which appears to have been appropriated to the Quebec gaol out of the advance of £31,000 from the military chest?—None.

Since the supplies were stopped, has the gaol been in a healthy state?—Yes, generally.

Has there been no cholera?—Four cases in 1832, and two in 1834.

*Has the physician's salary been paid?—No.*

Have the repairs of the gaol been carried on or stopped?—There have been partial repairs, and they have not been stopped.

Has the ventilation and cleansing of the gaol been carried on as usual?—Yes; the expense forms part of the arrears of £2,500, which I have already mentioned.

Suppose there had been a fire in the gaol, and any part of it destroyed, how would you have got money to rebuild it?—I know not. I could not have done so from my own funds.

How many gaols are there in Lower Canada?—There are gaols at Montreal, Three Rivers, Quebec, Gaspé, and Sherbrooke. I know no others.

*Have they all been similarly circumstanced?—I believe so.*

In what way, in Lower Canada, does the arrest of prisoners take place?—In town by police officers; in the country, by officers of militia, who are bound to pass them from one parish to the other, till they reach the gaol of the district.

Are there any constables in Lower Canada?—Yes, in the towns. In the country parishes the duties are performed by sergeants of militia.

Is there not a high constable for each district?—For the three principal districts.

What are his duties?—To attend the courts, marshal the constables, and see that they do their duty.

Are not the high constables salaried officers?—They have both salaries and fees.

*Have their salaries been stopped?—I believe so.*

The Hon. L. Gugy, Sheriff of Montreal, called in, and examined.

What degree of inconvenience, in the sheriff's office, was experienced in the district of Montreal by the stoppage of the supplies?—Advances which I made from my own resources alleviated the inconveniences. The gaoler, however, suffered much, and would have suffered more if he had not been assisted by loans of money from myself. I advanced money for the support of prisoners; nor had I any hesitation in doing so for one half-year, but when the payments extended to four half-years, it became very inconvenient.

What would have been the consequence if you had not made these advances?—I should have been obliged either to open the gaol, or else resign my situation, and leave the Government to find a successor.

What is the amount now due to you by the province?—Exclusive of my salary and of allowances, there is due to me on account of my advances £2,486, as certified by the inspector of public accounts.

Were these advances only for Crown prisoners, or did they include debtors?—They were for Crown prisoners; the debtors are only supplied with fuel and water.

What is the average number of prisoners in the gaol?—It fluctuates between 90 and 150.

How many of these are usually debtors?—Seldom more than 10.

Mr. John Neilson, of Quebec, also says:

In respect of gaols we are miserably off at present; it is discreditable. As to the administration of criminal justice, I have myself been obliged to advance, out of my own pocket, funds for the apprehension of criminals, and the means of subsistence to petty jurors, who have come from a distance of 20 or 30 miles to serve at quarter sessions, and who were, at that distance from home, in a starving condition.

These advances were made as loans, but great part of them have never been repaid.

Not content with stopping supplies, the next step was to supersede the law, and by secret and arbitrary means to set the ordinary courts at defiance, and form new tribunals, in which persons, appointed by no competent authority, and, we presume, much in the same way as Lynch law is enforced in the United States, were to act as "Pacificators," or judges, under a law and practice of their own.

When even this would not do, and it was determined by the British parliament that the accumulated revenue of Canada, arising in a very great proportion from the voluntary surrender by the Crown of its hereditary property, for the purpose of supplying, without taxing the people, all that was required for their civil government and local and public improvement—when the British parliament, at the suggestion of the ministers, passed those celebrated resolutions, and especially the 8th, for appropriating by force such sums so received to their legitimate purposes;—before any seizure was made, any law enacted, or any step taken upon such resolutions, the rebellion broke out, the causes and consequences of which it will now be our province to investigate and anticipate.

I. The first ostensible cause put forward by the Canadians in the van of their grievances is, the existence of a *Legislative Council*, or House of Lords, not elected by the people; and the first of the changes they desire is, that such Legislative Council shall be so elected.

There had been much animosity existing for a length of time between the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council; and especially since the latter prevented the former from passing a bill, in 1831, to pay each of its members' salaries out of the public revenues. In 1828, the claim of the House of Assembly was—not that the Legislative Council should be elected by the

people, but that it should be independent of both Crown and people. Their language then was—

‘ The enlightened and patriotic statesmen who devised our Constitutional Act, and the British parliament by which it was granted, intended to bestow on us a mixed government, modelled on the constitution of the parent state ; the opinions publicly expressed at the time in parliament, and the Act itself, record the benificent views of the Imperial Legislature. A Governor, a Legislative Council, and an Assembly, were to form three distinct and *independent* branches, representing the King, the Lords, and the Commons ; but the true spirit of that fundamental law has not been observed in the composition of the Legislative Council ; for the majority of its members, consisting of persons whose principal resources for the support of themselves and their families, are the salaries, emoluments, and fees, derived from offices which they hold during pleasure, they are interested in maintaining and increasing the salaries, emoluments, and fees of public officers paid by the people, and also in supporting divers abuses favourable to persons holding offices. The Legislative Council, by these means, is in effect the Executive power, under a different name ; and the Provincial Legislature is, in truth, reduced to two branches, a Governor and an Assembly ; leaving the province without the benefit of the intermediate branch, as intended by the aforesaid Act ; and from this first and capital abuse have resulted, and still continue to result, a multitude of abuses, and the impossibility of procuring a remedy. We acknowledge, that the Legislative Council *ought to be independent*, and if it were, we should not be entitled to complain to your Majesty of the repeated refusals of that branch to proceed upon various bills sent up by the Assembly, howsoever useful and even indispensable they might be.’

In 1834, however, when it was determined to stop the supplies, a Legislative Council independent of the Crown would not do, and then the demand became, that such Legislative Council should be elective—*Monsieur A. Norbert Morin* gave evidence before a select committee of the House of Commons, and stated the then views of the Canadian Assembly. But before we state these views, as we shall have occasion to refer frequently to this gentleman’s evidence, we will officially introduce him to our readers.

*Monsieur Augustin Norbert Morin*, a member of the House of Assembly for the province of Lower Canada, called in, and examined.

Are you the bearer of the resolutions of the House of Assembly, dated the 21st of February, 1834 ?—I am the bearer of the petitions founded on the resolutions.

The petitions are to the House of Commons and the House of Lords, are they not ?—To both Houses.

Are you a Member of the House of Assembly ;—Yes : and I have been so for four years.

Are you charged with any other communications to make to the authorities of this country, than are contained in the petitions?—None; but I have papers and statements which relate to the objects mentioned in the petitions.

Of course you are perfectly well acquainted with the views and feelings of the petitioners?—I believe I am.

You are commissioned as the Agent of the House of Assembly, are you?—I have a commission from the House of Assembly to support those petitions, conjointly with Mr. Viger, the agent of the House of Assembly, now in England.

Did your appointment take place by a resolution or a vote of the House of Assembly?—By a resolution of the House of Assembly.

Will you state the immediate circumstances which led to the passing of that resolution?—The circumstances which led to the passing of that resolution were the misunderstandings which have existed between the Colonial Administration and the House of Assembly for several years, grounded upon the several arbitrary and violent measures upon the part of the administration, as we conceive it, and also grounded upon the support which those measures have received from other constituted authorities in the colony, and also in part from His Majesty's Executive Government here in England.

Will you state to the Committee some of the more prominent of the differences which existed?—I believe the recent addresses of the House of Assembly relate to two principal points; the one is the defects in the laws and constitution of the country, and the other the manner in which those laws and that constitution have been administered. With regard to the laws and constitution, the petitioners advert, in the first instance, to one of the provisions of the Act of the 31st of Geo. 3, c. 31, which has established the present form of government in the colony. The petitioners have come to the conclusion, that one part of that Act principally, is not conducive to the good government of the colony, to wit, that part which creates a second branch of legislature, under the name of Legislative Council, entirely at the will and pleasure of the Executive.'

Here is the charge: now for the details:

'In what respect does the House of Assembly consider the Legislative Council unfit?—Because there are in it a number of persons who hold public offices, and are otherwise dependent upon the Executive, being connected with it by speculations on public property, or otherwise; because, also, the addition which has been made to that Council has been far from being sufficient to give it an independent character, inasmuch as if the new members were not in general connected by official stations with the Executive, they have long been known for their political bias on one side, that is to say, on the side of the colonial administrations, and for *their antipathies against the people of the country* and their *laws and institutions*, and for the violent manner in which they had publicly expressed a desire to introduce *changes in those laws and institutions*, in a way contrary to the rights and wishes

of the people, and in order to establish a subserviency to *other laws and institutions*, which these individuals might consider better, but *which the people of the provinces knew not, and were entirely unacquainted with.*’

Then as to the remedy :

‘ They (the Assembly) came to the belief, that any addition, by the exercise of the royal prerogative, and any renovation in the same way, would never insure a proper composition of the Legislative Council, because at all times it might be in the power of the local administrations, and their advisers, to make a choice of persons to serve their own particular objects. I believe this is a firm conviction, both in the Assembly and in a majority of the people. They have afterwards considered whether there was any other way, than by the exercise of the prerogative of the Crown, to constitute a second branch of the Legislature : a House of Peers, composed of hereditary members, was not at all in agreement with the consequences of the laws, nor with the physical state of things in America, there being there no materials to form a permanent aristocracy. They, in consequence, came to the belief that the wishes of Parliament, and the views of His Majesty’s Government might be fulfilled with advantage to the good government of the provinces, by having an elective Legislative Council.

Will you explain what you mean by interests not connected with the colony?—The Legislative Council had before, in their debates, pretended to be an exclusively *British* body, and to act as *British* men in opposition to the House of Assembly, who were by them unjustly considered *not to be British*, and resolutions were even proposed in the Council to that effect some years back. Now, since their reformation, the Legislative Council have expressly avowed that purpose ; for instance, they have pretended that the House of Assembly wished to preserve the lands of the Crown *only for the native Canadians*, which is not the fact ; and upon that ground they have pretended that they were a body necessary to protect *emigration* against the House of Assembly. They have also pretended that they represent the interests of the Established Church of England, which they considered not to be represented in the House of Assembly, and to which, apparently, they wished to give a protection of a particular kind. They have also pretended to represent British commerce for the same reasons. All those pretensions we consider as relating to interests vested out of the province, contrary to the rights and welfare of its inhabitants, and injurious to the representation of the people in the House of Assembly.’

Thus, in the very words of the Deputy of the House of Commons of Lower Canada, we have the evil and the remedy. The former, to a certain extent, we acknowledge—the latter we consider preposterous. We invite our readers to take a fair and dispassionate view of the whole question.

Mr. Pitt, by his bill of 1791, intended to model the Canadian constitution upon our own ; and, if circumstances had been similar, no doubt such a machinery might have been found to work very harmoniously, which was all that that corrupt and wily minister wanted. As to having two independent Houses, the one to serve as a check and counterpoise to the other, and yet both to harmonize in promoting the public good, the idea was only fit for a child or a mountebank. The thing never did exist anywhere, and never will exist anywhere. The House of Commons worked smoothly enough with the House of Lords, but why ? Because each was independent of the other ? No. But because the one was dependent upon, and in great part created by the other. The practice of nomineeship—the close pocket boroughs—the law of primogeniture, and a variety of other circumstances, made both of them, as to interests, “one and indivisible.” Mr. Pitt’s object was to delude the Canadians with a mockery of representation, while he secured the reality of power by forming an executive counsel of his own creatures, and an aristocracy nominated by himself. Had he not, by supporting despotism on a grander scale, been involved in a war that required his undivided attention, no doubt he would have found means of forcing the law of primogeniture upon the Canadian people ;—of thereby creating an aristocracy which might be hereditary, and of enacting the farce of a constitution for the benefit of the few and the mockery of the many, as it was then enacted in Great Britain.

So far as the Legislative Council, or House of Peers of Canada, is concerned in the dispute, we are quite ready to acknowledge its absurdity and inefficiency ; but we are not disposed to make it elective. Our remedy would be, either to do away with it altogether, or to cause it to be composed of men who having been returned by the people for a certain number of years (say 15 or 20) to another Assembly, and thereby affording presumption that they enjoyed the confidence of their constituents, might then take their seats for life in the Legislative Council, or House of Peers, being independent of both the monarchical and democratical influences.

It is quite true, that the Legislative Council, faulty as it was, has rendered great service in Lower Canada. It has been truly “a screen” by which the local government has often been enabled, after the great error was committed of dividing the Canadas, to protect British settlers and promote British interests, to check the Assembly in its miserably selfish object of arresting legislation, and acting for the feudal Seigniors and Seigniories ; and has, by its firm, though perhaps not altogether disinterested conduct, prevented the British minority from being crushed and sacrificed to the feudal pride and national hate of the French majority.

That our readers may be satisfied of the truth and justice of our views, we refer them to the following extracts from the Gene-

ral Report of the Canada Commissioners, Lord Gosford, Sir Charles E. Grey, and Sir George Gipps. These gentlemen say,

‘ By the separation of the Provinces, effected in 1791, nearly every thing that the extended territory of Quebec had contained of English, was then collected into a distinct body, and Lower Canada was again forced, we may say, by Act of Parliament, to be French. A constitution, too, was, under these circumstances, given to it, confessedly on the model of our own, in which the House of Representatives was endowed with powers analogous to those of the House of Commons, whilst, from the very nature of things, the great majority of the members of this House could be no other than French Canadians. In scarcely any instance since the existence of the House of Assembly, has the majority of French Canadians over English been so little as two to one ; and, of late, it has far exceeded that proportion. We have even heard the speeches of the minister of the day referred to, to prove that it was his intention to keep the province French ; a construction, however, which we consider erroneous. Mr. Pitt always expressed his desire that Lower Canada should become ultimately English, though he thought the best means towards that result was, not to do violence to the predilections and customs of the original inhabitants ; and it was certainly, we apprehend, no part of his plan to discourage English settlers. For many years, indeed, after the establishment of the Constitution of 1791, a vague sort of idea seems to have existed, that by the introduction of new settlers, the numerical disproportion between the two races would be made to disappear, and the English even to predominate ; and so, perhaps, in spite of all opposing circumstances, they ultimately may ; but the progress has been much slower than was expected, and at the present moment the highest calculation of the inhabitants of British descent does not make them more than one fourth of the whole.

The House of Assembly was not slow to perceive the importance of the functions which had been assigned to it by the Constitution ; the Government alone was slow to perceive it, or, if perceiving, to acknowledge it, and to provide with prudence for the consequences. Instead of shaping its policy so as to gain the confidence of that House, it adopted the unfortunate course of resting for support exclusively on the Legislative Council. The existence of a majority of French Canadians in the Assembly, seems to have been thought a sufficient reason that there should be a majority of English in the Council ; for the principle observed in the first nominations, of making it of equal numbers, French and English, was early departed from, and thus the Council and Assembly were constituted of antagonist principles almost from the commencement.’

Further on they say,

‘ The maintenance, on the other hand, of the principle on which the Council is actually constituted, affords no triumph to either party ; it

is but the maintenance of that Constitution, which, five years ago, all parties in the province were emulous in praising ; it is but the maintenance by England, in one of her favoured Colonies, of institutions modelled, as far as they can be, on her own. Great Britain, in giving those institutions to Canada, intended to bestow upon it the best gift that was in her power ; and it is not yet proved, at least we have yet seen no proof, that, under existing circumstances, a benefit would be derived from changing them.'

The consequences to British interests of making both Houses elective, are powerfully put in the same report.

' The great majority of the people of direct British descent, while they are firmly united in opposition to an Elective Council, are nearly as unconnected with the holders of office as are the body of French Canadians ; and the office-holders themselves, beyond the sphere of their own immediate duties, are little remarkable for anything but the exemplary patience with which they have borne the severe sufferings inflicted on them by the Assembly. We do not know where any persons are to be found of British descent, who enjoy any influence in society, and at the same time wish for an Elective Council ; whilst, of the higher class of French Canadians, there are several who have no desire for it. And if we look to the poorer classes of the community, we shall find, that the feeling is equally intense, to say the least, in the British population, against the proposed change, as it is amongst the French Canadians in favour of it. The French Canadians of this description, or by far the greater part of them, give their whole confidence to their leaders ; and when we consider how often they have been exposed to hear assertions that the Executive Government is corrupt, that the eminent individuals who have been their governors have robbed the public treasury, and that, in the distribution of Wild Lands, the *settled inhabitants of the country* have been denied their due proportion, we cannot but suppose that such representations must have their influence in urging many to assent to the demand for a change in the Constitution.'

Having now shown the evil effects of making both Houses elective, let us look at the composition, temper, and character of that one which demands this change in the other. *Mr. James Stuart*, an Advocate of Lower Canada, is asked, and answers as follows :

' Can you state, from your own personal knowledge, whether the representation of the two sects or parties, as you may choose to call them, is at all equivalent to their numbers in each case ?—The English that are dispersed among the French Canadian population, constituting a minority, they have no influence whatever in the elections in the part of the country which they inhabit. They cannot return a single member to the Assembly, and are therefore, otherwise than constructively, not represented at all in that body.'

Still, returning to the question of a fair and equal representation, taking the number of the population into consideration, do you not suppose, throughout the whole province, there is a fair and equal representation in accordance with the population?—If the population were all of the same *national* character, and exclusion from the Assembly on *national* grounds did not take place, the representation would not be objectionable; but as things are, the representation as it exists, is most objectionable on the part of the English.

Do they not have influence in proportion to their numbers?—Their numbers have influence in deciding a contest between two rival candidates supported by French interest, but alone are *powerless*, and this influence might as well not exist.

Are they not in the condition of every minority?—They are in the condition of a minority under very peculiar circumstances.

We think we have now shown enough to prove to our readers, that much may be said against the present system of the Legislative Council, against a reform of that Council by making it elective, against a continuance of that Council under existing circumstances, and against the composition and objects of the House of Assembly.

II. The second great point of opposition by the French Canadians, refers to the *law of tenures*, a subject which we will endeavour to simplify while discussing it, inasmuch as it is at once the most difficult as well as the most important part of the whole question.

In commencing the argument, we cannot do better than give, from Mr. Montgomery Martin's valuable work, a description of the tenures of Lower Canada.

'When the country was first settled by the French, the feudal tenure was in full vigour on the continent of Europe, and naturally transplanted by the colonizers to the new world. The king of France, as feudal lord, granted to nobles and respectable families, or to officers of the army, large tracts of land, termed seigniories, the proprietors of which were termed seigniors; and held immediately from the king, *en fief*, or *en roture*, on condition of rendering fealty and homage on accession to seigniorial property; and in the event of a transfer, by sale, or gift, or otherwise (except in hereditary succession), the seigniory was subject to the payment of a *quint*, or fifth part of the whole purchase money; and which, if paid by the purchaser immediately, entitled him to the *rabat*, or a reduction of two-thirds of the *quint*. This custom still prevails, the king of Great Britain having succeeded to the claims of the king of France. The lands being held for terms of years, renewal fines, according to the actual and existing value, are charged.

The position and extent of these seigniorial grants are:—

Territorial Division. <sup>1</sup>	Number of Seigneuries.	Extent of Seigniorial Grants.		Almost unfit for cultivation in the Seigneuries and Fiefs.
		Arpents.	Acres.	
Quebec, including Anticosti and other Isles . . . . .	79	5639319	5656699	2600000
Montreal and Islands . . . . .	63	3269966	2786011	500000
Three Rivers and St. Fran- cis, &c. . . . .	25	1220308	1039707	400000
Gaspé and Isles . . . . .	1	1547086	1318117	600000
	168	12676679	10800534	4100000

Estimating the number of acres of land in Lower Canada under cultivation, at 4,000,000, it will be perceived what a large portion of territories is embraced under the seigniories.

Now that any class of men, save those who are benefitted by it, can be enamoured of, and go to war for, such a system as this, must be a matter of the greatest astonishment. Its operation is to prevent improvements and conceal frauds. The *seigneurs*, or Landlords, no doubt, find their account in it, by the renewal of fines, which are enlarged in proportion to the existing value, though such value may have been entirely occasioned by the expensive improvements of the tenant, and also by the means which it affords them of concealing the '*hypotheques*,' or claims upon the property, and borrowing and selling as though no such '*hypotheques*' existed; such frauds are of frequent occurrence; and many instances are given in the reports before us. It has all the evils of our tithe system, with the addition of many more peculiar to itself. It was by getting rid of this system, that England has produced her agricultural prosperity, and effected her expensive and most important improvements in the cultivation and value of her land. The last shadow of feudalism (which had long ceased to be an oppressive substance), to wit, copyhold tenures, fell before the spirit of reform, and that "stalwart" Scot, Sir John Campbell, a short time ago. Every Englishman's house is his castle, and every English freeholder, who is possessed of land, can 'sit under his own vine and his own fig-tree, without any one 'daring to make him afraid.' This is our national pride and glory; and our agriculturalists would fight quite as fiercely, and a vast deal more successfully, to retain it, than the Canadian '*habitans*' to prevent it. The very fact, therefore, of any large

body of men other than the *seigneurs* themselves contending for such an unjust system of tenures, must be a matter of the greatest and the gravest astonishment.

This system, foolish, mischievous, and criminal as it] was, was not interfered with by the government, save in an act called the 'Tenures Act,' which merely enabled parties, if they thought proper, by mutual agreement to get rid of it. This act, which has occasioned an immense outcry in Canada, is well-described by Mr. James Stuart, formerly Attorney-General, and member of the House of Assembly, who was examined as follows before the Committee of the House of Commons.

As to the operation of that Act, Mr. Stuart is asked,

Are you aware of any instance in which property or the rights of the inhabitants of Lower Canada have been injuriously affected by Acts of the British Parliament? The Tenures Act, for example, is that in any particular objectionable?—There have been very few instances in which the British Parliament has exercised the power of legislation with respect to the affairs of Lower Canada; I do not recollect more than two, I mean as to matters of internal legislation. Strong considerations of utility and expediency, as affecting the interests of the inhabitants of Lower Canada, urged, I presume, the passing of the Tenures Act, which in its general scope and character is calculated to be highly beneficial. The great object of the Act was to provide for the voluntary, optional, and gradual conversion of the French feudal tenure into that of free and common socage. No compulsory obligation whatever has been imposed by this Act; it was left entirely to the discretion of the parties concerned, from a sense of their own interest, to determine whether such conversion should take place or not. With this view of the matter, the commencement of the projected change was to take place on the part of the seignior, or tenant *in capite*: he was to be permitted on the most easy and liberal terms, if he should be so inclined, by an amicable commutation, to alter the tenure by which he held his estate, in respect of the Crown; a subsequent conversion was then to take place between the seignior and his terre-tenant, the actual holder of the land, when the latter might desire it, but no obligation was imposed on the seignior to commute with his terre-tenant until after he (the seignior) had previously commuted with the Crown, and then only on payment of a full and fair equivalent and indemnity for the change.

Do you happen to know whether the possessors of seigniorial property in Canada have availed themselves of the provisions of the Tenures Act?—Up to the period of my leaving Canada, no person holding lands *a titre de cens* in seigniories, that is, terre-tenants, had availed themselves of the provisions of the Tenures Act; nor could they have done so, as no seignior has yet commuted with the Crown for the settled parts of his seigniory, *so as to admit of his tenants obtaining from him the benefit of a conversion of their tenures*.

Yet even this gradual, limited, and *optional* reform in Tenures,

was followed, ~~in~~ in order to please the *seigneurs*, by another act of the British Legislature, a few years ago, by which the Canadian Legislature was enabled to make such alterations in it as *they* might deem desirable. Surely this ought to have been considered satisfactory even by the most bigotted; but satisfactory it was not, and we will show the reasons why.

All the land granted by the Crown to new settlers, was granted in 'free and common soccage'; or, in other words, a freehold estate in fee. All the lands in America were so held; all the lands in Upper Canada were so held; and such lands fetched a much higher price in the market than the lands subjected to the feudal dues of the Canadian laws. This was a stinging fact to the French *seigneurs*, who desired to retain the old law, and an exciting example to the *habitans*, who had sense enough to desire to get rid of it. The great success of many of the British settlers, under their free tenures, as compared, or rather contrasted with the feudal system, excited in the breast of the French Canadians, feelings of bitter envy, added to national antipathy: (unfortunately, this is too generally the case, whenever new comers rival and eclipse old residents.) The operation of this feeling may be traced throughout the whole of the Canadian disputes. It was and is, a battle between French and English races, and the ignorant *habitans* are kept in their way of thinking, by their artful and selfish *seigneurs*, in order that their eyes may not be opened to the vast advantages of enfranchising their tenures. Mr. Neilson, one of the deputies from Lower Canada, admitted the fact, in giving the following evidence, before a Committee of the House of Commons in 1828 respecting the tenure of free and common soccage:—

'Is it your belief, from your knowledge of the people of French extraction in Lower Canada, that from seeing such a system established in their immediate neighbourhood, they would be likely, in course of time, to conform themselves to it, and to wish to adopt it?' His answer is, 'Upon the whole, many of us have been rather afraid than otherwise that they would conform too fast to what they saw in their immediate neighbourhood; but I conceive there might be a great many improvements introduced among them with their own consent, without making them exactly such as is in their neighbourhood, for it is not altogether what we could wish.'

What can be clearer than this? It surely is unnecessary to add another word to the subject.

The House of Assembly, not satisfied with clamouring against the British Legislature for interfering with their tenures, and by such clamour, procuring the act we have referred to, giving the Canadian Legislature the power to alter the law in any way they please—took other steps to effect their great object of keeping down British interests, under the mask of pitying the 'poor un-

fortunate emigrants,' who were landed on their shores, by seeking for a length of time so to impede emigration, as to stop it altogether. Mr. Morin, the Deputy for Canada, in his evidence shows this pretty clearly.

'The office of agent for emigration is to direct the emigrants who may come from this country at once to those lands upon which they may be settled to the greatest advantage, is it not?—That office is connected with the executive; and portions of country have been set apart and put under the control of that officer to settle them with emigrants.

Your real objection then to the mode of granting land is the facility which is given to *British* emigrants to settle?—Yes, *in preference to the inhabitants of the country*.

Will you state in what manner in preference?—First, by the operation of that agency for emigrants; and secondly, because the system, not being established under the control of the Legislature, has not become known or been put generally in operation in the *ancient settlements* of the country. It is only since about one year that there have been sales in those *anciently settled* parts.

At the end of the rules for the sale of lands, laid down by Lord Goderich in 1831, the Committee find this paragraph: 'Such is the system of management which I propose to adopt with respect to the Crown lands. It has been formed after no little consideration and inquiry into a subject of the utmost importance to the prosperity of a country circumstanced like Canada. To promote the prosperity, to adopt the measures best calculated to favour the full development of the natural resources of the province, has, I trust I need not assure the Assembly, been my only aim. If, however, upon a full consideration of the reasoning upon which my views are founded, they can recommend any modification by which this plan can be rendered more likely to forward that which is our common object, any suggestions which they may have to offer shall receive the fullest and most attentive consideration.' In consequence of that recommendation, have any suggestions been made by the House of Assembly for the purpose of establishing a better system of sale of land in the province?—The suggestion that has been made has been that the lands should be under the control of the legislature.'

In other words, under their own.

There is one point connected with this British law of Tenures (though not necessarily so), to which the Canadians have a right to object, and which wisdom as well as humanity would justify them in opposing; we allude to the cruel and criminal law of primogeniture. The French law as to intestacy, is more humane, and also more just and wise than our own. Under it, the children of an individual dying without a will, and where property is exclusively real, are all provided for—the eldest receiving a larger portion than his brother and sister. It is not in the nature of an unsophisticated people (and we believe the poor *habitans* of Canada to

be such), to understand the subtleties by which, in England, we justify the starving, by act of Parliament, all the younger children of an intestate, for the benefit of the eldest. They cannot perceive the great national advantages of making the estate follow the title, and dooming all but the noble and fortunate holder to the splendid pauperism of the Pension List, the dignified sinecurism of the Place List, or the sanctified pluralism of the Church List. Perhaps, even as a matter of policy, they may hold with Bacon, that 'Money (or property), is like manure, good for nothing unless it be spread.'

Having alluded to the ignorance of the *habitans*, as well as to their unsophisticated character, we cannot close this part of the subject better than by the following extract from the evidence of Mr. Stuart.

'To what causes do you ascribe the dissatisfaction which has prevailed in Lower Canada, and what remedies would you suggest?—The political disorder, and the consequent dissatisfaction which now prevail in Lower Canada, I conceive are mainly ascribable to the composition of the House of Assembly, in which a few individuals are enabled to exercise a power and influence inconsistent with the rights of their fellow-subjects and with good government, and over which there is not that check and control on the part of the constituent body which ought to be found in a representative government.'

Do they not represent the opinions of the people?—In the present state of Lower Canada, the opinions by which the Assembly are governed, can hardly be said to be those of the people. They are the opinions of a few individuals possessing uncontrolled power in the Assembly, which they disseminate with unceasing activity among the people, and call their opinions. The people are possessed of excellent natural intelligence, and of the best qualities and intentions, but they are without the advantage of education, and are not conversant with the political subjects on which they are called to decide. They are, therefore, liable to be deceived.

You have stated, that you think the great bulk of the population of Lower Canada hardly competent to form an opinion upon political subjects; but do not they feel very great confidence in those whom they send to represent their interests in the Assembly?—The fitness of that confidence would depend upon the qualifications and character of the individuals in whom it is reposed. In many cases the greater the confidence the greater the evil, where confidence may have been misplaced.

III. The next great head of Canadian grievances, is *the abuse of patronage and of Government influence*. This is a very sore point. Little acts of personal favoritism on one side, and consequent exclusion on the other, do more to excite discontent than a hundred times their amount in another shape. There are not many places in Canada to give away, and those are, compared

with similar English appointments, very poorly paid, yet if they are distributed in the majority of cases to the minority of the people, in preference to the larger class, the sense of injustice and exclusion, generates an amount of animosity wholly unproportioned to the small pecuniary loss. As to Lower Canada, there is no doubt that this charge is true, though to a smaller extent than in any other colony belonging to this Country. In the East, in the West, in the North, in the South, wherever the English Government prevails, the same charge may be made. 'The trail of the 'serpent is over them all.' Rotten at heart, the English Government has been rotten in all its members. The Lord Charleses and the Lord Henries have been provided for, as the price of political prostitution, by being sent to the Colonies. The Colonists know it; nothing can disguise the personal and profligate object of such appointments. Wherever there have been means of expressing an opinion upon them by a Representative Assembly, or a free press, that opinion has always been expressed in the same way. As knowledge and power have increased, those complaints have become so formidable, that Government have been driven to the alternative, either of abolishing the places, or giving them to those who cried out the most lustily against them. The latter has been the course pursued towards Canada. Pitt and his successors filled nearly every office and every place in the Executive and Legislative Councils with their own creatures. The Canadians most bitterly complained that they were governed by *foreigners*, and they hated those 'foreigners,' no matter whether such government were wisely and justly administered or not. Many individual instances occurred to give a colour to that hatred. Sir John Caldwell had been made Receiver-General; and when it was suspected that the public property (not, however, belonging to the people, but, at that time, belonging to the Crown) was in some danger, all accounts were pertinaciously refused; and when at last exposure could no longer be prevented, it turned out that this gentleman and his father were defaulters to an enormous amount. Notwithstanding this exposure, Sir John Caldwell was retained in the Legislative Council, and allowed to oppose by his vote all the measures sent up by the very Assembly that for years had been struggling against him.

At this time, two-thirds of this Legislative Council were composed of dependents on the Crown and the Executive Council; and the various places in the Colony were filled by persons not of Canadian birth. Since this period, practical reforms have been constantly taking place. Before 1828, the Legislative Council consisted of twenty-seven members, of whom eighteen were dependent on the Government. Since then it has been increased to thirty-five, of whom only seven are dependent on the Government; thus reducing official influence from two thirds, to one fifth:

and it appears, from a minute of Lord Aberdeen (see House of Commons papers for 1836, p. 11<sup>3</sup>), that *Mr. Papineau* and *Mr. Neilson*, the leaders of the House of Assembly, were themselves offered seats in that very Council.

The great Reform Bill of England altogether altered the means of carrying on government. Patronage, to a great extent, can no longer be exchanged for votes. Whatever other ministers, with an unreformed parliament, might be disposed to concede to well-grounded remonstrances, a government responsible to a reformed parliament, it might fairly be supposed, would go still farther—and none but the most prejudiced, or the most selfish and wilfully blind, can fail to see, in the correspondence that has recently been laid before Parliament between the local Governor and the Colonial Secretaries—that a most anxious desire has existed, to effect every reform that might be considered practicable or pleasurable to the Canadian people. This, however, did not satisfy the Papineau party. Under the name of reform, they sought to rid themselves of British influence altogether. They continued to harp upon abuses already reformed, and grievances already abated. To the ignorant population they contrived to represent the British government as a monster of corruption, and themselves as the most exemplary of patriots. *Monsieur Morin*, in his evidence, proves this:—

‘In the 52nd resolution it is stated, that the French origin, and the use of the French language by the people of Canada, ‘has been made by the colonial authorities a pretext for abuse, for exclusion, for political inferiority, for a separation of rights and interests.’ Is there not a strong feeling amongst the people of Canada generally, that the colonial subjects of French extraction are excluded from all places of honour and profit, and that they are in fact made, by the conduct of the authorities there, to feel themselves so far an inferior set of people?—*That is their belief, and, I believe, founded upon facts.*’

This fallacy has been kept up, and made to rankle in the breasts of an ignorant but a sensitive people. And the mode of pretending to grant supplies, on conditions which those who proposed them knew would not be agreed to by the other House, was for the purpose of stopping all government, all law, all protection of property and life, and making it appear that such was not their act, but the act of the British majority in the Legislative Council.

Though we sincerely entertain this conviction, should we therefore refuse or lessen those reforms which justice, wisdom, and humanity demand? Certainly not. Lord Durham, whose whole life has been one consecutive act of devotion to public rights, is sent over, not to protect tyranny, but to promote liberty; not to maintain abuses, but to reform them; not to narrow the just influence of the people, but to extend it; to grant freedom to all,

without injustice to any ; in a word, to reform and reconstruct the whole government and legislature of the colony.

We will conclude this article by offering one or two suggestions as to the means by which this great object can be effected. But first let us see what the Canadians themselves say. *Mr. Papineau*, in addressing His late Majesty, and arguing for an Elective Legislative Council, or House of Peers, uses, on the behalf of the House of Assembly, these words :

‘ In case Your Majesty should not consider it proper at this time to adopt such a measure, we will not take upon ourselves, in stating the result of our deliberations, to determine whether the entire abolition of the present Legislative Council of this province, and the assimilation of its government to that of several of the adjacent colonies, would tend to cause peace and harmony to be re-established in the conduct of affairs. The people of the country, if they had an opportunity of being legally constituted for that purpose, would be the best judges to decide this weighty question. We therefore proceed upon the supposition, that an intermediate branch may, in certain cases, produce more maturity in the deliberation and examination of Bills, than if only one body were called upon to assent to them ; at the same time, circumstances of rare occurrence might happen, in which the popular representation might, for the moment, contravene the interests of the body of their constituents, and that those interests might be cherished in the second branch, and guarded, until the wishes of the people were more fully expressed, either by more decided representations, or by the means of new elections.

The second branch, as actually in existence, is in no way connected, in the majority of its members, with the superior and permanent interests of the country ; is not adapted to fulfil that end ; and even putting the case, of which as yet there has been no example, that a provincial administration were to send to it a majority of men of opposite principles, the following administration, or perhaps the same, might very soon hasten to recompense the body in such a way as to insure its approbation of their measures.

The habits, the climate, the newness of the country, the changeability of fortunes, the division of estates, and the laws which facilitate it, are obstacles to the existence of a permanent aristocracy ; so that an hereditary legislative body, with the powers of the House of Lords, would be simply an impossibility in Canada. Landed property being here almost wholly owned in small lots by the mass of the people, it would be impossible to make a choice so as to form a permanent Legislative Council, even supposing it to be a numerous one, of men who, in their own persons, would present an essential portion of the existing means and capital of the country ; much more, they could not counterbalance, in importance and in wealth, any one single county of the province ; and even supposing that such a body could be collected, the above-mentioned circumstances would very soon bring it into decay. In fact, several persons heretofore called to the Legislative Council, and who we may reckon then possessed a large and permanent

interest in the country, have since found themselves entirely destitute of fortune.

As to the idea of perforce creating an aristocracy through the medium of law, either by endeavouring to establish, upon a system of *substitutions* (entails), or otherwise, a state of things which the moral and physical circumstances in which the country is placed forbids, or by making provision out of the public funds for legislators for life, and without responsibility, it is one that is so contradictory to the known ideas of the constitution of England, as a practical model to go by, that your faithful and loyal subjects, who now most respectfully address Your Majesty, do not think it necessary to dwell upon it.'

With every word of this argument we fully concur; yet we are by no means disposed to arrive at the inference desired, viz. an elective House of Peers. No elected body, if liable to re-election or rejection, can be an independent body. If the same electors have to choose two Houses, without any other difference than the money qualification of those elected, both Houses, with that exception, will be counterparts of each other. The great object of having a second House, is to prevent the influences which govern the first House from leading to the enactment of rash and improper laws. If the same influences govern both Houses, that object can rarely be effected. To give independence, respectability, and public confidence to such second House, should be the great aim. Wealth will not give these—birth will not give these—all the nonsense that Papineau and the Canadian party talk about, of the necessity of wealth to form an aristocracy or second House, is sheer delusion. If the members of their Legislative Council really possessed such wealth, they would hate it ten times more, for it would be ten times more influential and mischievous. There might be a plan, however, for forming a Legislative Council, which would embrace all those objects, and which would, we think, be popular even with the French Canadians themselves. Our plan of future government would be as follows :

1. Let there be but one House of Assembly, or House of Commons for the whole of the British dominions in North America, to which representatives may be sent, according to population, from Lower Canada, Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, &c.

2. From such House of Assembly let an upper House, or Legislative Council, be formed, to consist, besides the present counsellors, of all members who have been returned for (say) 14 years by the same constituency. These gentlemen, enjoying public confidence, may be supposed to be devoted to public interests; and, with the experience they will have gained, may be fairly considered the best fitted to correct the errors of the lower House; and, being made independent of both the popular and the monarchial influences, by holding their seats for life, will

form the best and readiest court of appeal to which both may refer.

3. The Executive Council, and all placemen, save the Governor-General and his Secretary, should, as the present holders die, resign, or are dismissed, be North Americans by birth or adoption, and should sit in both Houses, or either House, as they might consider expedient from time to time; but must not be permitted to vote, and of course need not be returned by any constituency.

4. The three Estates so formed, to be enabled, by an act of the Imperial Legislature, to unite the British tenure of Canadian lands, "free and common socage," or which our readers will better understand as *freeholds* in fee, with the French law of descents, in cases of intestacy; so that, in seeking to induce them to abolish and abandon their feudal tenures, which promote fraud and prevent improvement, we may not deter them from so doing by the injustice and inhumanity of our laws of primogeniture.

5. To give to the House of Assembly so formed, the full and entire control and appropriation of all the Crown and other revenues, duties, &c. upon the distinct stipulation, that out of such revenues and duties, a permanent civil list should be forthwith passed.

6. To leave to such three Estates all questions regarding emigration, official responsibility, the Wild Lands, and the law of tenures for future settlers; but not to permit any existing tenure to be altered without the consent of all parties concerned.

7. To have no state or dominant church whatever; but leave all matters affecting religion or education, and the disposal of all funds for the objects of either, to the decision, appropriation, and apportionment of the House of Assembly and Legislative Council—the Executive Council and Governor not to be permitted to interfere in the matter.

8. To give local charters to the different towns and districts creating municipal bodies by popular elections, and giving to such municipal bodies so created the sole right of declaring and maintaining that mode of tenure which each may deem the fittest for its own locality.

We throw out these cursory and perhaps crude remarks with hesitation, but with great sincerity. We do not agree with the celebrated Jeremy Bentham, whose pamphlet is before us, in thinking it to be good for the mother country and good for her colonists, to be suddenly and for ever separated; we have old-fashioned prejudices in favor of "ships, colonies, and commerce"; and have no desire to leave two rival races to cut one another's throats in their struggles for supremacy. We may have spoken harshly of the selfish objects of the leaders of the French Canadians; if so, our only excuse is that we are Britons, and that we feel as Britons towards our countrymen, whose properties, if

not liberties and lives, would have been sacrificed, had those French Canadians triumphed. We may have expressed opinions contrary to some of the leading principles of our own Constitution; if so, our plea must be that we are REFORMERS, and disposed to advocate every sound and well-considered change, that may conduce "to the greatest happiness of the greatest number." We may have spoken somewhat contemptuously of the intelligence of a section of the Canadians; if so, we would not only make the *amende honorable*, but express a fervent hope, that they may frame such a Constitution for themselves, based upon such principles of popular rights; rejecting all the extrinsic glitter, and intrinsic guilt of our law of primogeniture; eschewing all fallacies of church craft and state craft; benefitting every one, without injuring any one;—that the experiment being triumphant there, the mother may at last learn of the daughter, and Great Britain, instead of trying to create hereditary law-makers in Canada may be taught how to reform or to dispense with those she has got at home.

Of the publications at the head of this article, we have only to add, that the "Reports of the House of Commons" are full of interesting facts, the Canadian portfolio full of special pleading and declamation, Mr. Clarke's pamphlet full of plain common sense, Jeremy Bentham's full of singularly expressed crotchets, and Lord Brougham's speech full of bitter personal sarcasm, having more to do with English Ministers than Canadian matters.

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#### ART. IX. BRIEF NOTICES.

*The English Martyrology, abridged from Foxe.* By CHARLOTTE ELIZABETH. 2 vol. London: Seeley and Burnside. 1837.

These volumes belong to the *Christian's Family Library*, and are well adapted to sustain the reputation, and to extend the usefulness of the series. The name of the venerable martyrologist, Fox, is familiar to every Englishman. His ponderous work was read with astonishing avidity at the time of its first publication, and was amongst the most successful weapons employed by Protestant zeal against the machinations of Rome. It produced probably a deeper and more extensive impression on the public mind than any other uninspired publication in our language. It was read from the palace of Elizabeth to the meanest cottage,—was patronized by nobles and prelates, and was regarded as a bulwark of the Reformation. All parties united in its praise, though the puritan bias of its author deprived him of the ferment to which he was so justly entitled. The present abridgment is a seasonable publication. It is executed with taste and judgment, is written in an attractive style, and cannot fail both to instruct and gratify. We regret to perceive that the fair authoress is but imperfectly acquainted with the principles of religious liberty. It was not

unnatural that the sainted Edward should refuse his sister permission to celebrate her religious rites. His education, and the circumstances of his times, fully account for his conduct. But it is much to be regretted, that in the present day his conduct should be justified, and the urgent entreaties of Cranmer and Ridley be represented as a sacrifice of truth 'to the pestilent doctrine of expediency.' Nor is justice done to the Catholics of the day. Bonner and Gardiner are undoubtedly to be ranked among the worst specimens of a bad class; but it must not be forgotten that they received harsh and cruel treatment from Edward's counsellors. They brought to the work of persecution the memory of grievous wrongs, and acted as bad men, under such circumstances, naturally would. In condemning therefore their conduct, during the reign of Mary, we must not forget their treatment under her brother.

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*The Magazine of Natural History, and Journal of Zoology, Botany, Mineralogy, Geology, and Meteorology.* Vol. I. New Series. Conducted by EDWARD CHARLESWORTH, F.G.S. London: Longman and Co. 1837.

Mr. Charlesworth is entitled to much credit for the manner in which he has sustained the character of the *Magazine of Natural History*. The circumstances under which he assumed the editorship were sufficiently discouraging, but we are glad to perceive from the general tenor of his preface, that he is 'nothing daunted.' It would be a disgrace to the British public generally, and to that section of it in particular which is interested in the researches of Natural History, if such a Journal were permitted to sink. It has done good service to one of the most instructive departments of human inquiry, and is yet fresh and vigorous. Such of our readers as are engaged in the studies embraced within its province, cannot do better than enrol themselves immediately among its subscribers.

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*The Secret Disciple encouraged to avow his Master.* By the REV. J. WATSON. London: Ward. 1838.

This small publication owes its origin to a series of lectures delivered by Mr. Watson, to his late charge at Union Chapel, Islington; and is admirably adapted to mature and perfect the impressions made by his ministry. His retirement from so important a sphere of labor is one of the mysteries of God's providence, but we are encouraged to hope, by the appearance of the present publication, that our Author will be enabled to fill up another and important department of labor, in which he may yet be greatly useful to the church of Christ. His present production is characterized by a mild, earnest, and persuasive style of address, eminently suited to engage the best feelings of the heart. Ministers and heads of families will do well to put it into the hands of those who are the objects of their solicitude and care.

*The Christian Warfare Illustrated.* By ROBERT VAUGHAN, D. D. London : Tract Society, 1838.

This is a valuable work, which we are glad to meet with in so portable and cheap a form. The Tract Society cannot better fulfil its vocation than by rendering such volumes accessible to all classes of the community.

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*An Elementary English Grammar, upon an entirely New Principle.* By W. H. PINNOCK. Effingham Wilson. 1837.

Mr. Pinnock has exploded many of the absurdities which abound in Murray's Grammar. Most of his exercises are rational. This is what cannot be said of Murray's. The book is divided into chapters and lessons. Some hints also are given to teachers, which cannot fail of being useful as long as teachers require to have words put into their mouths for them. The exercises are certainly the best we have seen.

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*The Pilgrim's Progress, from this World to that which is to come.* By JOHN BUNYAN. With a Memoir of the Author, by J. A. ST. JOHN, Esq. London : Rickerby. 1838.

A very neat edition of one of the most popular and useful works in our language. The Scripture passages referred to in the text are pointed out at the foot of the page, and an extended and carefully prepared Index is prefixed. Mr. St. John's sketch of the life and writings of Bunyan adds greatly to the value of the edition, though it fails to do full justice to the deep spiritual significance of the allegory.

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*A New Derivative and Etymological Dictionary of such English Words as have their origin in the Greek and Latin Languages.* By J. ROWBOTHAM, F.R.A.S. London : Longman. 1838.

This work is intended to explain such scientific and technical terms, as are not always to be found in common dictionaries, or are not fully illustrated. The words are arranged according to the number of syllables ; one, two, three, four, or five. The following extracts will serve as a specimen :

‘ *Clí-max*,  $\varsigma$ .— $\chi\lambda\mu\alpha\xi$  (klimax), a gradation or rising by steps. A figure in rhetoric in which a word that ends the first member of a sentence, begins the second member, and so on progressively.

‘ *Radí-cal*,  $\alpha$  and  $\varsigma$ .—*radix*, a root. Original, primitive ; fundamental.  $\varsigma$ . The source or foundation whence any thing originates ; a primitive word ; in *politics*, one who seeks fundamental changes in the constitution.’ The Greek derivations come first, then the Latin. The explanations may not always be complete ; but the book will be useful to those who know nothing of the learned languages.

## ART. X. LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

Preparing for early publication, under the patronage of the London Missionary Society, A History of Madagascar, in connexion with the Protestant Mission; from its Commencement in 1818 to the Present Time. With an Account of the Country, the Religion, Manners, and Customs of the Inhabitants, principally in the interior. By the Missionaries on the Island. Edited by the Rev. Wm. Ellis, Author of 'Polynesian Researches.' In 2 vols. 8vo., with Maps and Plates. Price not to exceed 30s. Subscribers' names received by Fisher, Son, and Co., London.

The Rev. H. F. Cary, so well known as the Translator of Dante and Pindar, is engaged in editing a series of the British Poets. The first volume, containing Pope's Poems and Translations, will shortly be published.

Thoughts on the Past and Present State of Religious Parties in England, including the Substance of a Discourse delivered at Union-street Chapel, Southwark, Jan. 2, 1838, by Professor Vaughan, D.D.

A History of the Fossil Fruits and Seeds of the London Clay. By James Scott Bowerbank, F.G.S. The subject of this work has been the study of Mr. Bowerbank for many years, during which time more than 120,000 specimens have passed through his hands. As many species as can with certainty be determined will be drawn and engraved by Mr. James de Carl Sowerby.

A Geographical and Comparative List of the Birds of Europe and North America. By Charles Lucian Bonaparte, Prince of Musignano.

A new Volume by Mr. Maunder, on the plan of his 'Treasury of Knowledge,' entitled The Biographical Treasury, &c., &c., which is said to contain about Ten Thousand Memoirs of Eminent Persons of all Ages and Countries, brought down to the present time, will appear during the month. Independent of the 'Lives,' there are about 3500 Maxims and Precepts, arranged in a similar manner to those in the preceding Work.

Literature and Art.—According to the Supplement to Bent's Monthly Literary Advertiser for 1837, which contains Alphabetical Lists of the New Books and Engravings published in London during last year, there appears an increase of New Publications, the Number of Books amounting to 1380, (1800 volumes,) exclusive of New Editions, Pamphlets, or Periodicals, being 130 *more* than in 1836. The Number of Engravings is 98, (including 38 Portraits,) 10 only of which are engraved in the Line manner, 71 in Mezzotinto, and 17 in Chalk, Lithography, &c.

Mr. Lister's 'Life of Edward, First Earl of Clarendon,' with Original Correspondence and Authentic Papers, never before published, is very nearly ready.

Dr. Lindley is about to publish a 'Flora Medica, or a Botanical Account of all the most remarkable Plants applied to Medical Practice in Great Britain and other Countries.' The work will embrace the medicinal uses for which the plants are known, careful descriptions of them, an investigation of the evidence upon which officinal substances have been assigned to particular species, and an adjustment of the nomenclature to the most correct botanical standard.

Mr. Bakewell is preparing a new edition of his 'Introduction to Geology,' corrected throughout.

Just Published.—The Pictorial History of England; being a History of the People as well as a History of the Kingdom. Illustrated with many hundred Wood-cuts of Monumental Records, Coins, Civil and Military Costume, &c., &c. Vol. I.

The Rural Life of England. By William Howitt. 2 vols.

The Miseries and Beauties of Ireland. By Jonathan Binns, Assistant Agricultural Commissioner of the late Irish Poor Enquiry. 2 vols.